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The study looked at three key areas of inquiry to assess the performance of contract farming of 
pigs in northern Vietnam in terms of how it enables market participation by smallholder pig 
producers in the changing market for pigs and pig meat in Vietnam. These areas included the 
identification of barriers to participation by smallholders in various forms of contract 
arrangements in pig production, the estimation of the costs and benefits of contract 
arrangements in terms of quantitative and qualitative indicators, and assessing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of contract arrangements by evaluating producer performance in terms of 
economic measures (profitability). 
 
Pig producers in Northern Vietnam may engage in formal or informal contractual arrangements 
or operate independently without entering into a contract arrangement. It was also revealed 
from field surveys and key informant discussions that informal contracts take many forms 
although two main types are prominent; informal contracts with cooperatives or informal 
contracts with traders of inputs, outputs or both. 
 
Formal contracts tend to favour short duration production cycles that have the potential to be 
made more intensive with appropriate coordination of production activities. On the other hand, 
informal contracts are largely driven by the scale of the pig herd. Informal arrangements for 
input supply and/or output purchases tend to be dictated by scale; input and output traders 
preferred to enter into contract agreements and trade with farmers who can generate large 
volumes of feed input requirements or can deliver significant volumes of piglets and/or pigs. 
This scale bias is potentially neutralized when traders deal with pig producer cooperatives. 
Cooperatives are generally intended to organize small producers to achieve some common 
production and marketing objective for each member. A much appreciated benefit that 
cooperatives provide to their members is protection from market and price risks. 
 
A farmer’s decision to engage in a formal contract was found to be driven by age, proportion of 
time spent in pig-raising, level of resource ownership and location, which likely captures the 
effects of the policy environment conducive to pig-raising including infrastructure and market 
conditions. A farmer’s choice to engage in informal contracts with cooperatives was also 
influenced by similar demographic characteristics though land was not a significant driver and 
variables related to transaction cost were more important. Engagement in informal contracts 
with cooperatives was significantly related to the distance to veterinary shops, a proxy for access 
to animal health services which are important inputs in pig production. In the case of 
participation in informal contracts with input/output traders, variables related to transaction cost 
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also appear to be significant drivers of farmers’ decisions,  while demographics and resource-
related variables do not appear to be important. Specifically, distance to VBARD (a proxy for 
access to formal credit) significantly influenced farmers’ decisions to engage in informal 
contracts with traders; this suggests that pig producers with limited access to formal sources of 
credit may ease this constraint by partnering with input/output traders who can provide credit in 
kind to sustain their pig production activities. Location variables were also significant drivers of 
farmers’ decisions to engage in informal contracts either with a cooperative or an input/output 
trader. 
 
Costs and benefits of contract arrangements were assessed quantitatively by estimating 
profitability (returns to labour) under various types of contracts and identifying qualitative 
indicators of benefits and costs. In the absence of available data on production and other costs 
from formal contract growers, comparisons were made between informal contracts and 
independent operators only. 
 
Empirical evidence from analysis of survey data suggest that informal contracts with either 
cooperatives or traders can facilitate higher returns in some specific production activities using 
specific technologies. In this study, it is shown that informal contracts appear to facilitate better 
returns in production of crossbreeds in farrow-to-weaning and grow-to-finish systems; these are 
both short duration systems that were also the preferred types for formal contracts by integrators. 
It should also be emphasized that in these two cases, the informal contracts were with 
cooperatives. For longer duration production cycles (farrow-to-finish), independent producers 
had higher returns to labour. Informal contracts with cooperatives also facilitated higher returns 
to labour among producers engaged in combination mode of production of crossbreeds. This 
can be rationalized by the fact that in combination systems, producers can engage in two types 
of short-cycle production processes: farrow-to-wean and grow-to-finish. 
 
Survey respondents identified the following benefits of participation in contract arrangements: 
access to quality inputs and services, access to financing, access to assured market for outputs, 
access to information about technology and technology transfer, protection from production and 
market risks, reduced transaction costs in input procurement and output marketing and, more 
importantly, reduced transaction costs arising from asymmetric information in product quality 
certification. This last benefit is important because it represents the lost sales that farmers could 
incur when the market does not recognize the quality of the product they bring to the market, 
assuming that there is quality differentiation. Key informant discussions revealed that informal 
contract arrangements with input suppliers can facilitate this third-party certification of output 
by pig producers who are linked with reputable feed distributors who usually assist their clients 
to search for market outlets for their products and negotiate prices. These linkages occurred at 
the farmer and cooperative levels; in the latter case, the cooperative had input supply 
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arrangements with a feed distributor. Farmers linked with cooperatives were also able to obtain 
protection from market risk as the cooperatives provided them with a market of last resort for 
their outputs when the market was down and it was difficult to sell pigs at the spot market 
without incurring substantial losses. The cooperatives were able to provide this service to their 
members through a collective fund contribution meant to provide resources to help stabilize 
prices and provide a buffer to members from the effects of market fluctuations. 
 
There is limited scope for smallholder pig producers to participate in formal contract agreements 
primarily because of the barrier due to scale, i.e. participation in formal contracts is not scale-
neutral. This scale requirement is largely due to profit and efficiency motives of the contractor. 
Efficiency can be derived from reduced monitoring costs, lower risks of default and economies 
of scale. This is because it is easier to monitor and supervise a few large farms than numerous 
small farms, large farms have more resources to invest and sustain their operations than small 
farms, and large farms have a lower cost per unit of input and services provision to contract 
growers. Hence, smallholder participation in formal contracts may be limited in the long term 
unless alternative forms of contracts can be developed that will provide the right incentives for 
the private-sector investor (contractor or integrator) to engage with smallholder producers. 
 
Meanwhile, alternative forms of informal contracts are emerging and have been observed to 
enable smallholder participation. These include informal contracts with cooperatives and 
informal contracts with input/output traders. Between the two, contracts with cooperatives have 
the potential for mitigating the scale bias inherent in formal contract agreements that are 
currently observed in Northern Vietnam. Some input traders have also indicated preference for 
contracting only with relatively larger pig production operations in order to generate substantial 
volumes for their feed supply or output supply businesses although information from survey data 
indicates that the proportion of small-scale producers among those having informal contracts 
with traders is relatively high. Traders also indicated that there was a higher incidence of 
contract violation among small farmers, hence many traders preferred to enter into contracts 
with large-scale farmers. 
 
Key areas for pro-poor public policy in addressing the issues of smallholder participation in 
contract farming and other forms of market coordination for improving smallholder 
competitiveness in pig markets are discussed. First, the potential to harness the informal linkages 
between traders and pig producers to develop more sustainable private-public partnerships will 
be worth investigating. There appears to be potential to extract public goods from a partnership 
that is founded on private profit motives. Specifically, with proper incentives, traders can bridge 
the gap in information asymmetry in output quality certification that will enable pig producers to 
be appropriately compensated for delivering quality pigs to the market by output buyers who 
will accept and pay for the informally certified pigs. However, this is only a second-best solution 
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in the short term to address the prevailing needs of smallholder pig producers. There is still the 
bigger policy issue of market power and this third-party certification may not work effectively 
where the market is a buyers’ market. Hence, the long-term interest of the public would be best 
served by establishing some form of product certification or infrastructure that will make it easy 
for smallholders to access and have the quality of their pigs assessed and certified (particularly 
for disease-free status or lean meat content) according to specific grading standards. In addition, 
complementary policies to address the need for infrastructure in markets and services (wholesale 
markets, transport and communication services, and inspection and storage facilities) will also 
be useful intervention points from the public sector, as well as co-financing arrangements that 
will promote private-sector investment in infrastructure. 
 
Meanwhile, there is still merit in facilitating partnerships between large farms/companies and 
smallholder pig producers instead of viewing the relationship in a confrontational manner. It is 
true that such partnerships, when properly designed and implemented, can generate 
employment especially to the large unemployed sectors in rural areas. They can also 
demonstrate new ways to diversify income and reduce risks, and establish new market outlets 
that otherwise may not be accessible to smaller farmers and from which they will subsequently 
benefit. Since this is largely an initiative that is private-sector led, public policy can provide an 
enabling environment for enforcement of laws on contracts, trade and labour, among other 
sectors, to support private-sector investment. 
 
Given the potential of cooperatives to facilitate profitable pig production by smallholders, public 
policy will need to consider how best to use this mechanism to help smallholder pig producers 
improve their competitiveness in the changing market for pigs and pig meat. Barriers to entry in 
cooperatives by smallholders are not as restrictive as those in formal contracts and to some 
extent in some informal contracts with traders. Scale-related barriers can be partly addressed by 
a general improvement in the overall conditions of the economic environment; this wil l  
facilitate higher productivity and possibly more asset accumulation in the long run. In the short 
term and in the absence of clear directions on how to tackle the scale barriers imposed by 
formal contracts, public policy can focus attention on enhancing smallholder opportunities to 
participate in informal contracts with cooperatives. This may include providing an enabling 
regulatory environment to facilitate formation of voluntary farmer groups as well as special 
assistance in training and capacity building of smallholder farmers in these producer 
organizations. 
 
Maintaining smallholder competitiveness in the changing market for pigs and pig meat remains 
an important development challenge, particularly in the context of pro-poor public 
policymaking. With the ongoing rapid changes in market organizations to respond to changing 
consumer demand and market requirements, there is little room for complacency when it comes 
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to identifying viable options for smallholders to remain active participants in the pig industry 
where they are substantially contributing in terms of total output. Continued research will be 
necessary in this regard to provide appropriate tools to inform the policy debate. In the current 
context of the policy debate on how to develop the livestock sector in general, future inquiries 
will need to be directed and adequately supported towards new knowledge on viable 
institutional options and market organizations that will continue to keep smallholders as viable 
and productive partners. 
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1. Rationale and Objectives of the Study 
 
Demand for and production of livestock products in Vietnam has been increasing rapidly over 
the past 15 years (1990-2005), and this trend is expected to continue, driven by rising income 
due to the strong growth performance of the economy in recent years, growing numbers of the 
human population, and increasing urbanization in the country.  The most significant source of 
growth comes from pig meat. In 2005, pig meat accounted for about 80% of total meat 
production, while the share of poultry meat is about 13% and all other kinds of meat including 
beef, buffalo, and goat accounted for 7%. The main explanation behind this dramatic growth of 
the pig sector has been use of better quality feeds, use of more high-yield lean meat hybrids and 
foreign swine breeding stocks, and investment by the private sector in slaughtering/processing 
stimulated largely by strong domestic demand.  Per capita consumption for pig meat is highest 
among all meat at an average rate of 6% kg per year. This rapid increase in demand for pig meat 
was induced by rising income (8% per year between 1990 to 2005) (see relationship of income 
and consumption in Figure 1), diversification of diets (brought about by increase in purchasing 
power at 5.4% per year over the same period), and population growth particularly in major 
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Figure 1. Pig meat consumption and income, 1990-2005 (constant at 2000) 
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In the international market, Vietnam’s main pork export is suckling pigs. Vietnam’s pork meat 
does not compete effectively in the global market because of health restrictions related to both 
animal and human health from other countries. Vietnamese pork has a lean meat ratio of about 
33.6% - 40.6 % in the north and 34.5%-42.6% in the south of Vietnam, which is very low 
compared to what the international markets require (about 60%) (Huong, N.T., 2005).  
Thus, the government is encouraging the development of capacity in producing high quality 
meat (high lean meat content) for domestic as well as export markets, through the development 
of modern, large-scale, commercial vertically integrated farms/companies. Further, the 
government is promoting commercial farms, which comprise 20% of total pig production in 
Vietnam, by having support programs such as reduced land rents, increased artificial 
insemination, and grants preferential tax rates for commercial farms, large-scale slaughter 
facilities and livestock processing factories (Huong, N.T., 2006). 
In the presence of these government policies that seem to favour large and commercial pig 
production and processing operations, what will happen to smallholders who supply 80% of 
total pig production in Vietnam? These smallholders typically own one or two sows and less 
than 10 fatteners and they depend heavily on pig production for their income and livelihood 
(Lapar et al., 2003).  As  markets demand for increased uniformity of product, which in turn 
requires the difficult to compete as it would require higher investments use of improved 
genetics, feeds, and animal health inputs, smallholders would find it. The poor state of basic as 
well as rural transport infrastructure not only raises the costs of marketing of livestock products 
significantly, but also raises the cost of individual market-entry investments in cooling and 
preserving infrastructure in production areas; 
A relative lack of access to market information on the part of smallholders further weakens the 
negotiating position of small production units. Furthermore, economies of scale in marketing 
and processing livestock products tend to favour integrated producers over independent ones.  
Finally, even if some smallholders would be able to produce objectively high-quality and 
reliable livestock products, they find it hard to gain access to market premia for quality and 
reliability because of infrequent and small amounts sold and the difficulty of differentiating their 
output from the mass of smallholder producers. In other words, there are high transaction costs 
that smallholders have difficulty of overcoming, thus inhibits their participation or entry into 
competitive markets. 
1.1. Contract farming as a mechanism in overcoming transaction 
costs barriers 
In many cases in Southeast Asia, contract farming has been shown to help smallholders 
overcome these high transaction costs in a changing and more remunerative domestic and 
export markets (Tiongco and Delgado, 2007).  Yet the history of contract farming is mixed, and 
characterized by a variety of institutional arrangements, largely dictated by local conditions, but 
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some of which are much more pro-poor than others.  The main lessons emerging from a review 
of experience in contract farming is summarized in Kirsten and Sartorius (2002). 
Producers would typically get involved in contracting in order to (1) gain access to output 
markets, (2) reduce capital investment; (3) gain access to information on prices and market 
behavior, technology, managerial skills, access to credit, and veterinary and extension services, 
resulting to lower marketing and transaction costs (in buying good quality feed and better 
growing stock), reduced price risk, efficient production thereby increasing income, improved 
coordination of product delivery, and optimum quality of the product (Pasour, 1998; Delgado et 
al., 2003; Glover, 1984; Delgado, 1999; Simmons, 2002, Tiongco and Delgado, 2007). 
Integrators, on the other hand, find contract farming attractive simply because they need to get a 
reliable supply and a consistent quality of output. As Glover (1987) simply puts, the integrators 
have considerable control over all the vertical stages of production including the inputs used, 
quality of the final product, and the timeliness of delivery of predetermined quantities. In 
addition, they can also avoid responsibility in complying with environmental regulations in 
production as it is passed on to the contract growers (Tiongco and Delgado, 2007).  
Therefore, those contracts that provide credit, technology, inputs, information, extension 
services and risk mitigation help producers improve production efficiency, develop commercial 
culture and augment income and employment (Glover and Kusterer 1990, Key and Runsten, 
1999, Holloway et al. 2000, Warning and Key 2002, Patrick 2004, Birthal et al. 2005, 
Ramaswami et al. 2006). 
Gulati et al. (2005) also noted that contract farming is the private sector solution to 
accomplishing credible certification of output quality in a way that distributes costs, benefits, 
and risks and in a manner that maintains incentives for all actors to participate. For example, 
Martinez and Zering (2004) stated that organizational arrangements can facilitate industry efforts 
to address pork quality needs by reducing sorting and grading costs, controlling quality 
attributes that are difficult to measure, facilitating adaptations to changing quality standards, and 
reducing transaction costs associated with relationship-specific investments in branding 
programs. 
1.1.1. Some empirical evidence from studies on contract farming in livestock in Asia 
In the Philippines, integrators would prefer to contract out with large-scale farmers (with a 
minimum holding of 200 piglets) than with smallholders to minimize costs in the delivery of 
inputs and services and in monitoring grower’s management on farm. With international 
certification for food quality and food safety of products, these integrators obtain better access to 
large supermarkets and other formal chains in the domestic market in the supply of better grade 
pig meat cuts, relative to smallholders (Costales et al., 2007).  
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Maharjan and Fradejas (2006) have shown that the cooperative enabled backyard pig producers 
to gain greater degree of accessibility to various production resources (animal stocks, feeds and 
veterinary supplies) and services (marketing), which consequently improved their pig raising 
operations leading to increases in income.  
The LEAD project on “Livestock Industrialization, Trade, and Social-Health-Environment 
Impacts in Developing Countries” conducted by FAO and IFPRI in 2002-2003 provided a 
controlled baseline study of the cost structures and relative competitiveness of independent 
smallholder and medium scale dairy and poultry operations in India, with comparison to some 
farmers under contract farming and cooperatives. The studies by Mehta et al. (2003) and Sharma 
et al. (2003) revealed that institutional development, such as contract farming, is a possible key 
to pro–poor livestock development in overcoming high transaction costs that smallholders face 
in securing quality inputs and getting market recognition for quality outputs (Delgado et al. 
2003).  
The findings of the LEAD project, suggest that contract farms producing broilers, and piglets and 
fattening pigs are more profit efficient than those farms operating independently. Further, they 
suggested that contract farming was a potential solution for smallholders to improve their market 
position and increase their household income to keep them competitive in a rapidly growing 
and changing livestock market. To understand better how these contractual arrangements have 
become more beneficial to smallholders in terms of how they affect profitability, a follow-up 
study was conducted by FAO and IFPRI in India on contract farming in milk and poultry 
production. In the case of broiler production, Fairoze et al (2006) found that contract farming’s 
major benefits come from reduction in transaction costs and assurance of regular income for 
broiler farmers. Results showed that independent broiler farmers obtained higher profit per unit 
of output than contract farms, but contract farmers had lower transaction costs and were 
insulated from market fluctuations as they were paid growing fees based on performance and 
not on market prices. In the case of milk production and marketing, Birthal et al (2006) found 
that contract farmers were obtained more profits per unit of output than independent farms. 
Smallholders derive significant benefits from contract farming in terms of reduced transaction 
costs and provision of services and technical advice from the integrators. Tiongco et al (2006) 
observed that an integrator’s transaction costs are incurred on a per grower basis and do not 
depend on the size of the farm, which makes it valid for them to contract out with larger farms 
in order to lower their cost of procurement or to lower cost of default. The results of this study 
provides empirical evidence to the criticism that contract farming discriminates against 
smallholders so as to avoid costs of negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of contracts with a 
large number of them (Glover and Kusterer 1990, Little and Watts 1994, Key and Runsten 1999, 
Singh 2002; Camargo Barros et al. 2003). 
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1.1.2. Some results from Vietnam’s experience in contract farming arrangements 
In the case of Vietnam, contract farming is a relatively new development in the pig sector. The 
concept of contract farming is strongly supported by the Vietnam government. This support 
includes Decision 80/2002/TTg on contract farming which regulates the mechanisms and 
policies for promoting the consumption of agricultural products through signed contracts 
between enterprises and farmers and which promotes cooperation between the “four houses” 
namely the state, farmers, researcher and enterprises. This support for contract farming is linked 
with government support for the development of “new cooperatives” to organize smallholder 
production. 
Since the enactment of the Law on Cooperatives in 1997, a large number of new cooperatives 
have been formed, and many old cooperatives have been updated. However, the majority of 
both old and new cooperatives are still involved in providing inputs and other services, rather 
than in marketing of outputs. If cooperatives are to play a role in supporting smallholder 
involvement in value chains and contracting, then they need to have a greater focus on 
marketing of output. Producers need to have good mechanisms for coordination to market 
outlets to ensure the consistent delivery of their products to the market to meet fluctuations in 
the market demand. 
Recent experiences have largely been in crops where results are mixed (ADB 2005) and 
experiences in livestock have not been adequately documented to date. On example is the 
project conducted by the Agrarian Systems Department (VASI) to promote farmers' participation 
in the evolution of production and in collective incorporation, from which the farmers could 
derive economies of scale in input procurement, production, and sale of the products (Anh D.T 
and Binh V.T, 2003). The result of this project confirmed that farmers in the project sites were 
successfully integrating veterinary services, fodder production, credit, and input-output sale. The 
farmers in each group have common a objective to discuss on the elaboration of a collective 
production technology in order to produce the homogenous quality product. This helps farmer 
to organize the common sale by group in contract system. 
In the absence of legal agricultural contracts, the contract farming through development of 
cooperative seems to be the most suitable form for small farmers in North Vietnam as 
exemplified by Lam Son sugar-mill in Thanh Hoa. The model helps reduce transaction costs in 
production and marketing through effective co-ordination in the procurement of inputs and 
delivery of services, thereby benefiting from economies of scale and timely delivery, as well as 
in organizing the collective sale through harmonization of the product quality and harvest.   
In An Giang, the model for agriculture contracts has already been developed in various forms 
since 2001. According to Nguyen Tri Khiem (2005), in order to help farmers, processors, and 
traders in production and selling/buying products, the provincial government proposed six types 
of contract (assessed through the determination of price) at different levels, namely: (a) contract 
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with agreed price at time of delivery; (b) contract with floor price; (c) contract with fixed price; 
(d)  contract for input provision and product purchase with fixed complementary price; (e) 
contract for animal husbandry, and (g) contract with guaranteed production cost and purchase 
price according to instruction. Total agricultural production using signed contracts in 2004 
increased significantly compared to 2003, nearly double in the case of rice and a 30% increase 
in the case of aqua products. Although the growth is fast, it still accounts for a small percentage 
of the total production capacity. 
Anecdotal evidence from the value chain studies conducted under the Making markets work 
better for the poor projects for tea and cassava revealed that there are three main issues that 
compromise the effectiveness of contract farming schemes in Vietnam (ADB 2004). First, farmers 
have been accused of reneging on contracts when higher prices are offered from traders. This 
has particularly been the case in cassava, where large factories have had difficulties procuring 
consistent volumes of cassava from producers who tend to prefer sales to traders with more 
transparent buying arrangements. Second, when buyers are faced with oversupplies of products 
from contracted producers, quality standards are sometimes tightened so processors can reject 
unwanted output. Third, knowledge of contractual obligations by parties in the contract is often 
lacking.  
Other issues with contracts under Decision 80-TTg have been product-specific. In tea, contracts 
are sometimes procurement contracts that are not based on price, which disadvantaged farmers 
linked to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the market downturn in 2003. Contracts have 
largely failed in cassava, as most are made between factories and traders, with limited 
coordination with producers. While there is rationale for making contracts with traders, due to 
lower monitoring costs, the end result has been inconsistency in both quality and volumes 
delivered. Fourth, problems in contract enforcement need to be addressed.  Specifically there is 
a need to improve enforcement among all parties in the contract.  Contracts require the 
development of both formal and informal enforcement mechanisms that bind parties to the pre-
agreed conditions embodied in a contract. And the further elaboration of the roles of the public 
and private sector is necessary. Clearly, the public sector has a major role to play in terms of 
improving laws and the means to enforce them. In addition, the private sector needs to work 
with the government to help inform government to develop laws and regulatory frameworks that 
promote contracts and facilitate business relationships. 
Hence, for contracts to be successfully implemented in Vietnam, it is important to understand 
how different forms of contract farming overcome transaction cost barriers that are net losses to 
both buyers and sellers, and distribute the risks, costs, and returns to contract farming between 
small-scale/poor producers and integrators.  
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1.2. Vietnam as an entry point for the contract farming study 
Vietnam presents a particularly appealing opportunity for a case study for looking at the impacts 
of institutional innovations such as contract farming on poverty alleviation.  First, it is a country 
in transition from central planning to a market-oriented economy and the process of 
liberalization and its accompanying institutional adjustments have been more extensive and 
more rapid than in most other nations.  Vietnam has recently joined the WTO, which will have 
implications on getting access to export markets as well as opening up the pig sector to more 
intense competition with more efficient trading partners. Second, it has exhibited strong 
economic growth during the last decade of reforms, which creates significant opportunities as 
well as threats of displacement for smallholders.  Third, the livestock sector is expanding, and 
together with aquaculture, has increased its contribution to at least one-third of total increases in 
agricultural revenues (Vietnam Development Report 2001).  Fourth, livestock is an important 
source of income among rural households, where poverty incidence is relatively high, with pig 
production constituting the main component of livestock economic activity.   
These development trends present opportunities for income gains through participation in this 
remarkable growth and expansion, but may also mean a threat to traditional producers and 
suppliers of pigs and pig meat if they are excluded or displaced from the changing markets.  For 
example, the smallholder production systems generally have limited access to input supplies 
and services. On the other hand, public policies support the development of large commercial 
livestock production systems for pigs and provide investment incentives, as well as open 
importation of breeding animals and veterinary inputs largely by state-owned enterprises.  Thus, 
there is a potentially critical inconsistency of current policies with the ultimate objective of 
reducing poverty.  Appropriate institutional arrangements that will keep smallholder p ig  
producers in the game will be of utmost importance if the twin goals of poverty reduction and 
equitable distribution of the gains of economic growth will be achieved in Vietnam.  This study 
therefore investigates the validity of these concerns, and seeks to make a significant contribution 
to policy and institutional change aimed at a more equitable development of the pig sector.  
1.3. Objectives of the Study 
This project seeks to characterize and quantify the economic costs and benefits of contractual 
arrangements used in pig production in Northern Vietnam. The end objective is to identify a set 
of policy and intervention options for the facilitation of profitable market-oriented livestock 
farming partnerships, and to understand barriers to participation of smallholders in contractual 
arrangements. 
In particular, this study seeks to: 
1. Identify and characterize the different forms of existing contractual arrangements in pig 
production in Northern Vietnam; 
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2. Identify the determinants of participation of producers in contractual arrangements for 
pig and piglet production; 
 
3. Identify the scale bias of particular contractual arrangements and analyze their 
implications on smallholder producers’ participation in mainstream markets of slaughter 
hogs and pig meat; 
 
4. Quantify and compare production costs and net returns under various contractual 
arrangements between producers and their market intermediaries, across various types 
of pig production activities;  
 
5. Assess and evaluate the broader institutional and policy environment to guide and 
facilitate the use of particular contractual arrangements for pigs and piglet production 
that have potentials in efficiently integrating smallholders in pig and piglet production 
to mainstream for the development of policies and institutions towards a more equitable 
growth and development of the pig sector in Vietnam; 
 
1.4. Hypotheses of the Study 
The study has the following hypotheses: 
1. Producers that are more likely to participate in contract arrangements are those that have 
higher levels of physical assets and human capital; 
2. Participants in contract arrangements in pig production have higher scale of production than 
non-participants; 
3. Participants in contract arrangements incur lower costs of production per unit of output than 
non-participants in various types of pig production activity; 
4. Participants in contract arrangements have better access to production inputs, services and 
output markets than non-participants;  
5. Participants in contract arrangements have higher net income per unit of output from pig 
production compared to non-participants, in various types of pig production activity. 
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2. Research methodology 
The research methodologies employed in this study can be divided into methodologies for data 
collection and data analysis. These are briefly described below. 
 
2.1. Data collection approaches 
The nature of information that was required for the study dictated the data collection 
approaches that were subsequently employed. The data collection involved two approaches: 
focus group discussions and structured surveys. 
 
2.1.1. Focus group discussions 
The study used focus group discussions to get opinions of key stakeholders such as farmers with 
contracts, independent farmers, input suppliers, output buyers and other market-mediating 
actors in the areas where the surveys were conducted. Focus group discussions were conducted 
before implementing the farm and trader surveys.  The respondents of the focus group 
discussions included officials of the various departments and research institutes of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development that are engaged either directly or indirectly with 
livestock R&D initiatives.  Other groups interviewed for were provincial and district officials of 
the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development offices, officials of cooperatives engaged 
in livestock-related activities, first-level input suppliers and output traders, formal contract 
growers of pigs, large pig producers engaged in sub-contracting with smaller pig producers, and 
independent pig producers.   
 
The results of the focus group discussions were used to help the project team to identify sample 
respondents (farm households and trader respondents) for the survey.  In addition, information 
about contract arrangements were used to construct a typology of various contract types, 
ranging from the more formal to the case of no contract, that are typical in Northern Vietnam.  
 
2.1.2. Structured survey 
Surveys of pig producers and input and output traders were conducted using structured 
questionnaires that were developed and tested before being implemented in the field (see Annex 
1 for the survey questionnaires). Among the variables collected were: 
· household characteristics such as age, gender, education, experience and training received 
· various asset-related variables 
· credit access and information 
· inputs used, such as feeds and growing stocks 
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· volume and prices of inputs and outputs 
· location characteristics, such as distance to nearest market and proximity to waterways and 
highways 
· types of roads 
· input/output policy subsidies received 
Household and farm related variables were to be used for modelling the decision of households 
to participate or not participate in which types of contract arrangements.  Farm related variables 
were also to be used for cost and return analysis of pig production in Northern Vietnam. 
 
Market chain information was also collected using structured interviews of traders and market-
mediating institutions or organizations (i.e. integrators or contractors) to obtain information on: 
· costs and market prices along the supply chain 
· transport costs 
· other transaction costs 
· traders’ selling prices 
· retail prices 
· grading of outputs 
· differentiation of products 
· marketing margins and value addition 
· strategies for selecting contract farmers 
The information obtained from the survey of traders were also used to construct the supply 
chains used by pig producers in Northen Vietnam. 
 
2.1.3. Limitations of the survey of market actors 
There were no integrator companies that are currently engaged in contract growing schemes 
with pig producers in Northern Vietnam that were willing to be interviewed as a respondent for 
the market actor survey.  Hence, no comparable information on the activities of integrators 
engaged in formal contract growing schemes and the nature of these contract arrangements 
were directly obtained from the integrators themselves.  Where available, information about 
these was inferred from responses from the farmers who were contract growers of these 
integrators, although these were limited, thereby making the analysis of formal contract growing 
arrangements from the view point of the market intermediary, i.e., the integrator, themselves not 
feasible given the available information from the survey. 
2.2. Methodology for data analysis 
Survey data were analyzed using descriptive statistical tools to describe characteristics of survey 
respondents and reveal similarities and differences across contractual arrangements engaged in 
by the respondents and pig production systems. Where appropriate and necessary, statistical 
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tests were performed to validate the statistical robustness of observed similarities and 
differences. 
 
Quantitative data on production were analyzed to reveal the production cost structure of pig 
production under different production systems and under varying degrees of contract 
engagement. Subsequent cost and returns analysis determined the profitability of pig production 
according to type of contractual arrangements and type of production technology, mainly in 
terms of the breed of pigs raised. 
 
Econometric analysis using limited dependent/qualitative response models was performed to 
assess the barriers to participation by smallholders in contractual arrangements. The 
econometric analysis was intended to identify the drivers of participation in various types of 
contractual arrangements. 
2.2.1. Transaction costs in pig production and marketing and the role of contracting 
There are two main streams of economic thought that underpin the analysis of the role of 
contracts in agriculture.  On stream of thought is founded on agency theory that espouses the 
risk-shifting hypothesis based on the following assumptions:  (1) the producer (the agent) is risk 
averse and the buyer (the principal) is risk neutral, and (2) output depends on the producer’s 
effort and other exogenous factors, and only the producer can shirk (thereby creating moral 
hazard).  Hence, the economic outcome of these relationships will necessitate incentives that 
will induce an appropriate balance of risk avoidance (Cheung 1969; Stiglitz 1974).  The 
evidence of this risk-shifting hypothesis from empirical studies is thin, with empirical findings 
indicating little support for risk as a determining factor in contract choice (Leffler and Rucker 
1991; Allen and Lueck 1995, Hobbs 1997; Hudson and Lusk 2004). 
 
The second stream of thought is founded on transactions cost theory that negates the assumption 
that contracts are costless to write and implement, as in the principal-agent model.  Under the 
transactions costs model, it is asserted that writing and fulfilling contracts is not without costs, 
particularly in terms of monitoring and enforcement that will mitigate potential impacts of 
opportunistic behaviour (Coase 1937; Williamson 1979; Hart 1995; Klein, Crawford and 
Alchian 1978; Hudson and Lusk 2004). 
 
Williamson (1979, 1975) provides more recent and fuller development in transaction cost 
theory including a discussion of the role of investment characteristics and frequency of 
transaction (and the ensuing transaction costs) on the type of contract selected.  Williamson’s 
model would suggest that a relational contract would emerge, likely via unified governance, 
given the increased idiosyncratic investment and greater frequency of transactions between 
contractor and farmer as the operation increases in scale. 
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According to Williamson (1979), transaction costs arise due to communication breakdowns, 
imperfect information, incomplete contract stipulation, and ambiguous entitlements.  
Transaction cots decrease on a per unit basis with size of operation, in general.  Transaction 
costs can change due to the nature of how the inputs are procured and the outputs sold.  
Information, negotiation, and monitoring costs are some of the common transaction costs 
incurred in livestock production (Hobbs 1997).  Larger farmers are likely to incur decreasing 
unit costs associated with collecting price information and negotiating transactions due to their 
relatively higher frequency of animal sales.  Monitoring costs on the other hand may increase 
with size of operation.  Hence, while contracts may reduce information and negotiation costs, 
monitoring costs per unit may remain invariant to size of operation or increase with size. 
 
On the other hand, task programmability (or the ability of a function such as raining hogs to be 
engineered such that measured inputs result in a certain level of output) reduces monitoring 
costs (Davis and Gillespie 2007).    Higher task programmability may therefore lead to lower 
monitoring costs since effort may be directly measured by output.  Task programmability is 
generally higher in more specialized operations than non-specialized operations, allowing 
contractors to develop less costly monitoring systems. 
 
Hold up costs can also significantly impact transaction costs (Davis and Gillespie 2007).  Hold 
up costs are costs associated with one party providing less input to keep the facility operating at 
optimal capacity (such as the contractor refusing to supply enough hogs to the farmer) and/or 
the latter party providing less capacity than is needed by the former party.  For example, a 
contractor may incur this cost if there are not enough farmers with available space to maintain a 
consistent flow of pigs that need finishing.  The hold up problem may thus arise when parties 
invest in specific assets prior to entering the contract to prepare for the transaction, or there is 
some degree of uncertainty as to the timing, quantity, or quality of the product production under 
the transaction (Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978; Rogerson1992; Hennessy and Lawrence 
1999). 
 
Opportunism could also become a problem for producers with contracts (Davis and Gillespie 
2007).  Producers under incentive payment contracts who fail to increase earnings due to low 
feed efficiency and high mortality rates may choose to search for contractors who offer 
contractual arrangements with high base payments and low bonus incentives or flat-fee 
contracts.  The reverse effect can be applied to producing hogs under flat-fee or no incentive 
payment contracts, were under such cases, producers may leave their present contractor in 
search of a more lucrative contract consisting of profit sharing between the producer or 
contractor, or contracts that include a base payment plus bonuses based on death loss and feed 
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efficiency.  These changes in contractual arrangements are more likely to affect contractors than 
producers. 
 
Financial constraints faced by farmers are also cited as incentives to enter into a contractual 
arrangement.  Specifically, contracting can relieve a binding credit constraint for some 
producers, thereby freeing them to invest or apply inputs at a more efficient level (Key and 
McBride 2003).  On the other hand, since contractors usually supply a large share of production 
costs, contracting may drastically reduce the amount of production credit needed by producers. 
 
Contracts generally reduce price risk by guaranteeing a payment ahead of time per head 
produced.  On the other hand, farmers may incur contract risk because the contractor may 
default on the agreement of deny contract renewal due to unsatisfactory performance.  Hudson 
and Lusk 2004 show that in addition to transaction costs, risk avoidance is also an important 
determinant of contract choice and the effects of both are relative.  Thai is, if the marginal utility 
of transaction costs outweigh the marginal utility of risk-shifting, the observed relationship in an 
ex post setting should indicate that transaction costs drove the decision to contract. 
 
The analytical framework for transaction cost analysis 
Transactions cost theory under the New Institutional Economics framework explains the 
existence of and rationale for contract farming as a response to the problems of market failure 
and missing markets that arise from asymmetric information and other factors that impact 
transactions costs (Williamson 1985; Eggertson 1990; North 1990).  Previous work has 
developed the reasons for market failure and optimal form of coordination to address each of 
them (Minot 1986; Grosh 1994; Key and Runsten 1999; Kirsten and Sartorius 2002). 
 
These market failures include imperfect markets for information, specifically the asymmetry in 
information about product quality that is not efficiently transmitted via traditional price 
mechanisms (Akerlof 1970); and imperfect factor markets (e.g., land, credit, labor, inputs and 
services) where, again, asymmetric information prevents the efficient allocation of factors of 
production. For example, shirking, cheating, reneging, incomplete contracts, ill-defined property 
rights, and information and agency costs give rise to transactions costs, thereby preventing 
automatic evolution of optimal rules.  Consequently, property rights and how they are defined 
will determine economic behaviour.  This has implications on the types of organization and 
institutional arrangements that can effectively facilitate optimal economic behaviour from the 
point of view of equity and sustainability. 
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Indicators for assessing effectiveness of contract arrangements mitigating TCs 
Motivations for entering into contract agreements for pig production vary and will depend on 
the individual preferences and situations of farmers.  Subsequently these will generate varying 
degrees of effectiveness in mitigating transaction cost associated barriers to contract 
participation.  Masakure and Henson (2005) identified four types of factors that could potentially 
impact contract engagement, particularly by smallholders.  These include market uncertainty, 
indirect benefits such as access to new opportunities, direct income benefits, and intangible 
and/or latent benefits such as enhanced social status in the community.  Consequently, a 
typology of farmers with contracts was developed that illustrate the heterogeneity of drivers in 
contracting.  Specifically, the typology includes groups that are motivated to contract due to 
market drive (or specifically market uncertainty), direct “income” impacts, farm-level impacts, 
and overall impact (without focusing on a specific driver). 
 
Impacts arising from market drive or market uncertainty are important to farmers with relatively 
small-scale operations and have difficulty accessing markets for their product primarily because 
of their geographical location (i.e., away from the center of growth in their communities.  The 
group of farmers motivated by direct impacts of contracting (in terms of income and reduced 
market uncertainty are also relatively small-scale operators with relatively larger land sizes but 
which are not optimally utilized due to capital constraints.  Farm level impacts on the other 
hand refer to indirect benefits of contracting such as skills acquisition and the intangible benefits 
of self-satisfaction and esteem.  Farmers who belong to this cluster have relatively larger land 
sizes and easier access to markets.  Lastly, the overall impact of contracting is driving some 
farmers into contract arrangements due to the overall assessment of being in a better off state 
compared to that without contract.  Within this group are farmers who generally have larger 
land sizes and easier market access. 
2.2.2. Determinants of participation in contracts 
 
The generat theoretical model 
The random utility model for contract choice is used to explain an individual pig producer’s 
choice over substitute contract arrangements in pig production in Northern Vietnam. The utility 
from engaging in a contract arrangement is specified as a function of the “quality” of the 
contract as measured by the characteristic of the choices and the individual making the choices. 
These functions are estimated using Multinomial Logit which imposes the Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternative Assumption (IIA). Assuming that an individual producer i faces m 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive alternatives, we can represent the derived utility from 
choosing alternative j as 
(1)  U ij =V ij + e ij   
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where  V ij   is the non-stochastic component of the total utility function and  e ij  is the random 
and unobservable component.   V ij  depends on the characteristics of alternatives (the types of 
contract arrangements) and the decision maker (the producer) and is typically specified as linear 
in parameters with  V ij = X ij b .  X ij  is a vector of observable characteristics as perceived by 
an individual producer i that affect the utility from choosing the contract arrangement j.  The 
choice,  y ij = j
R S
, is expressed using random utility function as: 
(2)  U ij ³ maxk 2C i,k = j U ij   
The individual producer chooses an contract( arrangement that provides greater level of utility 
from a set of choices.  Considering such a discrete choice problem where the most preferred 
choice is observed, the probability of that choice is expressed as 
(3) P yi = j =




exp X. ij b
b cffffffffffffffffffffffffff  
where  y i  is the set of choice variables that contains the possible contract arrangement 
alternatives for each producer.  The log likelihood function is expressed as 





d ij ln p y i = j
B C
  
where d ij = 1 if individual producer i chooses an alternative contract arrangement j and 0 
otherwise. 
In the multinomial logit model, regressors do not vary across choices. Coefficients are estimated 
for any choice where one of the choice (j) variables is treated as a base category where the 
corresponding  b i  is constrained to zero. 
Since the dependent variable is the log of ratio of proportion of choices, interpreting the 
coefficients directly is difficult.  Consequently, marginal effects are estimated at the mean levels 






y ij b jx
f g
y ij   
where b jx  is the coefficient of characteristic x for contract arrangement alternative j.  The 
marginal effects in the multinomial logit model are not monotonic and may depend on the point 
of evaluation.  They can also differ in sign from the coefficients. 
 
Empirical specification 
The choice of contractual arrangement is modelled as the probability that a pig producer will 
choose one of the four alternatives (formal contract, informal contract with cooperative, 
informal contract with traders or no contract/being independent) and is depicted as a binary 
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dummy variable that takes the value 1 under each alternative and 0 otherwise.  A pig producer’s 
decision to engage in a particular form of contractual arrangement (among the available 
alternatives) for pig production is hypothesized to be affected by socio-demographic factors, 
asset holdings, access to inputs and services, and location. 
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3. Overview of the Vietnam Pig Sector 
Vietnam experienced very rapid overall economic growth in the 1990’s, profiting from the 
considerable growth potentials unleashed by doi moi reforms in 1986, achieving around 5.7 
percent annual per capita income growth, outpacing that of many developing countries (Klump, 
2007). The rapid rate of income growth accompanied the increase in demand for meat, with per 
capita consumption doubling within 15 years between 1990 and 2005. As shown in Figure 2, 
among the eight Southeast Asian counties, growth in per capita consumption was most 
impressive in Vietnam, where by 2005, it now ranked 3rd in the level of per capita consumption 




























































Source: FAOSTAT 2007. 
Figure 2. Per capita consumption of meat among Southeast Asian countries, 1990 and 2005 (in 
kg/capita/year) 
Pig meat occupies the largest segment of meat consumption in Vietnam, with around 98 percent 
of households consuming the commodity, and has an income elasticity of demand estimated at 
around 1.04 (Tung, et al., 2005). The growth in demand for pig meat has likewise induced a 
rapid growth in the production side. Smallholders (holding 1 to 3 sows) account for the bulk of 
pig production in Vietnam (80%), with most of these households working on small farms in the 
rural areas (Ibid., 2005). The continued growth in the pig sector of Vietnam presents an 
opportunity for income growth among rural households, where poverty still remains more 
prevalent. Poverty incidence in rural areas is 27.5 percent as estimated by the VHLSS 2004, in 
contrast to 10.8% among urban households (Klump, 2007). The potentials for pro-poor growth 
in the livestock and pig sector in Vietnam, however, depends on whether smallholders and their 
market intermediaries along the supply chains remain competitive in the market for live pigs and 
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pigmeat, in both cost of production and marketing, and in output quality, as mainstream markets 
not only grow but also as urban consumers and formal market chains demand additional 
requirements on product quality and food safety. 
3.1. Growth of the Livestock Sector with Agriculture, 1990-2005 
As the Vietnamese economy grew in the last 15 years, so did the agriculture and the rural 
economy. Figure 3 shows that compared to the growth of the Industry and Services sectors, the 
combined Agriculture-Forestry-Fishery sector grew at a much slower pace. The slower growing 
sector has a more dominantly rural linkage. Over the period 1993 to 2002, the pace of poverty 
reduction was also slower in rural areas (-6.7% per annum) as compared to that in urban areas (-






















Source: GSO and CAP IPSARD, 2007 
Figure 3. Annual rates of growth in GDP and component sectors of the economy, Vietnam, 
1990-2005 (in real terms, at 1994 constant prices) 
Within Agriculture (outside Forestry and Fisheries), the two main sub-sectors - Crops and 
Livestock, exhibited different trajectories of growth as shown in Figure 1. Over the decade of 
1990-2000, both the crops and livestock sectors grew at almost the same pace, contributing to 
and average annual growth of around 5.8 percent in agriculture. In the last half-decade (2000-
05), however, the crops and livestock sub-sector followed different growth paths. As shown in 
Table 1, the livestock sector carried the overall growth in agriculture, accelerating at around 
6.4% per annum, tempering the slow down in growth in the crops sector (to 4.2% per annum). 
although the crops sub-sector still dominates in terms of contribution to value of agricultural 
output, the stronger growth in the livestock sector has resulted to steady gains in the share of 
livestock to agriculture value-added, from 16.8 percent in 1990 to close to 19 percent by 2005 
(FAOSTAT 2007). As one of the strongest sources of growth in agriculture, the livestock sub-
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sector presents opportunities for rural farm households to benefit from such continued strong 
growth. Even as the crops sub-sector remains to occupy the more dominant position in the 
agricultural and rural economy, as growth opportunities have been slowing down, the greater 
becomes the importance of livestock in the years to come. 
 
Table 1. Growth in gross value added in livestock, crops and agriculture, Vietnam, 1990-2005 
(in real terms, in '000 international dollars) 
Years Livestock Crops All Agriculture
1990-2000 5.9 5.8 5.8
2000-2005 6.4 4.2 4.6  
Source: FAOSTAT 2007 
3.2. The Dominance of Pig Production in the Livestock Sector  
The Vietnam livestock sector consists of mainly the pig, chicken, and cattle sub-sectors, 
accounting for around 92 percent of total livestock output, in metric tons, liveweight. The rest 
consists of small ruminants and other poultry. The pig sub-sector has traditionally been the 
dominant component, and in the last 15 years, has even more strongly consolidated its position. 
As shown in Table 2, the share of pig meat to total livestock output progressively increased from 
65 percent in 1990 to 72 percent in 2005. In contrast, while the share of chicken meat output 
dramatically improved between 1990 and 2000, the expansion was arrested over the period 
2000 to 2005, with the Asian avian flu crisis in 2004-05 also imposing a toll in chicken 
production in Vietnam. The period also showed the steadily declining shares of cattle output 
and other livestock. The trends show that pig production will continue to be a major component 
of livestock production activity in Vietnam, and that rural smallholder pig producers, which 
account for the greater bulk of pigmeat output in Vietnam, and their market intermediaries along 
the market chain, can benefit from continued growth in the livestock sector as a whole. 
 
Table 2. Changes in the composition of livestock output in Vietnam, 1990-2005 (in percent of 
total volume of output) 
Year Pig Chicken Cattle Others Total
1990 65 11 14 10 100
2000 68 14 9 9 100
2005 72 12 8 8 100  
Source: FAOSTAT 2007-10-24 
The changing composition of livestock output stems from the differential rates growth in the 
various components of the livestock sub-sector. As Table 3 shows, the acceleration of annual 
rate of growth in total livestock output from the last decade (6.2%) to the first half of this decade 
(8.4%) is attributable mostly to the acceleration in the growth of output in the pig industry. 
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While output growth in the chicken industry was the most rapid in the last decade, this rate of 
growth was not carried over into this decade, with the Asian avian flu crisis of 2004-05 
negatively affecting both consumption and production. As the government of Vietnam and its 
international partners continue to make inroads in the control of avian flu outbreaks, and as 
consumer perceptions regain confidence in the safety of poultry products in the market, growth 
in the chicken sector is expected to rebound.  
In contrast to behaviour of the growth in chicken output, although pig production was already 
growing at a rapid rate in the decade of the 1990s (6.8% per year), growth even more 
accelerated in the first half of this decade (10.2%). Thus, among the industries in the livestock, it 
is the pig sector which offers the greater prospects to stakeholders in production and along the 
marketing chains for income improvements through market participation in the broadest sense.  
 
Table 3. Comparative growth rates of production in major components of the livestock sector, 
Vietnam, 1990-2005 (in percent per year) 
Period Pig Chicken Beef Others All Livestock
1990-2000 6.8 8.6 1.2 5.1 6.2
2000-2005 10.2 1.7 6.8 4.7 8.4
Source: FAOSTAT 2007 
3.3. Meat Consumption Patterns 
As pig raising is the dominant economic activity on the production side of the livestock sector of 
Vietnam, this primacy is also reflected on the consumption side. The very rapid rise in the per 
capita consumption of meat in Vietnam from 1990 to 2005 could largely be attributed to the 
expansion in pig meat consumption. Figure 4 tracks the 3-year average per capita consumption 
levels of the main meat commodities in Vietnam over three periods, 1990, 2000 and 2005, with 
the dominance of pig meat consumption quite evident.  Although all meat types, except beef, 
showed significant increases in per capita consumption, sustained expansion through the first 
half of this decade was more evident the pig meat consumption.  
















Source: FAOSTAT 2007 
Figure 4. Average per capita consumption of major meat commodities in Vietnam, 1990, 2000, 
and 2005 (in kg in 3-year averages) 
The differences in growth performance in per capita meat consumption among the various meat 
commodities are shown on Table 4. Except for beef, all meat commodities showed strong 
growth over the decade of the 1990s. Between 2000 and 2005, however, only consumption of 
pig meat showed an acceleration in growth, with the respective rates in the other commodities 
not even half that of pig meat consumption over this period. Thus, over the period 2000-2005, 
the similar recorded growth acceleration in overall meat consumption could be attributed to the 
continued strong demand for pig meat. 
 
Table 4. Growth rates in per capita consumption meat consumption in Vietnam, by 
commodity, 1990-2005 (in percent per year) 
Year Pig meat Chicken Beef Others All Meat
1990-2000 5.1 5.9 -0.7 5.7 4.6
2000-2005 8.1 2.2 2.7 2.4 6.2  
Source: FAOSTAT 2007 
The sustained growth in pig meat consumption has not only resulted in the continued dominant 
position of pig meat in overall meat consumption, but also to a greater consolidation of that 
position, such that over a 15-year span, only pig meat registered a consistent increase in its 
share from 63 percent in 1990, to 64 percent in 2000, and to 67 percent by 2005. The share of 
beef exhibited a continuing decline in share, while chicken consumption similarly experienced 
a decline is share in total meat consumption between 2000 and 2005. 
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3.4. International Trade in Livestock Products in Vietnam. 
The volume of trade in meat and meat products is not yet very significant in Vietnam. Figure 5 
shows that over the years, exports of meat were mainly in terms of pig meat, with exports in the 
other types of meat relatively insignificant. Furthermore, the volume of pig meat exports became 
significant only over the period 2000-2005, although the level of exports were erratic, and 

















































Source: FAOSTAT 2007 
Figure 5. Volume of exports of meat by type, Vietnam, 1990-2005 (in ‘000 MT) 
Exports of pig meat were mainly in the form of pork and piglet meat for roasting. Government 
policy aims at developing the export capacities of Vietnam in the trade of high-quality lean 
pork. Current market destinations are mainly Hongkong and Mainland China, and to some 
extent, Malaysia. Russia was a major market destination in the 1990s, but its significance 
drastically declined starting 1999, as the Russian currency started becoming unstable (Tung, et 
al., 2005). 
Imports of meat and meat products have been a relatively recent phenomenon in Vietnam. 
These were mainly in the form of chicken meat, particularly over the years 2004-2005, 
coinciding with Vietnam being hit with the Asian avian flu crisis over that period. In recent 
years, beef imports also started coming in to satisfy increased demand. 
Although the volume of exports of pig meat appears to be dominant in absolute terms, as pig 
meat also occupies the largest segment in meat supply, in relative terms, the trade component of 
the livestock sector is not yet that large. Table 5 shows that over 5-year averages, net exports as 
a percentage of meat supply in major meat commodity were quite insignificant, not reaching 
one percent of supply of each meat type. Through the first half of this decade, however, trade in 
the various meat types picked up, with the country continuing to be a net exporter in pig meat 
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and beef, and a net importer in chicken meat. Still, even in pig meat, net trade remained to be a 
small 3.3 percent of total domestic supply. 
 
Table 5. Net exports as percentage of supply of major meat products, Vietnam, 1990-2005 (in 
percent, over 5-year averages) 
Period Pig meat Chicken Beef
1991-1995 0.6 -0.2 0.3
1996-2000 0.9 -0.1 0.3
2001-2005 3.3 -3.0 1.4  
Source: FAOSTAT 2007  
The trade picture shows that the livestock sector of Vietnam in general, and the pig industry in 
particular, remains to have a strong domestic market orientation. Although Vietnam has joined 
the WTO in 2007 and will be bound by trade agreements against highly protecting its livestock 
industry through tariff or non-tariff barriers, the sustained strong growth in domestic demand for 
pig meat will continue to be a driving force that will induce domestic production of pigs, even 
as competing pig meat products may start coming in. 
3.5. The Commercial Sector in the Pig Industry 
Although the pig sub-sector in Vietnam is dominantly smallholder-production in character, there 
is an emerging commercial farm sector. Commercial farms as defined in the statistics of the 
General Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam are farms that have at least 100 heads of pigs at any 
given time. These pig farms are officially registered, and their location readily identified. 
From the 2003 livestock farm statistics of the GSO, there were only 548 commercial pig farms 
recorded in the whole of Vietnam. Compared to the smallholder sector, this number is small, 
but produce combined output that accounts for around 20 percent of total annual production. 
The size distribution of these commercial farms is shown on Figure 6. 
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Source: GSO (2003); Giao (2004). 
Figure 6. Size distribution of commercial farms in Vietnam, 2003 
The distribution of commercial pig farms show that quite a large proportion of the farms, around 
three quarters, fall in the smallest category, keeping around 100 to 200 pigs at any given time. 
The very large farms, holding more than 500 heads of pigs at any given time, constitute just a 
tiny proportion (3%) of all the commercial farms. 
The commercial farms are not evenly spread throughout the country, but are concentrated in the 
south of Vietnam, where around 85 percent of these farms are found. Table 6 shows the 
distribution of commercial pig farms across the eight regions of Vietnam. 
 
Table 6. Distribution of commercial farms in Vietnam, by region, 2003 
Region No. of farms % of farms
Northwest 0 0
Northeast 9 1.6
Red R. Delta 70 12.8
N. Central Coast 4 0.7
S. Central Coast 2 0.4
Central Highlands 17 3.1
Southeast 418 76.3
Mekong R. Delta 28 5.1
Total 548 100  
Source: GSO (2003); Giao (2004) 
Not only are the commercial pig farms predominantly located in the South, but they are heavily 
concentrated in the Southeast region, where three quarters of all commercial pig farms have 
congregated. In the North, the commercial farms are located mostly in the Red River Delta 
region. 
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The concentration of commercial farms in particular regions is related both to the proximity 
major demand centres, and to sources of vital input supplies and livestock services. In the 
Southeast, the major demand centre is Ho Chi Minh City. For the Red River Delta region, there 
is the national capital of Hanoi. Both the Southeast and the Red River also have good access to 
international ports where imports of livestock feed materials pass through. 
3.6. Engagement in Pig Production among Households in Vietnam 
3.7.1. Proportion of rural households engaged in pig production, 2002 and 2004 
Pig production is an integral component of livelihood activities among farm households in 
Vietnam. With average farm sizes at less than half a hectare per household, households diversify 
economic activities to make full use of available family labour and other resources, not only to 
produce staple crops but also to earn cash income from the raising and marketing of livestock, 
mainly pigs and poultry. In Figure 7, the Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys (VHLSS) 
of 2002 and 2004 show the proportion of rural households producing pigs in Vietnam as a 
whole, and across the various regions, and the changes in such incidence from 2002 to 2004. 
For Vietnam as a whole, the proportion increased significantly from 49 percent to 66 percent of 
rural households between the two periods. This indicates that as an economic activity, the 
returns to pig production must be significant enough to attract new households to engage in that 













































































 Sources: VHLSS 2002 and 2004. 
Figure 7. Proportion of rural households engaged in pig production in Vietnam, by region, 
2002 and 2004 (in percent of rural households) 
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The increase in participation of rural households in pig production occurred in all eight 
geographical regions of Vietnam, although at different degrees. In general, the largest increases 
occurred in the regions which had lower participation rates in 2002, and these regions were 
mainly in the south of Vietnam. In terms of participation rates of rural households by 2004, in 
general, a higher percentage of households in the north of Vietnam were engaged in pig 
production, with mean proportions ranging from 62 percent to 81 percent of rural households, 
as compared to the regions in the south (36-68%). The relatively high proportion of households 
engaged in pig production provides an indication of the potential impact on the income 
potentials of rural households when they also gainfully participate in the supply of pigs as the 
domestic demand for pig meat continues to expand. 
 
3.7.2. Scale of pig production among households, 2002 and 2004 
Pig production at the household level is in general smallholder in scale. Using the VHLSS 2002 
and 2004 information on the volume of output (in kilograms liveweight) from pig production per 
household, the number of pigs produced per year was estimated. The conversion factor used is 
60 kgs = 1 pig. The number of pigs produced per household will be an underestimate to the 
extent that the average liveweight of pig produced is less than 60 kgs (as would be the case 
when households also produce piglets and not only slaughter hogs). The distribution of 
households according to scale of pig output (in kilograms liveweight) is then transformed into 
the distribution of households by number of pigs produced.  Figure 8 shows the distribution of 
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Source: VHLSS 2002 and 2004 
Figure 8. Changing scale of pig production by households in Vietnam, 2002 and 2004 (in 
percent of households) 
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The pattern of distribution of households by scale of production indicates that majority of the pig 
producing households produce less than five pigs per year. Where the cut-off point is put at less 
than 10 pigs produced per year, even as of 2004, the proportion of households falling in that 
category is quite high at 85 percent. Producing 10 pigs over a one-year period is small in scale. 
Where pig production takes place in two cycles, this implies that the household would be 
raising five pigs at a time, and raising another five as the first batch is sold over the first half of 
the year. 
The changing distribution of households over scale of production from 2002 to 2004 shows that 
over time, households have been expanding their scale of production, with a greater proportions 
of households producing more than five, 10, and 20 pigs per year, and a correspondingly lesser 
proportions of households producing less-than-two and less-than-five pigs per year. 
Taking Figures 7 and 8 together, not only have more rural households undertaken pig 
production as an integral part of their livelihood between 2002 and 2004, but that these 
households have also been increasing their scale of production of pigs over the same period, 
although the greater proportion still produce at a smallholder-scale level. 
The changing scale of pig production in Vietnam could also be distinguished according to the 
regional patterns. Figure 9 shows the changing patterns in the northern regions of Vietnam. 
Figure 10, on the other hand, shows the patterns in the southern regions. 
Observing Figure 9 for northern Vietnam, except for the Northwest region, the other three 
regions in general reflect the distribution of households according to scale of pig production for 
the whole of Vietnam, where the mode of the distribution falls on the group of households 
producing between 2-to-5 pigs per year, and where there is an increase in the proportion of 
households falling in the upper three categories producing more than five pigs per year, and a 
reduction in the proportion of households falling in the two lower categories producing less than 
five pigs per year. The pattern observed for the exception (Northest region) shows that the mode 
of the distribution falls on households with the smallest scale of production (<2 pigs per year), 
and do operate at very small scale of output. Although a similar scaling-up of production is 
observed, such is occurring at a lower starting level.  
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Sources: VHLSS 2002 and 2004. 
Figure 9. Changing scale of pig production in northern regions of Vietnam (in percent of 
households) 
In Figure 10, among the southern regions, only one region, the South Central Coast, mirrors the 
shape of the overall Vietnam distribution of households according scale of production, and the 
patterns of change in the distribution from 2002 to 2004. The distribution of households in the 
Central Highlands has some similarities with the Northwest in terms of the mode of the 
distribution falling on the smallest scale (<2 heads), but differs in the pattern of scaling up, with 
the Central Highlands having a relatively greater proportion of households in the upper three 
categories (i.e., higher scales of production). 
The Southeast shows a pattern where the households with the higher levels of production are 
becoming the more dominant group. To a lesser extent, the changing distribution of scale in the 
Mekong River Delta region also shows a pattern where the upper three categories of households 
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Sources: VHLSS 2002 and 2004. 
Figure 10. Changing scale of pig production in southern regions of Vietnam (in percent of 
households) 
Thus, in comparing the North and the South, in general, smallholder production of pigs is a 
more dominant phenomenon in the North as compared to the South. Too, the pattern of scaling 
up of pig production in Vietnam is more closely reflected in the northern regions than in the 
South. In the investigation of the integration of smallholder pig producers to growing markets 
through contract farming and other institutional organizations, this study focuses on pig 
production and marketing in the north. The provinces chosen are located in the Northeast, the 
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4. Study sites and contract arrangements in pig 
production in Northern Vietnam 
This chapter discusses the criteria for survey site and sample selection and the characteristics of 
the provinces that were selected as survey sites.  It also presents the typology of contract farming 
arrangements that were observed as typical in Northern Vietnam including the distinct 
characteristics of each type. 
4.1. Characteristics of provinces selected for survey sites 
North Vietnam consists of 32 provinces in three ecological regions, namely, the N orthern 
Mountainous Region or the Northeast (with 15 provinces), the Red River Delta region (with 11 
provinces) and the North Central Coast Region (with six provinces). Based on statistical data 
provided by the General Statistics Office in 2004, the North comprised 50.8% of the total area 
and 48.9% of the total population of the whole country. 
 
Table 7 provides basic information on the four provinces that were selected for the study. All the 
selected provinces have the same characteristics as the other provinces in the North, 
specifically, a higher population density relative to the average in the region. Similarly, all four 
selected provinces had higher pig numbers relative to the average of the region. Thus, the 
selected provinces are considered the main pig production areas in North Vietnam. 
 
Table 7. Characteristics of sample provinces in the study (based on 2004 indicators) 
Area Human population Number of pigs Province 
(‘000 ha) (%) (‘000) (%) (‘000) % Rank 
Bac Giang 382.3 2.3 1563.5 3.9 899.2 5.5 5 
Ha Tay 219.2 1.3 2500 6.2 1137.8 7.0 3 
Thai Binh 154.6 0.9 1842.8 4.6 1015.1 6.2 4 
Thanh Hoa 1111.6 6.6 3646.6 9.1 1351 8.3 1 
North Vietnam 16,728.9 100 40,110.2 100 16,318 100  
Source: Statistical yearbook (2004) 
 
Pig production in all four provinces is dominated by smallholders. Only a small proportion of 
pigs are kept in large commercial farms or contract grower farms with CP or Japfa Comfeed. We 
do not have data on the number of pigs and total pig live weight from commercial farms in all 
country as well as in selected provinces. However, the data in Table 7 give some idea on the 
distribution of pig herds among commercial farms across different regions in Vietnam. 
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4.2. Brief description of the survey sites 
The project team used the following criteria to select the four survey sites (provinces):  
· high pig density 
· high rural poverty incidence 
· good market access 
· incidence of any form of contractual arrangement for pig production. This included 
cooperatives with satellite farms as voluntary members, with or without written contracts, 
engaged in either “direct inputs providing” production contracts or pig-purchase 
agreements, and vertically and horizontally integrated farms with foreign feed companies 
such as CP and Cargill. 
4.2.1. Bac Giang province 
Bac Giang is located in the Northern Mountainous Region where agriculture plays an important 
role in terms of GDP contribution and income generation for majority of the population. Bac 
Giang only occupies 2.3% of total area of the North but has 3.9% of the region’s population. 
Bac Giang Town is only 50 km from Ha Noi on the way from Ha Noi to China. Bac Giang has a 
good transport network to other provinces in North Vietnam. Agricultural commodities from Bac 
Giang (especially livestock products such as pig, chicken, fish) are normally sold to urban and 
industrial areas such as Ha Noi, Quang Ninh, Hai Phong for local consumption and export. In 
2004, the pig population in Bac Giang was 5.5% of the total pig population of the region; 
currently its pig herd ranks fifth in the north. Farmers in the province mainly raise local sows 
(e.g. Mong cai breed) to produce local breed or cross-bred piglets. A few farmers also raise 
exotic sows but this practice is not popular in the province. By the end of 2005, there were nine 
CP farms in Bac Giang. Small-scale pig traders normally buy fattening pigs at villages for sale to 
wholesalers who then sell the pigs in other provinces. 
4.2.2. Ha Tay province 
Ha Tay and Thai Binh are the two major agricultural production provinces in Red River Delta. In 
these provinces, swine was a major component of livestock production which provided 
products not only for local consumption but also for urban areas such as Ha Noi, Hai Phong, 
Quang Ninh, other industrial areas in Red River Delta as well as for export. Ha Tay and Thai 
Binh are the third and fourth largest swine production provinces in the North after Thanh Hoa 
and Nghe An. In 2004, Ha Tay and Thai Binh accounted for 7.0% and 6.2%, respectively, of the 
total pig population of the North. Ha Tay has a greater advantage than Thai Binh in swine 
production because it is close to Ha Noi, the biggest pork consumption market in the North. 
Additionally, CP and Japfa Comfeed are located in the province; these companies provide feed, 
breeding stock and technical assistance and offer contracts to farmers in the province. CP and 
Japfa Comfeed presently have 25 pig contract farms in Ha Tay province. 
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4.2.3. Thai Binh province 
Thai Binh is close to Hai Phong, the second largest pork consumption market and pork 
exporting centre in the North. The products of swine production in Thai Binh are normally 
transported to Hai Phong for consumption and export. Thai Binh province has the highest 
population density in the country. Because off-farm opportunities for income generation are 
limited limited, farmers pay more attention to agriculture and livestock production. In Thai Binh, 
there are three food processing companies that buy native or cross-bred piglets for export. There 
is no formal contract farm in Thai Binh; instead Thai Binh agricultural marketing cooperatives 
(Thai Binh COOP) provide informal contracts for farmers in the province. The cooperative was 
established in 2004 and has only 70 members (including large farms, compared to normal pig 
farms in Thai Binh). Majority of pig producers in Thai Binh are smallholders and classified in this 
study as independent producers. 
4.2.4. Thanh Hoa province 
Thanh Hoa is one of the provinces of North Central Coast Region, located in the South of Ha 
Noi. Thanh Hoa is situated about 170 km from Ha Noi and is the largest province in the North 
in terms of area and population. There is no formal contract pig farm in Thanh Hoa, but some 
cooperatives provide informal contracts to pig raisers to provide inputs and help sell outputs. Pig 
producers in Thanh Hoa are mainly smallholders and classified as independent producers in this 
study. Fattening pigs from Thanh Hoa were transferred to Northern provinces of Ha Noi, Hai 
Phong or to the South (Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City). In 2004, the pig herd of Thanh Hoa was 
8.3% of total pig population in the North. The province is also the largest pig producer in the 
country.  
4.3. Sample selection 
4.3.1.  Stratification strategy 
The project team limited the sample to households engaged in pig farming and then stratified 
the sample according to households engaged in any form of contract farming arrangement 
(participants) and households not engaged in any contract farming arrangement (non-
participants). 
 
The project team also included in the sample categorization and distribution, cooperatives and 
other forms of contracts and collective action such as leading farms with unwritten contracts 
with their “satellite” farms, among others, and did not limit contracting institutions to vertically 
integrated companies such as CP, Japfa and Cargill. 
 
The emerging typologies of arrangements where smallholders are linked in both input and 
output markets are summarized in Annex 2. Given the cases identified, the project team 
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surveyed formal contract growers as Case 1,  i.e. the typical contract growing arrangement 
between an integrator and a farmer (who is relatively larger than the typical farmer in North 
Vietnam as observed in the field visits). These cases have been observed specifically in Ha Tay 
and Bac Giang. In addition, other arrangements that allow smallholders to overcome barriers to 
access to input and output markets by being linked to a contract grower (usually a farmer 
operating on a larger scale), a feed distributor (also a farmer with relatively larger scale 
operations), or a cooperative were also investigated (Cases 2 to 6). In these cases, there is no 
direct link between the smallholder farmer and the integrator, but the cooperative, contract 
grower or feed distributor acts as an intermediary, allowing farmers access to inputs and product 
outlets. These cases can be considered as complete loops where linkage with input and output 
markets is facilitated by the same intermediary. Cases 7 and 8 are considered incomplete loops 
where smallholders are linked to  either the input side only or the output side only. In these 
cases, the smallholders operate as independent farmers, even if they have better linkages with 
either side of the production/marketing loop. The various cases identified above were used to 
guide the sample selection by type of respondents in the four provinces where such cases were 
applicable. 
 
Given the lack of prior knowledge about the population characteristics in terms of actual 
numbers and the spatial distribution of its sub-populations, the following sampling approach 
was followed: (1) once an area was selected as a sampling site through rapid survey or key 
informant interviews, the population (households/farms) in the area was classified into 
participants and non-participants in any form of contract arrangements and (2) the number of 
households/farms from each group was randomly selected according to the target sample size.  
 
In areas where it was easy to identify households with formal contracts with an integrator, for 
example, these households were automatically included in the sample of formal contractors if 
their total number did not exceed the target sample size. In cases where the number of 
households with formal contracts was less than the target sample size of that particular type in 
each province, the balance was made up by random selection of households with non-formal 
contracts. To select input and output traders and other market-mediating institutions, complete 
enumeration was done in most cases as the number of population in the area was usually less 
than the target sample size. Where the population was larger than the target sample size of 
input/output traders, random sampling was done (see Annex 3 for a  description of sample 
selection procedure). 
4.3.2. Final distribution of sample respondents 
The original sample sizes proposed were 50 contract growers and 50 independent growers in 
each province for a total of 400 household respondents. Another 50 respondents were sampled 
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from among traders, input and output buyers and other market-mediating institutions such as 
cooperatives. 
 
Only 37 households were identified to represent the total population of formal contract growers 
in the four provinces, i.e. the number could not be more than 37 in the survey sites. Hence, the 
remaining 163 sample households came from the informal contract growers in the four survey 
provinces. The sample size and distribution for each type of farm in the study provinces are 
presented in Table 8. Note that in the final sample selection only 34 of the identified 37 
households with formal contracts were included in only two provinces: Ha Tay and Bac Giang 
as no formal contract arrangements were identified in Thai Binh and Thanh Hoa provinces. 
Three more informal contract growers were sampled to fill the gap in order to match the sample 
of 200 non-participants.  
 
Table 8. Distribution of sample respondents by type of contractual arrangement 










Ha Tay 25 25 50 13 
Bac Giang 9 41 50 13 
Thai Binh 0 50 50 12 
Thanh Hoa 0 50 50 12 
Total 34 166 200 50 
 
4.4. Contract arrangements in pig production in Northern Vietnam 
 
There are three general types of contractual arrangements observed among sample respondents 
in the four provinces surveyed in Northern Vietnam. These include formal contracts, informal 
contracts, and no contracts. Formal contracts as used in this study refer to the typical contract 
growing arrangement between a pig producer and an integrator. Informal contracts generally 
refer to arrangements without written contracts. While these arrangements may mimic the 
formal contract arrangements by having both input and output linkages, such may not be 
governed by strict performance parameters as required by integrators, and the relationship may 
be more flexible in the sense that a closed loop of input provision and output purchase may 
occur between the same entities, i.e., between the pig producer and the contractor.  
4.4.1. Formal contracts 
The formal contract in swine production in Northern Vietnam has been offered by CP-Vietnam 
Company since the year of 2000 and by the Jappa Comfeed of Indonesia since 2003. These 
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formal contracts being offered are generally farrow to wean and grow to finish operations with a 
breeding component to control for genetic quality of stock, with a feed milling/mixing section to 
control for quality of livestock nutrition, and with a veterinary and animal health program to 
control the incidence of diseases. The formal contract farms with supervision from integrators 
choose the optimal timing of the sale of their outputs, and are up to date with information on the 
daily price fluctuations in the market for live hogs.  As of the end of 2005, there were 34 formal 
contract pig farms in Northern Vietnam, and these were largely concentrated in the provinces of 
Ha Tay and Bac Giang. Among the 34 formal contract farms, six were producing piglets (farrow 
to wean operation) and 28 were producing slaughter hogs (grow to finish operation).  
 
Figure 11 shows the linkages between the contract grower and the integrator in this type of 
contractual arrangement.  This type of linkage can be termed as a closed loop, whereby the 
providers of inputs and the buyer of outputs are of the same entity.  A slight variation of this 
contractual arrangement is shown in Figure 12, whereby some contract growers (usually referred 
to as satellite farms of the integrators) are also contracting some small-scale producers within 
their neighborhood to produce the same output that they are contracted to deliver to the 
integrator.  In some instances, this may be driven by the limited labor that the contract grower 
has available, so that sub-contracting to neighboring farms can help solve this constraint. 
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Figure 12. Variation in flow of inputs and outputs in a contract farming arrangement for pigs 
in Northern Vietnam 
 
4.4.2. Informal contracts 
As previously defined, informal contracts are generally unwritten contracts.  A number of 
informal contract arrangements were observed in the survey sites.  These are summarized in two 
main cases and shown in Figures13 and 14. In general, the informal contract arrangements were 
between the producer and a cooperative or the producer with an input supplier. 
 
Informal contract with a cooperative 
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In this case (Figure 13), the farmer is a member of a cooperative, usually a pig production and 
marketing cooperative, but could also be a general purpose cooperative where some members 
may be pig raisers.  The cooperative is linked to either an integrator for the supply of feeds and 
stocks (weanlings for fattening and/or female growers for breeding sows), or various input 
suppliers (feeds and stock).  When linkage is with an integrator, the cooperative can function as 
the contract grower for the integrator, where coop members undertake the contract growing 
activities for the coop. In this sense, the linkage mimics that found in formal contracts, where 
the coop takes the role of the contractor and the farmer members take the role of the contract 
grower.  Hence, farmers who could not quality to be a formal contract grower is provided an 
opportunity to do so in this type of contractual arrangement, without necessarily obligating them 
to invest substantial amounts of money for pig pens and equipment, given the relatively small-
scale nature of their operations relative to those under formal contract growing schemes. In 
some cases, the linkage between the coop and the integrator is mainly for regular feed supply 
and/or stock supply to the cooperative where members are raising pigs, with no requirements for 
purchase of outputs by the integrator from the cooperative.  In other cases, the coop is linked to 
several input suppliers (feed and stocks), where the feed supply could be provided by a feed 
manufacturer and stocks are obtained from numerous sources, both public (state breeding farms) 
or private (integrators, collectors, farmers in the neighborhood).  Farmer members can either sell 
their pigs to the coop or sell them directly to their preferred market outlet, e.g., 
collectors/traders, slaughterhouses, or other farmers in their locality. 
 
The coop acts as the guarantor of pig quality raised by its farmer members, as it is in its own 
interest to be known as a source of good quality pigs in order to establish credibility and 
increase its market share.  It does this by providing technical support services to coop members 
for improving their skills in pig raising, ensuring that the inputs used by its coop members are of 
good quality (by using only reputable sources of feed and stocks), and providing access to 
services (either in-house or contracted to outside providers) to manage diseases and reduce 
mortality.  Farmer members are also assisted in searching for buyers and if the coop has a supply 
contract with output buyers (e.g., slaughterhouses, processing firms, wholesalers, etc.) then 
farmers are assured of a regular market for their pigs with minimum transaction costs in terms of 
actual search and transport costs, as well as negotiating and obtaining the right price for the 
quality of their pigs. 
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Informal contract with traders  
 
Figure 14. Informal contract arrangement with input suppliers (case 1 open loop) 
 
In this case (Figure 14), the pig producer is linked with an input supplier, usually a feed 
distributor who is also a pig raiser.  The feed distributor is linked with an integrator for the 
supply of the latter’s feed products for sale.  The main motivation for the feed distributor’s 
linkage with a regular clientele of pig farmers is to have a captive market for the feed that the 
distributor has to dispose to the market, and in order to cultivate their loyalty, the feed 
distributor gives incentives in terms of feed credit (i.e., pig farmers can purchase feed without 
immediate cash payment at no interest rate when paid), or the feed distributor facilitates the sale 
of the pig farmers’ outputs (slaughter hogs or piglets) by linking them with output buyers and 
providing an informal form of certification of the quality of feed used to raise those pigs.  The 
pig farmer benefits from this linkage in a number of ways, e.g., (1) having a regular supplier of 
feed with known quality, (2) being able to obtain feed on credit and manage his cash flow, (3) 
being linked to an output buyer, and (4) more importantly, having a third party entity (the feed 
distributor) certify the quality of his pigs indirectly through the use of feeds with known quality 
(e.g., from the reputation of the feed being distributed by the feed distributor).  In this way, the 
pig farmer can negotiate for a better price and reduce lower transaction cost in search of buyers 
and in getting the market recognize the quality of his pigs. 
 
4.4.3. Independent producers 
Independent producers are those with no regular links to either an input supplier or an output 
buyer.  The key word here is regular, as the independents generally purchase inputs or sell 
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entities. Here, households would have one breeding sow and once piglets are produced these 
are sold as weanlings, and some households would keep one or two of these weanling that they 
fatten themselves and sell at market weight.  Being an independent operator allows the farmer 
the flexibility to make decisions about the type of production system it will engage in, the type 
of breed to be raised, the types and quantities of feed to be used, and the timing of sale of 
outputs. 
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5. Understanding determinants of participation of 
smallholder producers in contract arrangements 
5.1. Characteristics of households 
5.1.1. Socio-demographics 
Decision-making in pig production within the household 
Table 9 presents information on the share of decision-making in pig production between male 
and female members of the household. Note that the key decision-maker is not necessarily the 
household head (typically the husband). Decision-making in pig production is generally made 
by the senior-most male member of the household (usually the husband), although wives also 
have a significant share in decision-making. The degree of participation of women in decision-
making in pig production also appears to increase as contractual arrangements become less 
formal. For example, the proportion of women making decisions about pig production among 
sample respondents ranged from 18% among formal contract growers to about a third among 
independent producers. One in every four households engaged in informal contracts also had a 
female decision-maker in their pig raising activity. 
 
Table 9: Percentage share of household decision-making in pig production and marketing 
between male and female members 
 Formal Informal Independent 
Production    
Male 77.27 (36.08) 65.27 (27.05) 62.25 (29.22) 
Female  22.73 (36.08) 35.18 (26.94) 37.75 (29.22) 
Marketing    
Male 79.70 (36.44) 66.39 (27.44) 63.38 (29.24) 
Female 20.30 (36.44) 34.02 (27.35) 36.62 (29.24) 
Standard deviation in parentheses 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
In terms of decision-making by type of activity in pig-raising, men generally have a higher share 
of production decisions with a relatively higher average among those with formal contracts 
relative to those with informal contracts or independent operators. Marketing decisions are 
generally made by men in formal contract growing schemes. On the other hand, the share of 
marketing decisions is split on a 2:1 basis between men and women in farms with informal 
contracts and those that operate independently. 
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Personal characteristics of pig producers 
On average, pig producers engaged in formal contracts were older and had higher levels of 
education than those engaged in informal contracts and those operating as independent 
producers (Table 10). These observations are consistent with the hypothesis that formal contract 
growers have relatively more experience (with age taken as a proxy for experience) and are 
better educated than the informal contract growers and independent producers. Swine 
production was the main occupation of most male respondents, with the percentage share 
highest among formal contract growers and declining among those with informal contracts and 
independent producers. Interestingly, less than half of female independent producers considered 
pig-raising as their main occupation. 
 
Table 10: Characteristics of male and female heads of pig-raising households in the study sites 
Formal contract growers  
(n = 34) 
Informal contract growers  
(n = 166) 
Independent 
producers (n = 200) 
Characteristic 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Percentage of respondents 82.4 17.6 74.7 25.3 64.0 36.0 
Age (years) 45.6 (6.9) 43.2 (11.8) 45.3 (8.2) 42.9 (6.9) 44.1 (8.6) 41.9 (7.8) 
Number of years in school 11.2 (2.0) 11.1 (2.9) 10.0 (1.9) 10.1 (195) 9.4 (1.7) 9.1 (1.8) 
Main occupation (%)       
Pig-raising 82.1 83.3 79.7 63.6 65.6 47.9 
Other jobs 17.9 16.7 20.3 36.4 34.4 52.1 
Agricultural production 85.7 83.3 95.1 90.9 93.0 68.4 
Non-agricultural production 14.3 16.7 4.9 9.1 7.0 31.6 
Standard deviation in parentheses 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
Household size 
In general, most of the households in all groups consisted of four to five members.  The average 
household sizes across all groups have small differences, with the formal contract growers 
having slightly higher average household size (4.3) than that of the informal contract growers 
(4.1) and independent households (4.2) (Table 11). 
 
Table 11: Household sizes of sample respondents 
Number of people 
per household 
Formal contract 
growers (n = 34) 
Informal contract 
growers (n = 166) 
Independent 
producers (n = 200) 
1 to 3  11.8 22.3 19.5 
4 to 5  79.4 63.2 65.0 
More than 5  8.8 14.5 15.5 
Average 4.3 (0.8) 4.1 (1.3) 4.2 (1.2) 
Unit: % surveyed household 
Standard deviation in parentheses 
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Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
Membership in cooperatives 
Membership in cooperatives was most prevalent among pig producers with informal contracts 
(80%) and among those, the incidence of membership in livestock cooperatives was also highest 
(83%), suggesting the prevalence of engagement in livestock cooperatives by those with 
informal contracts.  In contrast, only a quarter each of those with formal contracts and 
independent producers were members of cooperatives (Table12).  There is, however, a marked 
difference in the types of cooperatives in which these two groups were engaged. Specifically, 
those with formal contracts who are members of a cooperative are all members of livestock 
cooperatives (100%), while independent producers who are members of cooperatives are 
mostly members of general cooperatives (89%) not necessarily dealing with livestock.  
Membership in cooperatives among those with informal and formal contracts was relatively 
recent, being less than three years on average. This is consistent with the discussion on 
cooperatives in the previous section indicating that the existence and operation of livestock 
cooperatives are relatively recent phenomena.  Independent producers who are members of 
cooperatives have been members of such institutions much longer than the other groups, i.e., six 
years compared with less than three years among those with formal and informal contract, on 
average.  However, most of independent producers are members of general cooperatives and 
not directly related with livestock. 
 
Table 12: Proportion of pig producers who are members of cooperatives 






Member of a cooperative (%) 25.00 80.12 25.7 
Average duration of membership (years) 2.38 (1.06) 2.46 (1.66) 6.02 (2.24) 
Member of a livestock cooperative (%) 100.00 83.46 10.87 
Member of a general cooperative (%) 0 16.54 89.13 
Standard deviation in parentheses  
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
5.1.2. Household resources 
Availability of household labour 
On average, independent pig producers have relatively more household members involved 
(either full time or part time) in pig production compared to those with formal and informal 
contracts ( Table 13).  That is, only one family member is involved in pig production among 
formal contract growers, on average, while this number is 1.5 and 1.7, respectively, for informal 
contract growers and independent operators, or about 2 family members.    
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In terms of the extent of engagement of household labour, formal contract growers have an 
average of one household member working full-time in pig production; this incidence is higher 
than that among informal contract growers (0.7) and independent operators (0.6). Conversely, 
the incidence of part-time engagement in pig production is much higher among informal 
contract growers and independent operators t h a n  among formal contract growers. These 
findings suggest that pig production is considered a full-time business operation among formal 
contract growers, requiring the full-time involvement of at least one family member; this may 
not be the case in general among pig producers with informal contracts or those operating 
independently. 
 
Table 13: Average number of family members involved in pig production 








Part-time and full-time 1.03 (0.39) 1.47 (0.66) 1.65 (0.74) 
Full-time only 1.00 (0.00) 0.69 (0.59) 0.63 (1.02) 
Part-time only 1.04 (0.20) 1.47 (0.59) 1.63 (0.68) 
Standard deviation in parentheses 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
Area of land owned 
Pig producers with formal contracts own relatively larger areas of land relative to producers with 
informal contracts and independent operators. On average, a formal contract grower owns 
about half a hectare of land, about twice the size of land owned by those with informal 
contracts and independent operators. However, only about 25% of formal contract growers own 
their land while land ownership is predominant among producers with informal contracts and 
independent operators (Table 14). Note that it is only after the land reform policy in Vietnam 
was implemented that farmers were granted full ownership of the land they tilled for crop 
production. Hence, the observed ownership of land among sample respondents actually refers 
to crop land that was transferred to them after the land reform policy was implemented. 
 
Table 14: Percentage of producers owning land for crop, animal and fish production, and 
average sizes of land holdings 
 Formal contract 
growers 
(n = 34) 
Informal contract 
growers 
(n = 166) 
Independent 
producers 
(n = 200) 
Incidence of 
ownership of 
agricultural land (%) 
26.5 82.5 88.5 
Total agricultural 
land owned, ave. in 
ha 
0.45 (0.86) 0.29 (0.33) 0.27 (0.17) 
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Land use allocation    
Crop production    
Area (ha)  0.13 (0.30) 0.19 (0.13) 0.18 (0.12) 
Animal production    
Area (ha)  0.27 (0.83) 0.03 (0.06 ) 0.02 (0.07) 
Homestead    
Area (ha)  0.04 (0.12) 0.02 (0.05) 0.04 (0.07) 
Fishery    
Area (ha)  0.01 (0.04) 0.05 (0.31) 0.03 (0.09) 
Standard deviation in parentheses 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
Agricultural land is generally used for various livelihood activities like crop production, animal 
production and fishery, and as homestead.  Informal contract growers and independent 
operators, on average, have relatively larger land allocated to crop production compared with 
formal contract growers. In terms of areas of land for animal production, on average, formal 
contract growers have larger farms (0.27 ha) compared to informal contract growers (0.03 ha) 
and independent producers (0.02 ha). Regarding land used for other livelihood activities like fish 
production, producers with informal contracts have relatively larger areas of land compared to 
formal contract growers and independent producers, although the incidence of land ownership 
for fish production is much lower than that observed for crop and animal production.  The 
striking contrast in intensity of land use for animal production vis-à-vis other livelihood activities 
(e.g., crops and fishery) between those with formal contracts vis-à-vis those with informal 
contracts or independents suggest that animal production may likely be a secondary livelihood 
activity among those in the latter two groups. 
 
Sources of household income 
Formal contract growers obtain most of their household income from pig production (Table 15). 
On the other hand, those with informal contracts have a more balanced distribution of income 
sources, split between pig production (20%), fishery (25%) and non-agricultural sources (55%). 
Independent operators obtain more than half of their household income from salaries and non-
agricultural sources, and the rest from crops and livestock. Specifically, about 40% o f  the 
household income of independent operators comes from livestock sources, of which about 14% 
is from pig production. 
 
Table 15: Percentage of household income from livestock, crops and non-agricultural sources 






Livestock    
Pigs 83.63 21.33 13.38 
Poultry 13.83 7.53 6.05 
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Cattle/buffalo 0.00 0.11 4.21 
Goats 0.00 0.01 12.63 
Non-livestock 
incl fishery 
   
Fish 0.97 26.45 1.21 
Crops 0.41 0.07 4.61 
Fruit 0.00 0.01 0.15 
Non-agriculture    
Non-agricultural 1.07 16.86 22.82 
Non-farm wage 0.00 0.04 0.08 
Remittances 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Gifts 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Salary 0.10 27.59 34.86 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
These findings suggest that the degree of dependence on livestock production in general and pig 
production in particular declines as one moves from formal contract growing to informal 
contract growing and independent pig production. This further suggests that pig raisers who 
engage in formal contract arrangements undertake p i g -raising as an important source of 
household income, much like a business enterprise. At the other extreme are independent 
operators who may not consider pig production as a major source of income, hence their 
observed preference to engage in spot market transactions more than farmers in formal or 
informal contractual arrangements. 
 
5.1.3. Scale distribution by type of contractual arrangement 
Two indicators of scale were developed to ascertain the distribution of farms across types of 
their contractual arrangements.  The two indicators of scale used were: average level of 
inventories (i.e., average of beginning and ending inventories) and total annual output (in kg 
liveweight).   
 
The scale categories based on inventory are defined as follows:   
· Small semi-commercial -  less than 3 sows or less than10 fatteners;  
· Small commercial – having from 3 to10 sows, or from 10 to 50 fatteners;  
· Medium – having from 10 to 50 sows, or from 50 to100 fatteners; and  
· Large -  having more than 50 sows, or more than 100 fatteners.   
 
The scale categories based on total output (yearly) are as follows:   
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· Small semi-commercial – producing up to 1,000 kg;  
· Small commercial – producing from 1,001 to 5,000 kg;  
· Medium -  producing from  5,001  to 50,000 kg; and  
· Large – producing more than 50,000 kg. 
 
Scale by inventory levels 
Figure 15 shows the distribution of farms according to scale in terms of inventories, by type of 
contractual arrangement.  As can be seen, farms with formal contracts are all categorized as 
Large farms.  Among farms with informal contracts as well as independent farms, most are in the 
first two categories of Small semi-commercial and Small commercial farms. Among farms with 
informal contracts, these two categories of Small farms constitute close to 80 percent of the 
sample. Among independent farms, these first two categories constitute about 90 percent of the 
sample. 
 
There is some variation in the size distribution of farms between farms with informal contracts 
and independent farms. The smallest category constitutes the majority of the independent farms 
(60%), while among farms with informal contracts, the second category – the Small commercial, 
occupies a slightly larger proportion of the farms (40%) than the smallest scale category (37%?). 
Too, there is a larger proportion of Medium-scale farms among farms with informal contracts 
than among independents. Under this scale classification by inventory levels, none of the 
independents farms could be classified as Large. 
 
In general and based on inventory levels, the scale of operation of farms decreases as one moves 
from formal contract farms, to farms with informal contracts, to independent farms. 












1 2 3 4
 
Figure 15. Distribution of respondents by scale (in terms of inventory level), by type of 
contract arrangement 
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Scale by volume of annual output 
The scale distribution of farms by volume of annual output in 2005, across various contractual 
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Figure 16. Distribution of respondents by scale (in terms of annual volume of output), by type 
of contract arrangement 
 
Based on annual volume of output, formal contract farms still are predominantly classified as 
Large, although a small proportion emerges as Medium. The Medium-scale farms would likely 
involve some farms engaged in farrow-to-weaning operations (Type 1), where the weight of 
each piglet produced would only be between 5-8 kgs. 
 
Among farms with informal contracts and independent farms, as the basis of scale categorization 
is changed from inventory levels to annual output levels, a change in the scale-category 
distribution is observed. The most evident is that for both groups, the proportion of farms 
classified as Medium-scale increases, and that the proportion of farms in the Small semi-
commercial and Small-commercial categories, respectively, fall. In contrast to scale 
classification by level of inventory, classification by level of annual output captures the impact 
of intensity of operations, given any level of inventory. 
 
Another change, particular to the independent farms, is the distribution of farms in the first two 
categories (Small), where the proportion of Small-commercial farms increased, with a 
corresponding decrease in the proportion of Small semi-commercial farms, such that the share 
of the former is now greater than the share of the smallest category. 
 
The contrast between the two groups is that for the independent farms, the combined shares of 
Small semi-commercial and Small-commercial still constitutes the majority (60%), but among 
farms with informal contracts, the Medium-scale farms constitute largest proportion (50%), 
although the combined shares of the farms categorized as Small is still significant (46%).  For 
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both the farms with informal contracts and independent farms, a very small proportion of farms 
could be considered as Large. 
 
The observations here on the comparative scale-distribution across types of contractual 
arrangement are consistent with the trends shown in the previous discussion. The scale of 
operation is positively correlated with the degree of formality of the contractual arrangement.  
As one moves sequentially from independent farms, to farms with informal contracts, to farms 
engaged in the formal contract growing schemes with integrator companies, the scale of 
operations increases.   
 
Another perspective in capturing the configuration of the various farms with respect to scale of 
operations is looking at the distribution of the various categories of farms according to 
contractual arrangements across the defined scales of operation. To provide additional insight 
into the impact of the two types of informal contractual arrangements on scale, this subset of 
farms is further specified into farms with informal contracts with cooperatives (Informal-
Cooperative), and those with informal arrangements with traders (Informal-Trader). Figure 17 
below shows the configuration of scale distribution using the expanded categorization of types 
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Figure 17. Distribution of respondents by type of contract arrangement, by scale of operation 
 
The distribution of farms according to scale in Figure 17 should be interpreted in conjunction 
with the preceding graph on the relative distribution of various contractual arrangement-
categories of farms according to scale, where in particular, the largest concentration of farms 
with informal contracts and independent farms were in second (Small-commercial) and third 
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(Medium) size categories, and that the smallest size category (Small semi-commercial) 
constituted just a fifth of the independent farms and farms with informal contracts. Thus, the 
results in Figure 17 should be viewed strictly in relative terms, of the share of each farm type 
within each size category. 
 
Focusing on the composition of the smallest scale category, one could that Small semi-
commercial farms are composed predominantly of farms with informal contracts with input 
traders (70%), and another fifth are independent farms. There are also a small percentage of 
farms engaged in informal contracts with cooperatives that operate as Small semi-commercial in 
scale.  
 
Among Small-commercial farms, the group consists predominantly of independent farms (close 
to 50%), and about a third consisting of farms with informal links with a cooperative. For the 
third scale category (Medium-scale), the composition is predominantly of farms with informal 
links to a cooperative (close to half), and more than a quarter would be independent farms.  
Among the Large-scale farms, these would consist mostly of farms with formal contracts with the 
integrator companies. There are, however, also a few farms informal links with cooperatives 
classified as Large farms.   
 
In general, the results consistently put the put the formal contract farms in the Large scale 
category. Secondly, being linked informally to a cooperative is associated with being able to 
operate at a Medium-scale of operations, although Small-commercial farms could also be 
associated with such link, although to a less dominant degree. Independent farms are quite 
varied, and more or less cover the first three categories of scale of operations (Small semi-
commercial-to-Medium). 
 
The splitting of the sample of informal contracts into those involved in cooperatives and those 
linked with traders reveals that there is real distinction between the two groups in terms of scale 
of operations. Those linked with cooperatives would likely be Medium-scale farms, while those 
informally linked with traders would likely belong to the smallest size category. Hence, it 
appears that engagement in informal contractual arrangement with cooperatives is not scale 
neutral.  Other forms of informal contractual arrangements, such as those with input suppliers or 
with output buyers may be more accessible to the smallest of the small-scale farms. 
5.2.3. Production systems by type of contractual arrangement 
Contractual arrangements also vary by the type of production system used by pig farmers in 
northern Vietnam. Four pig production systems were observed in the survey areas:  
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· Farrow-to-wean: Sows (100% local, crossbreed with high level of local blood, or 100% 
exotic) are bred to produce piglets and then sold as weanlings. A farmer usually has one 
sow that is made to farrow for at least one cycle each year. 
· Farrow-to-finish: This can be considered as the full cycle system; it starts from breeding of 
sows to produce piglets, which are then raised until they reach market weight and sold 
either as growers (for fattening operations) or as slaughter hogs ready for slaughter and sold 
as carcasses. 
· Grow-to-finish: This is also termed “fattening operation”. Here, pig raisers buy weanlings 
or growers and raise them to full market weight. The intensity of fattening operations can 
be gauged by the number of batches that an operator can fatten in one cycle that usually 
lasts for three to six months depending on the breed used. The fattening period is generally 
longer for local breeds or crossbreeds with high level of local blood than for exotic breeds, 
although exotic breeds generally require a different feeding and animal management 
system. 
· Combination of piglet production and fattening: This is a more common system for raising 
pigs in northern Vietnam where one sow is bred to produce piglets and some piglets are 
kept to be raised as growers and/or slaughter hogs. Some households buy weanlings or 
growers to fatten while waiting for piglets to be born from their sows. 
 
The distribution of farms according to contract types by production system is shown in Figure 
18.  Here it is seen that formal contract growers are engaged in only two types of production 
systems, farrow to wean (FF) and grow to finish (GF); specifically, formal contract growers 
account for some 30% of total farms engaged in grow to finish production, and slightly less than 
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Figure 18: Distribution of farms by type of production system, by contractual arrangement. 
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Among farms having informal contractual arrangements, those linked with cooperatives are 
shown to be engaging in all four types of systems in varying proportion.  The highest incidence 
of informal contract growers linked with cooperatives is observed in farrow to finish (FF) 
production (i.e., almost half of the share of all farms in that production system category); the 
second highest incidence is observed in mixed production system (i.e., combination of piglet 
production and fattening operations) where they account for about two-fifths of total farms in 
that production system category.  In contrast, the highest incidence of farms having informal 
contractual linkages with traders is observed in farrow to wean (FW) production where they 
account for almost a third of total farms in that production system category, while they account 
for only 5% or less of total farms in each of the other types of production systems. 
 
Significant shares of independent farms are also observed across the four types of production 
systems, where the highest incidence of independent operations is observed in grow to finish 
(GF) and mixed production systems (i.e., more than half of total farms in those two production 
system categories).  Independent farms also account for the largest share of total farms engaged 
in farrow to wean production and the second largest share of total farms in farrow to finish 
production. 
 
Within the sub-sample of farms categorized as small semi-commercial scale in terms of annual 
output, all of those who are informally linked with traders are undertaking farrow to wean 
production, while the majority of those informally linked with a cooperative or operating as 
independent operators are engaged in the same production system (Figure 19).  Within those 
linked informally with cooperatives, about a fourth are engaged in mixed systems, and this is 
slightly smaller (about a fifth) than the share of farms within the independent operators who are 
engaged in the same production system.  Only less than 10% of independent farms is engaged 
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Figure 19. Type of production system by type of contract arrangement, small semi-commercial 
scale 
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Mixed systems and farrow to finish production are more common among farms categorized as 
small commercial scale based on annual output (Figure 20).  Specifically, the majority of farms 
with informal links with traders or operating as independent producers are undertaking mixed 
production systems.  None of them are engaged in farrow-to-wean operations.  Farrow-to-finish 
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Figure 20. Type of production system by type of contract arrangement, small commercial scale 
 
Within the sample of respondents categorized as medium scale, those having formal contract 
agreements are split between farrow-to-wean and grow-to-finish operations ( Figure 21).  The 
majority of those with informal contracts with cooperatives are likewise split between farrow-to-
finish and mixed systems, and a very small proportion is observed to be engaged in grow-to-
finish operations.  Mixed systems are also observed to be common among the largest share of 
respondents having informal contracts with traders, followed by farrow-to-finish operations.  
Among independent operators, grow-to-finish operations account for the largest share, and 
farrow-to-finish and mixed systems having almost the same share; a very small proportion are 
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Figure 21. Type of production system by type of contract arrangement, medium scale 
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Among large scale farms, none was found to have any informal contract arrangements with 
traders ( Figure 22).  Independent large farms generally undertake farrow-to-finish operations, 
and only a small proportion is engaged in mixed systems.  The majority of those with informal 
contracts with cooperatives is engaged in mixed production systems; the rest are into farrow-to-
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Figure 22. Type of production system by type of contract arrangement, large scale 
 
Figure 23 summarizes the distribution of farms by type of contract by type of production system.  
Formal contract growers are predominantly engaged in grow-to-finish (fattening) operations 
(80%), and to a lesser extent in farrow-to-weaning operations (20%), both short-duration 
production cycle.  Among those with informal contracts with cooperatives, about 40% are 
engaged in farrow-to-finish systems, while about a third are doing combination mode 
production, less than 20% are doing piglet production, and about 10% are doing fattening 
operation.  On the other hand, the majority of those with informal contracts with traders are 
engaged in piglet production (farrow-to-weaning), while those engaged in farrow-to-finish and 
combination mode accounted for less than 20% each.  Among independent operators, the 
distribution by type of production systems is almost equally divided among the four types, with 
combination mode of production having the highest share.  It is thus observed that while formal 
contract growers are engaged in only two types of production systems that are both short-
duration systems which are dictated mainly by the integrator companies with whom they have 
contracts, the informally linked operators differ in their propensity to engage in which type of 
production system by the nature of this linkage.  Specifically, operators with informal contract 
arrangements with cooperatives are more frequently observed to engage in full cycle or longer-
duration cycle of production operations, as well as in combination mode systems, while those 
that are informally linked with traders are more frequently observed in shorter-duration cycle of 
production. 
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Figure 23: Distribution of farms by type of contract by type of production system 
 
5.2. Determinants of participation in contracts 
Understanding the drivers of smallholder participation in contracts will be useful in identifying 
specific barriers to participation and the subsequent strategies that may be used to address these 
barriers. Barriers imposed by specific policy biases will merit review for possible adjustment. 
Where barriers emanate from farmer-specific characteristics and resources, public interventions 
may be required via appropriate technology packages and/or institutional mechanisms. In this 
section, we discuss the results of econometric analysis aimed at unravelling the specific factors 
that influence farmers’ decisions to engage or not to engage in a contractual arrangement in pig 
production. 
5.2.1. Factors affecting decision to participate in contractual arrangements 
Table 16 summarizes the descriptive statistics of survey respondents by type of contract. Here, 
contractual types are classified into formal contracts, informal contracts with cooperatives, 
informal contracts with non-cooperatives (e.g. feed traders, output buyers) and independent (no 
contracts). 
 
Table 16: Descriptive statistics of survey respondents by type of contract 
Variable Formal Cooperative Non-
cooperative 
Independent 
Demographic characteristics     
Age (years) 45.35 45.08 42.65 43.31 
 (8.09) (7.43) (8.95) (8.35) 
Education (years) 11.65 10.31 9.19 9.27 
 (2.17) (1.79) (1.81) (1.71) 
Proportion of time in pig-raising (%) 80.45 60.81 37.35 49.92 
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 (26.05) (23.12) (16.34) (21.96) 
Main occupation is pig-raising 
(dummy = 1 if yes) 
82.35 84.38 44.74 59.5 
Assets     
Area of land owned (m2) 4522.77 2993.48 3121.79 2667.70 
 (8607.44) (3654.92) (2791.97) (1749.80) 
Access to services     
Received government loan 
(dummy = 1 if yes) (%) 
38.24 54.69 26.32 40.5 
No. of visits by veterinarian 0.41 6.35 4.26 4.73 
 (1.18) (7.57) (3.87) (6.63) 
Distance to VBARD (km) 3.38 4.46 6.02 3.72 
 (2.66) (4.09) (3.37) (2.79) 
Distance to commercial supply (km) 3.06 4.90 2.09 1.60 
 (3.01) (10.35) (3.75) (2.57) 
Distance to vet shops (km) 2.47 5.55 2.21 1.61 
 (2.68) (8.87) (5.53) (2.97) 
Location     
Ha Tay (dummy = 1 if yes) (%) 73.53 16.41 10.53 25.00 
Thai Binh (dummy = 1 if yes) (%) 0 34.38 15.79 25.00 
Thanh Hoa (dummy = 1 if yes) (%) 0 35.16 13.16 25.00 
Bac Giang (dummy = 1 if yes) (%) 26.47 14.05 60.52 25.00 
Sample size 34 128 38 200 
Standard deviation in parentheses 
VBARD: Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
Farmers with formal contracts were slightly older than those without formal contracts, although 
the average age of those with formal contracts and those with informal contracts with 
cooperatives was almost the same.  
 
Average years of schooling are also relatively higher among farmers with formal contracts and 
those with informal contracts with cooperatives. Those with informal contracts with non-
cooperatives appear to have the least average number of years of schooling. 
 
Pig producers with formal contracts spend an average 80% of their time on pig production, a 
much higher proportion than that spent by farmers under the other contractual arrangements. 
Those engaged in informal contracts with cooperatives spend on average 61% of their time in 
pig-raising while those with informal contracts with non-cooperatives spend only about a third 
of their time in pig-raising, on average. Independent producers spend much more time on pig-
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raising than those with informal contracts with non-cooperatives but slightly less time than those 
with informal contracts with cooperatives. These findings are consistent with the indicated main 
occupation by respondents according to contractual arrangements. Among independent 
producers and those with informal contracts with non-cooperatives, a lower proportion of 
respondents indicated pig-raising as their main occupation. 
 
In terms of assets, farmers with formal contract arrangements have relatively more land 
compared to those without formal contracts. The differences in land area among farmers with 
informal contracts and independent producers are very small. Access to services is measured in 
five aspects, namely, incidence of receipt of a government loan, number of veterinary visits 
received during in 2005, distance to a formal credit institution – t h e  Vietnam Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD), distance to urban markets (proxied by distance to 
commercial supply of inputs) and distance to veterinary shops.  
 
The incidence of receipt of a government loan was highest among farmers with informal 
contract arrangements with cooperatives followed by independent farmers. Only about 40% of 
formal contract growers had received a government loan. It is thus likely that formal contract 
growers are less dependent on government loans and may have access to other sources of credit 
like private banks.  
 
Farmers with informal contract arrangements with cooperatives reported the highest incidence 
of visits by a veterinarian while those with informal contract arrangements with non-
cooperatives and independent farmers have received the same average number of veterinarian 
visits. Farmers with formal contracts recorded the lowest incidence of veterinarian visits; this 
may be because integrators generally have in-house veterinarians who provide veterinary 
services to their contract growers. 
 
In terms of distance variables, farmers with non-cooperative links are the farthest away from 
VBARD, which may be one reason for the relatively lower incidence of receipts of government 
loans in this group. Independent farmers are the second nearest to VBARD which may account 
for the relatively higher incidence of receipt of government loans by farmers in this group. 
Formal contract growers are nearest to VBARD as many of them live in urban or peri-urban 
areas where VBARD’s offices are located. Independent farmers and farmers with non-
cooperative links were situated nearest to market centres. Both groups of farmers were also 
situated nearest to veterinary shops;  t his may account for the relatively higher incidence of 
veterinary visits among independent farmers. 
 
In terms of geographical spread, formal contract growers are concentrated in only two 
provinces: Ha Tay and Bac Giang. Both these provinces are relatively close to Hanoi and Hai 
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Phong, the main urban markets for pigs and pig meat. Farmers under the other types of contract 
arrangements are evenly distributed across the four survey sites, except for farmers with informal 
links with non-cooperatives who are mostly concentrated in Bac Giang province. 
 
Multinomial logit model of participation 
A multinomial logit model was estimated to identify the factors that determine farmers’ decisions 
to enter into different contractual arrangements. The model allows for multiple choices, with the 
underlying assumption that each choice is independent of the other choices. This is consistent 
with field observations that a farmer’s choice to engage in one contract arrangement does not 
depend on other contract arrangements. The underlying motivation for choice of contractual 
arrangement is founded on utility theory, where rational individuals will make a choice that will 
maximize their utility. This choice will certainly be affected by transaction costs in searching for 
or accessing the various alternatives presented, as well as by the personal circumstances of the 
individual.  
 
A pig raiser’s decision to engage in some form of contractual arrangement for pig production is 
thus hypothesized to be affected by socio-demographic factors, asset holdings, access to inputs 
and services, and location. Specifically, the choice of contractual arrangement is modelled as 
the probability that a farmer will choose one of the four alternatives (formal contract, informal 
contract with cooperative, informal contract with non-cooperative o r  no contract/being 
independent) and is depicted as a binary dummy variable that takes the value 1 under each 
alternative and 0 otherwise. Table 17 shows the estimated coefficients of the multinomial logit 
model, where the base category is “no contract” (i.e. independent farmers).  
 
Table 17: Estimated coefficients of the multinomial model 
 Formal Cooperative Non-cooperative 
Demographic characteristics    
Age 0.133* (0.069) 0.059** (0.019) 0.0004 (0.026) 
Education 1.410*** (0.480) 0.363*** (0.083) 0.126 (0.129) 
Proportion of time in pig-raising 0.123*** (0.040) 0.009 (0.008) -0.024* (0.013) 
Main occupation is pig-raising -2.484 (1.765) 0.908** (0.393) 0.169 (0.557) 
Assets    
Area of land owned 0.0007** (0.0003) -0.00005 (0.00009) 0.00002 (0.00001) 
Access to services    
Received government loan 
(dummy = 1 if yes) 
-1.220 (1.228) 0.374 (0.288) -0.478 (0.539) 
Number of visits by a veterinarian -0.957 (0.680) 0.003 (0.019) 0.012 (0.043) 
Distance to VBARD -0.405 (0.273) 0.023 (0.050) 0.204** (0.069) 
Distance to commercial supply 0.163 (0.118) 0.066 (0.044) 0.089 (0.059) 
Distance to veterinary shops 0.066 (0.150) 0.077** (0.036) -0.012 (0.082) 
This watermark does not appear in the registered version - http://www.clicktoconvert.com
 58 
Location    
Ha Tay (dummy = 1 if yes) -3.358** (1.701) -0.749 (0.518) -1.807** (0.782) 
Thai Binh (dummy = 1 if yes) -35.846 (1.03e+07) -0.124 (0.468) -2.033** (0.718) 
Thanh Hoa (dummy = 1 if yes) -36.846 (1.03e+07) 0.280 (0.482) -1.246* (0.697) 
Constant -27.004*** (7.937) -8.205*** (1.466) -2.101 (1.827) 
Independent status is the base outcome 
Number of observations: 340 
LR chi2 (39): 229.58 
Probability > chi2: 0.0000 
Log likelihood: -247.71046 
Pseudo R2: 0.3167 
VBARD: Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
 
Decision to engage in contracts 
The results from the multinomial logit model estimation indicate that certain demographic 
characteristics significantly affect farmers’ decisions to engage in different types of contracts. 
Farmers who are older and more educated and who spend more time in pig-raising are likely to 
engage in formal contracts or informal contracts with cooperatives rather than remaining 
independent. On the other hand, farmers who spend more time in pig-raising are less likely to 
engage in informal contracts with non-cooperative entities such as feed traders or output 
suppliers relative to being independent farmers. In this case, the farmers may be opting for the 
flexibility afforded by independence as they devote more time to their pig-raising businesses. 
 
Assets ownership was a significant only in the choice to enter into formal contracts; farmers with 
more land are more likely to engage in formal contracts relative to operating independently. 
This is consistent with observations from descriptive statistics where formal contract growers 
generally have large land holdings compared to farmers with informal contracts or independent 
operators. This may also signal the potential for land as an entry barrier to formal contract 
participation by smallholders who, in the context of Vietnam, may only have an average of 0.3 
to 0.5 ha of land. 
 
Among the access variables, distance to VBARD (proxy for access to formal credit) significantly 
affects decisions of farmers with non-cooperative links. Specifically, the result suggests that 
farmers who are nearest to VBARD are more likely to engage in informal contracts with non-
cooperatives rather than remaining independent. On the other hand, farmers who are located 
farther away from veterinary shops are more likely to engage in informal contracts with 
cooperatives relative to remaining independent. This implies that engaging in cooperative 
contracts will facilitate access to veterinary services that otherwise would not be easily 
accessible given the distant location of veterinary shops. 
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Among location dummies, the significance of the Ha Tay coefficient suggests that farmers 
located in Ha Tay are less likely than farmers in Bac Giang (the reference variable) to engage in 
formal contracts or informal contracts with non-cooperatives relative to being independent. 
Currently, formal contracting (in pigs and other commodities) is highly concentrated in Ha Tay 
province, suggesting that farmers in Bac Giang are more likely to engage in formal contracts, 
given that the incidence of formal contracting in Bac Giang is still relatively low at present. 
Informal contracting with traders may also be potentially attractive to farmers in Bac Giang, as 
can be inferred from other results on the Ha Tay location dummy. Further investigations may be 
useful to assess the potential for these indicators of likely interest in formal and informal trader 
contracts by farmers in Bac Giang province. 
 
The statistical significance of the coefficient of the Thai Binh location dummy variable means 
that farmers in Thai Binh are less likely than farmers in Bac Giang to enter into an informal 
contract with a trader (non-cooperative) relative to being independent farmers. 
 
Marginal effects 
Marginal effects are the changes in probability given a unit change in the independent variable 
and are a  more useful basis for interpreting the results of the model. The estimated marginal 
effects as shown in Table 18 suggest that the impact of independent variables on farmer’s choice 
to engage in formal contracts is not statistically significant. However, some variables are 
potentially more important in assessing implications for farmer’s choice to engage in other 
informal contracts. Specifically, education appears to have a higher impact on the probability of 
engaging in informal contracts with cooperatives compared to the potential impact of age (i.e. a 
unit increase in age and education will increase the probability of engaging in this type of 
contract by 1.4% and 8.1%, respectively). Moreover, the change in probability that farmers will 
engage in this type of contract when their main occupation is pig-raising is estimated to be 19%. 
Since this is a dummy variable, the marginal effect is a change in the probability (from 0 to 1) of 
entering into this type of contract. Therefore, there is a 19% increase in the likelihood of 
engaging in informal contracts with cooperatives when pig-raising is the main occupation. 
 
Table 18: Estimated marginal effects under each type of contractual arrangement 
Variable Formal Cooperative Non-cooperative Independent 
Demographic 
characteristics 
    
Age 6.89e-14 (0.000) 0.0136*** (0.004) -0.001 (0.001) -0.0125** (0.004) 
Education 7.87e-13 (0.000) 0.081*** (0.019) -0.0006 (0.006) -0.080*** (0.019) 
Proportion of time 
in pig-raising 
7.47e-14 (0.000) 0.002 (0.002) -0.001** (0.0006) -0.001 (0.002) 
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0.192** (0.076) -0.007 (0.029) -0.185** (0.077) 
Assets     
Area of land owned 4.47e-16 (0.000) -0.00001 (0.00002) 1.90e-06 (0.00001) 0.00001 (0.00002) 
Access to services     
Received 
government loan 
(dummy = 1 if yes) 
-8.25e-13 (0.000) 0.095 (0.065) -0.031 (0.027) -0.064 (0.066) 
No. of vet visits -5.93e-13 (0.000) 0.0006 (0.004) 0.0006 (0.002) -0.001 (0.004) 
Distance to VBARD -2.62e-13 (0.000) 0.001 (0.011) 0.010** (0.004) -0.011 (0.011) 
Distance to 
commercial supply 
8.32e-14 (0.000) 0.013 (0.009) 0.003 (0.003) -0.017 (0.010) 
Distance to 
veterinary shops 
2.43e-14 (0.000) 0.018 (0.008) -0.002 (0.004) -0.016* (0.009) 
Location     
Ha Tay  
(dummy = 1 if yes) 
-1.15e-12 
(0.00001) 
-0.137 (0.102) -0.058** (0.025) 0.195* (0.102) 
Thai Binh 
(dummy = 1 if yes) 
-6.31e-09 
(0.0167) 
0.00002 (0.105) -0.074** (0.026) 0.074 (0.105) 
Thanh Hoa  
(dummy = 1 if yes) 
-1.77e-08 (0.047) 0.085 (0.112) -0.056** (0.028) -0.029 (0.111) 
VBARD: Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
 
From the point of view of independent farmers, the estimated marginal effects o f  age and 
education suggest that a one-year increase in age and education of the farmer will reduce the 
probability that a farmer will remain an independent by 1.25% and 8%, respectively. Hence, as 
a farmer gets more experience through added years in age and schooling, there appears to be 
more potential to engage in some form of contract farming. Also, the likelihood of remaining an 
independent operator declines by about 19% if pig-raising is a farmer’s main occupation. 
 
Among distance variables, a one-kilometre increase in distance between the farmer’s premises 
and the location of VBARD increases the probability that a farmer will engage in informal 
contracts with traders (non-cooperatives) by 1%. 
 
Impacts of location dummies on changes in probability were observed to be significant only in 
the context of informal contracts with non-cooperatives or independent farmers. Specifically, the 
likelihood of engaging in informal contracts with non-cooperatives is reduced by 5.8%, 7.4% 
and 5.6%, respectively, for farmer in Ha Tay, Thai Binh, and Thanh Hoa relative to farmers in 
Bac Giang. On the other hand, the likelihood of remaining an independent farmer is increased 
by 19.5% when a farmer is located in Ha Tay relative to Bac Giang. 
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5.2.2. Factors affecting decision to engage in informal contracts: Probit analysis 
The comparison of descriptive characteristics of households and farms shows that formal 
contract farms are a different class of households and farms, in terms of scale and other 
characteristics, from those of independent producers as well as those with informal contracts. 
Among formal contract growers, there are no smallholders. Hence, a simpler binary probit 
model was estimated as an alternative model to determine the factors that influence farmers’ 
decisions to remain independent or to engage in informal contracts. The underlying motivation 
for this model is the rational choice theory where choice is made in order to maximize utility. 
Specifically, the choice is a binary variable taking a value of 1 if a choice is made to engage in 
informal contracting and a value of 0 otherwise. The same set of independent variables is 
hypothesized to affect this choice plus additional variables on production system and social 
capital. Table 19 presents the estimated coefficients and marginal effects of the independent 
variables in the probit model. 
 
Table 19: Estimated coefficients and marginal effects of the probit model 
Variable Coefficient Marginal effect 
Demographic characteristics   
Gender (dummy = 1 if male) 0.183 (0.216) 0.071 (0.083) 
Age 0122 (0.011) 0.005 (0.004) 
Education 0.205*** (0.054) 0.080*** (0.021) 
Main occupation is pig-raising 0.561** (0.233) 0.213** (0.084) 
Proportion of time spent in pig production -0.006 (0.005) -0.002 (0.002) 
Assets   
Area of agricultural land owned -9.23e-06 (0.00005) -3.62e-06 (0.00002) 
Production system   
Grow-to-finish (dummy = 1 if yes) -1.910*** (0.396) -0.511*** (0.059) 
Piglet prod & fattening combined (dummy = 1 if yes) -1.153*** (0.315) -0.436*** (0.106) 
Total weight sold 1.50e-06 (4.96e-06) 5.90e-07 (1.94e-06) 
Social capital   
Member of cooperative (dummy = 1 if yes) 2.085 *** (0.254) 0.692*** (0.058) 
Access to services   
Received government loan (dummy = 1 if yes) 0.2952574 (0.193) 0.116 (0.075) 
No. of veterinarian visits -0.015 (0.013) -0.006 (0.005) 
Distance to VBARD 0.084** (0.035) 0.033** (0.014) 
Distance to commercial supply 0.101** (0.039) 0.040** (0.015) 
Distance to vet shops 0.024 (0.026) 0.009 (0.010) 
Location   
Ha Tay (dummy = 1 if yes) -1.278*** (0.339) -0.420*** (0.080) 
Thai Binh (dummy = 1 if yes) -1.404*** (0.320) -0.466*** (0.078) 
Thanh Hoa (dummy = 1 if yes) -1.013*** (0.314) -0.360*** (0.094) 
Constant -2.702*** (0.799)   
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Number of observations: 319 
Wald chi2 (18): 110.38 
Probability > chi2: 0.0000 
Log pseudo likelihood: -128.76929 
Pseudo R2:0.4146 
Proportion correctly predicted of informal contracts: 82% 
VBARD: Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
 
Education and pig-raising as  the  main occupation significantly affect farmers’ decisions t o  
engage in informal contracts. Specifically, a one-year increase in education increases the 
probability that a farmer will engage in informal contracts by 7%. Pig-raising a s  the main 
occupation increases the probability that a farmer will engage in an informal contract by 21%. 
 
The  t ype of production system also significantly affects a farmer’s choice of contract 
arrangement. If a farmer operates a grow-to-finish (fattening) or combination production system, 
the probability of engaging in informal contracts declines by 51% or 44%, respectively. As 
observed, most grow-to-finish operations were either under formal contract arrangements or by 
independent farmers while the  combination system was generally practised by independent 
operators. 
 
Membership in cooperatives (as proxy for social capital) increases the probability of engaging in 
informal contracts by 69%. Again, it is known that informal contracts with cooperatives are 
among the more common alternative contractual arrangements practiced by smallholder farmers 
in northern Vietnam. 
 
Distance to VBARD and to commercial supply also influences a farmer’s choice of contract. For 
every one-kilometre increase in distance from VBARD and commercial supply (proxy for urban 
centre), the probability of engaging in informal contracts increases by 3% and 4%, respectively. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that contracting will facilitate reduced transaction costs 
associated with obtaining inputs or accessing services. 
 
The impact of location on choice of contract suggests that the probability of farmers in Ha Tay, 
Thai Binh, and Thanh Hoa engaging in informal contracts will decrease by 42%, 47%, and 
36%, respectively, relative to that of farmers in Bac Giang. Hence, farmers in Bac Giang appear 
to have a higher likelihood of choosing to enter into informal contracts. 
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6. Characterization and Quantification of the True Costs 
and Benefits of Contract Arrangements 
 
This chapter focuses on the differences of farm characteristics of pig producers disaggregated 
into independent and contract producers.  It compares and contrasts independent and contract 
farms in terms of their types of production activities engaged in, in their sources of inputs, access 
to credit and other services, market outlets, and production costs and net returns per unit of 
output.  
6.1. Characteristics of farms 
6.1.1. Scale of farms and types of production systems 
As discussed in previous sections, there are four main types of production systems that were 
observed in the survey sites in Northern Vietnam, namely, farrow-to-weaning (type 1), farrow-to-
finish (type 2), grow-to-finish (type 3), and combination of piglet production (farrow-to-weaning) 
and fattening (farrow-to-finish or grow-to-finish) (see Table 6.1).  Taking total output in terms of 
kg liveweight (based on 2005 operation) as an indicator of scale, four scale categories were 
derived, as follows:  scale 1 (smallest) for total output of at most one ton; scale 2 (small) for total 
output greater than 1 ton up to 5 tons; scale 3 (medium) for total output greater than 5 tons up to 
50 tons, and scale 4 (large) for total output greater than 50 tons.  In terms of scale of farms, 
farrow-to-weaning systems are dominant in the smallest scale category (those producing 130-
1000 kg); and there are no farms engaged in full-cycle systems (farrow-to-finish) among those 
classified under this scale.  On the other hand, combination farms are dominant among scale 2 
(small-commercial farms producing 1001-5000 kg) farms, followed by full-cycle systems (type 
2), then fattening (type 3), while farrow-to-weaning farms account for the smallest share of farms 
classified under this scale category.  Among medium scale farms (those producing 5001-50000 
kg), full-cycle systems (farrow-to-finish) account for a significant share, closely followed by 
combination farms, then fattening farms.  There are no farrow-to-weaning farms in this scale 
category.  The largest farms in this survey (those producing >50000 kg ) are observed to be 
engaged in type 4, followed by farrow-to-weaning.  Both fattening and farrow-to-weaning farms 
are observed to have almost similar shares in this scale category. 
 
These preceding discussions suggest therefore that the relatively smaller farms are likely to be 
engaged in short-duration cycles such as farrow-to-weaning (piglet production) and to some 
extent in fattening (grow-to-finish), or in combination systems.  On the other hand, longer-
duration cycles for farrow-to-finish are more frequently observed among medium to large farms. 
 
This watermark does not appear in the registered version - http://www.clicktoconvert.com
 64 
6.1.2. Sources of inputs 
This section discuss the inputs used in swine production for the pig poducers in the sample: 
contract growers under formal and informal contractual arrangements and independent 
producers. Table 20 shows the distribution of the sample of pig producers by contractual 
arrangement and by type of production activity. 





Contracts Informal Contracts Total 
Type of 
production system     Cooperative Trader All Informal   
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Farrow to weaning 7 21 32 16 16 12 23 62 39 23 78 20 
Farrow to finish 0 0 48 24 47 36 5 14 52 31 100 25 
Grow to finish 27 79 45 23 9 7 2 5 11 7 83 21 
Combination* 0 0 75 38 57 44 7 19 64 39 139 35 
All types 34 100 200 100 129 100 37 100 166 100 400 100 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
Sources of weanling stock 
Among all inputs used for swine production, weanling stock was the most important input. 
According to swine breeders, the quality of weanlings (largely in the context of breed) 
contributes a great deal to the productivity performance of pigs. Table 21 shows the number and 
proportion of farms with regular sources of weanling stock for production activities that use 
weanling stocks. 
Table 21. Number and proportion of pig producers purchasing or securing weanling stock 
from regular sources, by contract arrangement and type of production system 






(n=27) (n=75) (n=123)      
  no. % no. % no. % 
Grow-to-finish 27 100 2 18.2 7 15.6 
Combination (*) n/a n/a 7 10.9 17 22.7 
Total 27 100 9 12.0 24 19.5 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
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There is a stark contrast in the purchase or securing weanling stock from regular sources. For 
contract growers, a hundred percent of the grow-to-finish farmers get their weanlings from their 
regular source – their integrator company. In the relevant activities, on 20 percent of 
independents and 12 percent of those with informal contracts get their weanling stocks from 
regular sources.   
I t  can also be inferred from Table 21 that the majority of farms with informal contracts or 
operating as independents, generally procure their weanlings from non-regular sources. The 
main reason for this practice as cited by survey respondents is that it was difficult for pig raisers 
to find regular sources for weanlings, given the differences duration of the cycles of pig 
farrowing and grow-to-finish activities.  Given the longer duration of farrowing compared to pig 
fattening, farmers engaged in grow-to-finish activities may often find themselves in a situation 
where they could not find replacement weanlings (of desired quality) from their regular suppliers 
after disposing their current batch of fatteners in the market. This would likely be the case when 
the scale of activity of the producers is small, and where the transactions happen only 
infrequently. The second reason mentioned is that the farmers (both with informal contracts and 
independent farmers) prefer to have the flexibility to choose good piglets for fattening when their 
regular suppliers could not supply them. 
 
The various regular sources of weanling stocks by the three categories of pig producers are 
shown in Table 22. 









Type of production system 
 no. % no. % no. % 
Grow-to-finish 27 100.0 2 100 7 100 
a. Bred on farm 0 0.0 0 0 0 0 
b. Purchase from state 
farms 
0 0.0 
0 0 0 0 
c. Purchase from 
commercial farms 
0 0.0 
0 0 5 71.4 
d. Purchase from 
neighbors 
0 0.0 
2 100 2 28.6 
e. From integrator 27 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Combination (*) n/a na/ 7 100 17 100 
a. Bred on farm n/a na/ 5 71.4 16 94.1 
b. Purchase from state n/a na/ 2 28.6 0 0 
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farms 
c. Purchase from 
commercial farms 
n/a na/ 
0 0 0 0 
d. Purchase from 
neighbors 
n/a na/ 
0 0 1 5.9 
e. From integrator n/a na/ 0 0 0 0 
Total 27 100.0 9 100.0 24 100.0 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
As to types of regular sources of weanlings, formal contract growers engaged in grow-to-finish 
operations generally obtain their weanling stocks from their integrator company, thus likely 
ensuring the quality of weanlings. For both independent farms and those with informal 
contracts, under the combined activity type, most breed their weanlings in their own farms. 
Breeding in own farm may be a cheaper way of securing weanling stocks over purchasing them 
in the market. More likely, too, farmers would have greater information on the quality of stocks 
that they themselves produce. 
In grow-to-finish operations, independent farms get their weanling stocks mostly from 
commercial farms. When sourcing weanling stocks from the market, obtaining them from 
commercial farms may result in having greater reliability of the quality of the stocks than when 
the stocks are bought in the neighbouring farms. In contrast, farms with informal contracts  
generally obtain their weanlings from neighbours. More likely, the weanling stocks from the 
neighbours are relatively cheaper than those from commercial farms, but it could also be that 
the farmers have more information about the quality of weanlings given the proximity and/or the 
familiarity with neighbours’ pig raising activities  
 
Source of commercial feed 
There are two types of commercial feed that pig producers generally use, namely, commercial 
mixed feed and concentrate feed.  Table 23 presents the number and proportion of farmers 
having regular sources of mixed feeds. 
Table 23. Number and proportion of pig producers obtaining commercial mix feed from 
regular sources, by contract arrangement and type of production system 
  Formal contracts Informal 
contracts 
Independent 
producers   
Type of 
production 
(n=34) (n=166) (n=200)    
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  no. % no. % no. % 
Farrow to wean 7 100 16 41.0 6 18.8 
Farrow to finish n/a na/ 43 82.7 19 39.6 
Grow to finish 27 100 2 18.2 9 20.0 
Combination (*) n/a n/a 14 21.9 16 21.3 
Total 34 100 75 45.2 50 25.0 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
In the sourcing of commercial mixed feeds, all contract growers obtain their feed from their 
regular source.  For farmers with informal contracts, and to a lesser extent the independents, the 
proportion of producers obtaining commercial mixed feed from regular suppliers is higher than 
the proportion of farmers within the same group obtaining weanlings from regular sources.   
Since feed is purchased and used more frequently as input (as compared to weanlings), farmers 
are more likely to develop supply relationships with feed suppliers, particularly if they are 
purchasing in bigger quantities.   
Table 24 presents the distribution of various regular sources of commercial mixed feeds. 
 









Type of production system 
 no. % no. % no. % 
Farrow-to-weaning 7 100 16 100 6 100 
a. Integrator company 7 100.0 0 0 0 0 
b. From cooperatives 0 0.0 10 62.5 5 83.3 
c. From feed distributors 0 0.0 4 25.0 0 0.0 
d. Feed millers 0 0 0 0.0 1 16.7 
e. Feed retailers 0 0.0 2 12.5 0 0.0 
Farrow-to-finish   43 100 19 100 
a. From cooperatives   32 74.4 10 52.6 
b. From feed distributors   4 9.3 2 10.5 
c. Feed millers   3 7.0 5 26.3 
d. Feed retailers   4 9.3 2 10.5 
Grow-to-finish 27 79.4 2 100 9 100 
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a. Integrator company 27 100.0 0 0 0 0 
b. From cooperatives 0 0.0 0 0.0 9 100 
c. Feed retailers 0 0.0 2 100 0 0 
Combination (*)   41 100 16 100 
a. From cooperatives   32 78.0 15 93.8 
b. Feed millers   7 17.1 0 0 
c. Feed retailers   2 4.9 1 6.3 
Total 34 100.0 75 100.0 50 100.0 
 (*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
All formal contract growers have their integrator companies as their regular source of 
commercial mixed feed. These companies are also feed millers, aside from engaging in pig 
production and meat processing. 
For independents as well as farms with informal contracts, cooperatives are the more dominant 
regular source of commercial mixed feed, except by the farrow-to-finish producers among those 
with informal contracts. It is interesting to note that with the exception of those engaged in 
farrow-to-finish operations, a relatively higher proportion of independent operators have 
indicated cooperatives as their regular sources of commercial mix feed compared with those 
having informal contract agreements.  This reveals that cooperatives play quite an extensive role 
in the distribution of feeds in northern Vietnam, not only catering to their own members but also 
to independent farms who find it convenient to deal with them rather than other sources of 
commercial mixed feed. This also reveals that although majority of the sample of informal 
contract farms were linked to their own cooperatives, the rest that have informal contracts with 
input suppliers (like feed distributors) would less likely patronize another source, e.g., the 
cooperatives in their own locality. 
In farrow-to-f inish, a significant proportion of independents (about one-fourth) also obtain 
commercial mix feed on a regular basis directly from feed millers.  This is interesting because a 
feed miller is also usually an integrator.  Hence, for independent operators having feed millers 
as regular sources of commercial mix feed may suggest that they are buying in bulk (as feed 
millers usually do not sell on retail), and this may also be true among independent operators 
belonging to the upper end of the farm scale.   
None of the formal contract farmers were using feed concentrates. This would imply that the 
mixed feeds being supplied by their integrator companies are already complete from the animal 
nutrition point of view such that supplementary concentrates would be redundant. 
 
Table 25 presents the distribution producers obtaining feed concentrates from regular sources. 
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Table 25. Number and proportion of pig producers purchasing concentrated feed from regular 
sources by contract arrangement and type of production system 
  Informal 
contracts 
Independent 
producers   Both groups 
Type of 
production 
(n=166) (n=200)    
(n=366) 
  no. % no. % no. % 
Farrow to wean 24 61.5 20 62.5 44 62.0 
Farrow to finish 17 32.7 27 56.3 44 44.0 
Grow to finish 8 72.7 34 75.6 42 75.0 
Combination (*) 27 42.2 57 76.0 84 60.4 
Total 76 45.8 138 69.0 214 58.5 
Note: The formal contract growers did not use concentrated feed. 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
Among independents and producers with informal contracts, in the purchase of concentrate 
feed, an even higher proportion of pig producers indicated having regular suppliers for this type 
of feed. Within activity types, the highest rate of use of regular sources is found in grow-to-finish 
operation (74%). 
 
Table 26 shows the various regular sources of concentrate feed by the respondents. 
 





producers Both groups 
Type of production system 
n % n % n % 
Farrow-to-weaning 24 100 20 100 44 100 
a. From cooperatives 24 100 0 0.0 24 54.5 
b. From feed distributors 0 0 5 25.0 5 11.4 
c. Feed millers 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
d. Feed retailers 0 0 15 75.0 15 34.1 
Farrow-to-finish 17 100 27 100 44 100 
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a. From cooperatives 14 82.4 0 0.0 14 31.8 
b. From feed distributors 0 0.0 20 74.1 20 45.5 
c. Feed millers 1 5.9 1 3.7 2 4.5 
d. Feed retailers 2 11.8 6 22.2 8 18.2 
Grow-to-finish 8 100 34 100 42 100 
a. From cooperatives 6 75.0 0 0.0 6 14.3 
b. From feed distributors 0 0.0 5 14.7 5 11.9 
c. Feed millers 0 0.0 1 2.9 1 2.4 
d. Feed retailers 2 25.0 28 82.4 30 71.4 
Combination (*) 27 100 57 100 84 100 
a. From cooperatives 24 88.9 0 0.0 24 28.6 
b. From feed distributors 1 3.7 50 87.7 51 60.7 
c. Feed millers 0 0.0 1 1.8 1 1.2 
d. Feed retailers 2 7.4 6 10.5 8 9.5 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
The regular suppliers of concentrate feed vary between producers with informal contracts and 
independents. Most of the farmers with informal contracts obtain their concentrates from 
cooperatives, while most of the independents get their concentrate feed supply from feed 
distributors or feed retailers.  Feed distributors differ from feed retailers in that the former only 
supply feeds from a specific feed manufacturer (or a specific feed brand), while feed retailers 
may carry different brands of a specific type of feed such as concentrate feed.   
 
Among independent operators, the choice of regular supply source appears to be strongly 
related to the type of activity. Those engaged in shorter duration production cycles like farrow-
to-weaning and grow-to-finish buy more from feed retailers. Given the shorter production 
cycles, the flexibility of switching to different brands of concentrate feeds after observing 
performance after one cycle may be one reason for the observed preference for feed retailers as 
regular sources of concentrate feed. For those engaged in longer-duration activities, feed 
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distributors carrying a particular brand may be more reliable sources for more stable 
performance. 
 
Source of feed ingredients 
Some pig producers use other non-commercial types of feed ingredients that they mix with 
commercial feeds.  These include rice bran, broken rice, maize, cassava, fish meal, among 
others. None of the formal contract pig producers purchase nor use these additional pig 
ingredients. This practice is more commonly observed among household based pig raising 
operations, mainly to reduce feed costs by utilizing available local feed ingredients as substitute 
for commercially processed feeds.  
Table 27 shows the distribution of farmers having regular sources in the purchase of feed 
ingredients. 
Table 27. Number and proportion of pig producers purchasing non-commercial feed 
ingredients from regular sources, by contract arrangement and type of production system 
  Informal 
contracts 
Independent 




(n=166) (n=200)    (n=366)    
  no. % no. % no. % 
Farrow to wean 5 12.8 11 34.4 16 22.5 
Farrow to finish 10 19.2 12 25.0 22 22.0 
Grow to finish 6 54.5 17 37.8 23 41.1 
Combination (*) 18 28.1 43 57.3 61 43.9 
Total 39 23.5 83 41.5 122 30.5 
 (*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
A little less than a third of independent producers and farmers linked with informal contracts 
obtain their feed ingredients from regular suppliers, with the  proportion relatively higher among 
independent producers (42%) than among those with informal contract arrangements (24%). In 
general, feed ingredients are sourced from the open market, as these are more generic inputs 
where quality differences do not vary much from among suppliers. 
Table 28 presents the various regular sources of feed ingredients by the independent producers 
and farmers with informal contracts. 
Table 28. Distribution of respondents by regular sources of feed ingredients, by type contract 
arrangement and production activity 











Type of production 
activity 
 n % n % n % 
Farrow-to-weaning 5 100 11 100 16 100 
a. From cooperatives 5 100 5 45.5 10 62.5 
b. Feed retailers 0 0 6 54.5 6 37.5 
Farrow-to-finish 10 100 12 100 22 100 
a. From integrator 4 40.0 3 25.0 7 31.8 
b. Feed retailers 6 60.0 9 75.0 15 68.2 
Grow-to-finish 6 100 17 100 23 100 
a. From cooperatives 3 50.0 8 47.1 11 47.8 
b. From feed 
distributors 0 0 1 5.9 1 4.3 
c. Feed retailers 3 50.0 8 47.1 11 47.8 
Combination (*) 18 100 43 100 61 100 
a. From cooperatives 8 44.4 24 55.8 32 52.5 
b. Feed retailers 10 55.6 19 44.2 29 47.5 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
Cooperatives and feed retailers are the most common sources of non-commercial feed 
ingredients by those with informal contracts or are independent operators .  Between these two 
sources, it appears that the respondents were not very much particular as to the preferred 
source. This may be consistent with the generally generic character of these feed ingredients 
where the main considerations would be availability of supply and the price of the commodity. 
 
Source of veterinary medicines and other drugs 
Veterinary medicines are special inputs for swine production, and it is very difficult for farmers 
to determine the quality of these inputs ex post, since they do not have adequate technical 
knowledge on this matter. Hence, the majority of them are observed to rely on regular suppliers 
to have some guarantee on the quality of the products. Table 29 presents the distribution of the 
respondents with regular sources of veterinary medicines. 
Table 29. Number and proportion of pig producers buying veterinary medicine from regular 
sources, by contract arrangement and type of production system 
Type of Formal contracts Informal Independent 
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contracts producers production  
activity (n=34) (n=166) (n=200)      
  n % n % n % 
Farrow to wean 7 100 26 66.7 26 81.3 
Farrow to finish 0 0 42 80.8 27 56.3 
Grow to finish 27 100 9 81.8 33 73.3 
Combination (*) 0 0 55 85.9 61 81.3 
Total  34 100 132 79.5 147 73.5 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
Among all inputs, it is in the purchase of veterinary medicines and drugs that has the highest 
incidence of purchasing or obtaining from a regular supplier, particularly among the 
independent producers and those with informal contracts. This very high incidence is observed 
across all activity types. 
Table 30 shows the distribution of respondents according to regular source of veterinary 
medicines and drugs. 
Table 30. Percentage of medicine bought from regular sources, by type of contract 
arrangement and production system 
Formal contracts 





Type of production system 
no. % no. % no. % 
Farrow-to-weaning 7 100 26 100 26 100 
Medicine distributors 0 0.0 7 26.9 4 15.4 
Medicine retailers 0 0.0 1 3.8 1 3.8 
Para-veterinarian 0 0.0 16 61.5 21 80.8 
Veterinary division 7 100.0 2 7.7 0 0 
Farrow-to-finish   42 100 27 100 
Medicine distributors   3 7.1 0 0 
Medicine retailers   1 2.4 1 3.7 
Para-veterinarian   24 57.1 23 85.2 
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Veterinary division   14 33.3 3 11.1 
Grow-to-finish 27 100 9 100 33 100 
Medicine distributors 0 0.0 3 33.3 5 15.2 
Medicine retailers 0 0.0 0 0 1 3.0 
Para-veterinarian 0 0.0 3 33.3 22 66.7 
Veterinary division 27 100.0 3 33.3 5 15.2 
Combination (*)   55 100 61 100 
Cooperative shops   5 9.1 0 0 
Medicine distributors   20 36.4 19 31.1 
Medicine retailers   1 1.8 2 3.3 
Para-veterinarian   22 40.0 34 55.7 
Veterinary division   7 12.7 6 9.8 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
Formal contract growers generally source their veterinary medicines and drugs from their own 
integrator companies. The integrator company would either have its own veterinary division, 
which supplies the products, or would  have their own preferred suppliers, and distributed the 
supplies to their contract growers. 
Among independent producers and those with informal contract agreements, para-veterinarians 
are the most common regular sources of veterinary inputs.  Para-veterinarians are usually local 
people who have been trained by professional veterinarians to provide basic veterinary services 
to farmers in their locality. These services may include diagnosis of common symptoms of 
animal diseases and advice on what appropriate measures may be taken for control, including 
prescription of appropriate medicine when necessary, as well as technical advise on pig raising 
in general. Since para-veterinarians usually live in the same commune or village as the local 
people, they are generally well-known and are familiar with the pig raising activities by people 
in their respective localities.   
Between independent producers and farmers with informal contracts, a higher incidence of 
reliance on para-veteterinarians as regular sources of veterinary inputs is observed among 
independent operators, across types of production activities.  Other significant regular sources of 
those with informal contract arrangements are the veterinary medicine distributors and the 
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veterinary division of the institution they have informal contract with, particularly with 
cooperatives. 
6.1.3. Input price determination 
There are three ways in which input prices are determined as revealed by survey respondents.  
Inputs prices are either based on prevailing market price, or fixed by the input suppliers, or 
negotiated between the buyer and the seller based on some identified criteria agreeable to both 
parties. In the case of formal contracts the input prices are already indicated in the contract 
agreements, i.e., set beforehand by the integrator company. In the case of respondents with 
informal contract arrangements and independent operators, the input prices are more often 
determined based on prevailing market price. Table 31 shows the distribution of how input 
prices are determined, across type of production activities, and across contract arrangements.   
 
Table 31. Input price determination among producers buying inputs from regular sources, by 






producers      
 
Type of production 
n % N % n % 
Farrow-to-weaning 7 100 39 100 31 100 





0.0 29 74.4 19 61.3 
- Fixed by input suppliers 7 100.0 8 20.5 4 12.9 
- Negotiated by both parties 0 0.0 2 5.1 8 25.8 
Farrow-to-finish    50 100  46  100 
- Based on prevailing market 
price 
  
42 80.8 35 77.8 
- Fixed by input suppliers   4 7.7 7 15.6 
- Negotiated by both parties   4 7.7 4 8.9 
Grow-to-finish 27 100  11  100  44  100 





0.0 11 100 35 76.1 
- Fixed by input suppliers 27 100.0 0 0 3 6.5 




0.0 0 0 6 13.0 
Combination (*)    64  100  74  100 
- Based on prevailing market 
price 
  
61 95.3 69 89.6 
- Fixed by input suppliers   0 0.0 2 2.6 
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100.0 164 98.8 195 97.5 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
Variations are found in the second major mode of price determination in particular production 
activities. In farrow-to-weaninging, the second dominant mode among farmers with informal 
contracts is the setting of that the inputs prices by suppliers (20%). For independent producers, 
the second dominant mode is negotiation by both parties (26%). Price setting may occur among 
between traders of inputs and producers that are engaed with them in informal contract 
agreements for the supply of specific inputs such as feeds and veterinary supplies on credit, 
where the supplier is in a position to fix the prices of such inputs.  On the other hand, 
independent operators engaged in the same type of activity, without any ties with the input 
supplier, may be in a better position to negotiate with the traders in the pricing of inputs, 
particulary among producers who have larger scale of operations. 
6.1.4. Benefits from having regular input suppliers 
In formal contracts, the regular relationship between the contract grower and the integrator 
company is an integral part of the relationship. For independent producers and farmers engaged 
in informal contracts, with repeated transactions with regular input suppliers, pig producers 
establish a more stable relationship with their suppliers as compared to simply purchasing inputs 
from the spot market each time. From the viewpoint of producers, maintaining such relationship 
with a regular supplier provide benefits to their pig production activities. Table 32 summarizes 
the distribution of benefits derived from having regular inputs suppliers as perceived by the 
independent producers and farmers with informal contracts, where the incidence of perceived 
benefits is ranked from highest to the least.   
Table 32. Benefits from having regular input supplier, by contract arrangement and type of 
production system (% of farmers' answers) 





producers Both groups 
Farrow-to-weaning    
1. - Deliver to farm without transportation cost 94.9 81.3 88.7 
2. - Assured supply of input 94.9 78.1 87.3 
3. - Input purchase on credit 84.6 81.3 83.1 
4. - Free technical advice when needed 79.5 75.0 77.5 
5. - Guarantee of quality output to output buyers 59.0 50.0 54.9 
6. - Many type of inputs are available 69.2 37.5 54.9 
7. - Provide information on output price 28.2 9.4 19.7 
8. - Provide information on output buyers 23.1 6.3 15.5 
9. - Price premium on volume purchase 10.3 3.1 7.0 
10. - Assist in negotiation with output buyers 5.1 0.0 2.8 
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Farrow-to-finish    
1. - Deliver to farm without transportation cost 94.2 86.7 90.7 
2. - Assured supply of input 94.2 86.7 90.7 
3. - Input purchase on credit 78.8 62.2 71.1 
4. - Guarantee of quality output to output buyers 71.2 64.4 68.0 
5. - Free technical advice when needed 61.5 62.2 61.9 
6. - Many type of inputs are available 57.7 46.7 52.6 
7. - Price premium on volume purchase 32.7 26.7 29.9 
8. - Provide information on output buyers 40.4 13.3 27.8 
9. - Provide information on output price 36.5 11.1 24.7 
10. - Assist in negotiation with output buyers 19.2 2.2 11.3 
Grow-to-finish    
1. - Deliver to farm without transportation cost 100 82.6 86.0 
2. - Assured supply of input 100 82.6 86.0 
3. - Input purchase on credit 90.9 73.9 77.2 
4. - Guarantee of quality output to output buyers 90.9 71.7 75.4 
5. - Free technical advice when needed 54.5 58.7 57.9 
6. - Many type of inputs are available 45.5 54.3 52.6 
7. - Provide information on output price 45.5 32.6 35.1 
8. - Provide information on output buyers 45.5 30.4 33.3 
9. - Price premium on volume purchase 36.4 15.2 19.3 
10. - Assist in negotiation with output buyers 27.3 10.9 14.0 
Combination (*)    
1. - Deliver to farm without transportation cost 98.4 79.2 87.9 
2. - Assured supply of input 98.4 79.2 87.9 
3. - Guarantee of quality output to output buyers 90.6 64.9 76.6 
4. - Free technical advice when needed 78.1 57.1 66.7 
5. - Many type of inputs are available 67.2 55.8 61.0 
6. - Input purchase on credit 51.6 66.2 59.6 
7. - Provide information on output buyers 42.2 24.7 32.6 
8. - Provide information on output price 32.8 27.3 29.8 
9. - Assist in negotiation with output buyers 26.6 15.6 20.6 
10. - Price premium on volume purchase 9.4 22.1 16.3 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
In general, the two most cited benefits from engaging with a regular supplier of inputs, as 
perceived by the respondents, are being assured of supply of inputs and the benefit of having 
them delivered to the producers’ farm without additional cost. This holds for both the 
independent producers and the farmers with informal contracts except in the farrow-to-weaning 
activity where for independents, being assured of the supply of inputs is only ranked third, after 
the derived benefit of obtaining inputs on credit.  The perception of these two benefits from 
maintaining regular suppliers point to the sensitivity to timing of administration of inputs (e.g., 
mixed feeds, veterinary medicines) in pig production, and that the uncertainty of not obtaining 
them and and receiving them on time constitute a transaction cost barrier that would likely 
affect performance. 
The next two most mentioned benefits from engaging with regular suppliers of inputs are the 
opportunity to obtain the inputs on credit (except among farmers engaged in combined 
production systems, where the benefit ranked 6th), the guarantee of the quality of pigs produced 
to output buyers (except for farrow-to-weaning producers who ranked the benefit at a slightly 
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lower rank at 5th). The ability to obtain inputs on credit from a regular supplier appears to be 
closely linked with the other benefit cited on the assurance of the supply of inputs. The grant of 
a credit line could only be given by the supplier on the basis of knowledge of the producer’s 
capacity to repay, and the level of trust developed over past transactions continued to the 
present. The provision of a ‘guarantee’ to buyers of slaughter hogs (and to a lesser extent, piglets) 
of the quality of output of the pig producer is certainly only an informal one, as no certification 
is actually issued. Rather, as the pig producer is known to regularly obtain inputs of known 
quality to a supplier of known reputation, the link between quality inputs to quality output is 
established. This is particularly important in helping producers negotiate for better prices for 
their outputs, especially in the market for pigs where quality of output is very difficult to 
ascertain without any formal certification that is not generally available or affordable to acquire 
by smallholder producers, unless they are linked to some formal mechanisms that can provide 
such formal certification.  In this case, having the input suppliers (generally the feed suppliers) 
perform this certification function provides significant benefit to farmers via their ability to 
negotiate better prices at the very least, or even getting the prices they expect to receive. 
The fifth most cited benefit perceived (although actually alternating between 4th and 5th rank) 
was the provision of free technical advice when needed, which accompanies the provision of 
the inputs. The valuing of provision of free technical advise on pig production from the 
viewpoint of the producer reveals that the relationship between the regular input supplier and 
the pig producer goes beyond the narrow confines of the purchase and sale of inputs, extending 
and deepening the information and knowledge each party gains of the other, which could form 
the basis of future relationships. 
The sixth most mentioned benefit was the availability of a wider range of inputs provided by the 
regular supplier. What this response appears to imply is that farmers who develop a more stable 
relationship with an input suppliers choose a supplier that is able to offer a wide array of inputs 
and services (a ‘one-stop-shop’) so that the farmer does not need to go from one supplier for a 
particular input (e.g., mixed feeds) to another for another particular input (e.g., veterinary 
medicines), or that even for one class of input (e.g., mixed feeds), the supplier offers a variety of 
differentiated products for the farmer to choose from. In this perspective, the farmer could 
reduce the transaction costs associated with search of alternative suppliers for each input, or 
search of alternative specification of a class of inputs from different suppliers. 
As observed in Table 32, there are other benefits from engaging with regular suppliers of inputs, 
and varying significance according to the type of production activity, and according to whether 
or not the farmer was an independent producer or is linked with informal contracts to a market 
intermediary. These include linkages to the market for output such as: the provision of 
information on potential buyers, provision of information on market prices of pigs, and 
assistance in the negotiation with output buyers. Directly related to the inputs transaction is the 
obtaining of discounts (price premium) on volume purchases. 
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In general, with a few exceptions, for each cited benefit from engaging with a regular input 
supplier, the proportion of producers with informal contracts citing the obtaining of such benefit 
is consistently higher than the proportion of independent producers mentioning the obtaining of 
the same benefit. It is likely that farmers with informal contracts with their input suppliers have a 
more stable relationship with them as regular suppliers by virtue of the informal agreements. 
With longer and more stable relationships, the perceived benefits are more frequently revealed, 
and validated each time they are actually realized. 
6.1.5. Market outlets for outputs 
Pig producers either sell their output to their regular buyers or to other buyers in the spot market.  
Table 33 shows the distribution of respondents having regular buyers for their output, by activity 
type, and across contractual arrangements 
Table 33. Number and proportion of pig producers selling output to regular buyers, by 
contract arrangement and type of production system 





producers    
(n=200)  
Type of 
production n % n % n % 
Farrow to wean 7 100 22 56.4 15 46.9 
Farrow to finish   15 28.8 14 29.2 
Grow to finish 27 100 5 45.5 17 37.8 
4. Combination 
(*)     24 37.5 35 46.7 
Total  34 100 66 39.8 81 40.5 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
In the disposal of output, all formal contract growers generally submit their output back to their 
company-integrator with whom they have engaged in a production contract.  In the case of the 
formal contract growers, they do not really ‘sell’ their output but are given corresponding fees in 
compensation for producing the output. 
Between the group of farmers with informal contracts and independent producers, on the whole, 
the incidence of marketing their outputs in regular market outlets is about equal, at around 40 
percent.  This also implies that in general, majority of pig producers outside formal contracts still 
sell their outputs to non-regular buyers.  Common reasons for not being engaged with regular 
buyers include the following:  low volume of output, flexibility to seek better prices and cash 
payment, and lack of regular buyers in the locality.  In cases where there are no local traders in 
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the community, farmers do not have regular contacts with specific traders but have deal with a 
variety of traders who would occasionally come and purchase whatever pigs are available for 
sale. 
Within activities, there are slight variations between the two groups in the incidence of selling to 
a regular buyer of output. In farrow-to-weaning (piglet production), and to a lesser extent in 
grow-to-finish (pig fattening), the proportion of producers with informal contracts selling to 
regular buyers is higher than that of independent farms. On the other hand, the proportions are 
reversed in the combined activities in pig production (with dual types of outputs).  
Pig producers sell two main types of outputs, piglets and fattened pigs.  Fattened pigs could be 
sold as slaughter hogs (90-120 kg), or as ‘growers’, i.e., pigs in fattening not yet at full slaughter 
weight, and are intended for further fattening to reach full slaughter weight.  Piglets, on the other 
hand, are generally sold as weanling stock in pig fattening (for eventual slaughtering), or  in the 
case of good quality female piglets, are sold as replacement gilts for those engaged in farrow-to-
weaning or farrow-to-finish activities.  However, a significant proportion of piglets are also 
procured by exporting companies for export.  Sucking pigs are popular export items from 
Vietnam, and are highly demanded in countries like Hong Kong and China.  The more 
commonly used regular buyers of piglets are local traders, also known as collectors. 
Table 34 shows the composition of regular buyers of output of independent producers and 
farmers with informal contracts. 





producers      
 
Type of production 
n % n % 
Farrow-to-weaning 22 100 15 100 
     -  Neighbor 0 0.0 3 20.0 
     - Local trader 22 100 12 80.0 
Farrow-to-finish 15 100 14 100 
     - Local trader 10 66.7 6 42.9 
     - Butcher/slaughterhouse 5 33.3 8 57.1 
Grow-to-finish 5 100 17 100 
     - Local trader 2 40.0 10 58.8 
     - Butcher/slaughterhouse 3 60.0 7 41.2 
Combination (*) 24 100 35 100 
 a) Piglet/weanlings 8 100 10 100 
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     -  Neighbor 0 0.0 0 0.0 
     - Local trader 8 100 10 100 
b) Fattened pigs 16 100 25 100 
     - Cooperatives 2 12.5 0 0.0 
     - Local trader 10 62.5 12 48.0 
     - Butcher/slaughterhouse 4 25.0 13 52.0 
Total number with regular 
output buyers 66 100.0 81 100.0 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
In general, the regular market outlets for fattened pigs are either the local traders (collectors) or 
local butchers or slaughterhouses. Within types of activity, there is some variation on the more 
dominant regular outlet between producers with informal contracts and independents. In the 
sale of fattened pigs, in the two activities of farrow-to-finish (Type 2) and combination (Type 4), 
a higher proportion of producers with informal contracts have the local trader as their regular 
buyer as compared to the independents. The reverse is true in the activity of grow-to-finish (pig 
fattening). 
In the sale of piglets, although for both the independents and producers with informal contracts 
have the local traders as the dominant regular buyer, for the independent operators, the 
neighbouring farms are also regular outlets. 
It is interesting, particularly among producers with informal contracts, where the greater part of 
the informal contracts are with cooperatives, that these cooperatives themselves are not very 
prominent regular outlets of this group of producers. What is known is that while cooperatives 
encourage members to sell produce back to the cooperative so that the cooperative could 
collectively sell the outputs, there is no restriction on cooperative members in seeking other 
buyers outside the organization, particularly when prices in the open market are good.  The 
cooperative then appears to be an attractive option only when market prices are down, and 
farmer-members encounter difficulty looking for alternative buyers in the market without 
incurring substantial transaction costs for searching and negotiating prices. 
Cooperatives would also figure in some of these regular purchase transactions with its members.  
In Bac Giang province, for example, the cooperatives usually buys good quality female piglets 
from members of the cooperative and then sell these piglets to other provinces for replacement 
gilts. The price of good quality female piglets is generally much higher (sometimes double) than 
that of male piglets. The cooperatives also buy fattened pigs from farmers then sell them to 
slaughterhouses or food processing companies.  
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Slaughterhouses, on the other hand, are generally located in cities or towns and operate as large 
scale operations. They either buy directly from farmers or source their pigs from big traders or 
collectors who can supply the required volume.  
6.1.6. Output price determination 
The formal contract growers are a special case, where the contract growers are not paid a price 
for their output but are rather paid a fixed fee per unit of output by the integrator company, with 
corresponding incentives or penalties depending on performance, as stipulated in the contracts 
prior to undertaking the activity. The determination of the price of piglets in farrow-to-weaning, 
and of slaughter hogs in grow-to-finish, is beyond the scope of the farm but between the 
integrator company and its market outlet. 
For pig producers outside the formal contracts, there are three ways in which output price is 
determined by regular buyers of output, as revealed by survey respondents, namely (i) based on 
prevailing market prices, (ii) negotiated by both parties, or (iii) fixed by output buyers. As the 
transactions with regular buyers are repeated, the mode of price determination can change from 
one market condition to another, for which reason a particular respondent may have multiple 
responses.  
Table 35 shows the distribution of the modes by which prices of output are determined among 
independent producers and farmers with informal contracts, by type of production activity. 
Table 35. Output price determination for producers selling to regular buyers by contract 




producers      
Both groups     
Type of production 
no. % no. % no. % 
Farrow-to-weaning 7 100 13 100 20 100 
- Negotiated by both parties 0 0.0 3 23.1 3 15.0 
- Based on prevailing market price 7 100.0 10 76.9 17 85.0 
- Fixed by buyers 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Farrow-to-finish  44 100 42 100 86 100 
- Negotiated by both parties 32 72.7 32 76.2 64 74.4 
- Based on prevailing market price 12 27.3 10 23.8 22 25.6 
- Fixed by buyers 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Grow-to-finish  11 100 37 1001 48 100 
- Negotiated by both parties 5 45.5 28 75.7 33 68.7 
- Based on prevailing market price 3 27.3 9 24.3 12 25.0 
- Fixed by buyers 3 27.3 0 0 3 6.3 
Combination (*) 79 100 112 100 191 100 
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 a) Piglet/weanlings 36 100 46 100 82 100 
- Negotiated by both parties 25 69.4 40 87.0 65 79.3 
- Based on prevailing market price 11 30.6 3 6.5 14 17.1 
- Fixed by buyers 0 0.0 3 6.5 3 3.7 
b) Fattened pigs 43 100 66 100 109 100 
- Negotiated by both parties 25 69.4 40 87.0 65 79.3 
- Based on prevailing market price 15 34.9 6 9.1 21 19.3 
- Fixed by buyers 0 0.0 1 1.5 1 0.9 
Total responses 141 100 204 100 345 100 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006 
 
For farmers outside the formal contract arrangements, prices are negotiated between regular 
buyers and the sellers. The exceptions are the producers engaged in farrow-to-weaning, where 
prices are more dominantly based on prevailing market prices. In general, therefore, producers 
with regular buyers appear to have a relatively good negotiating position, whether or not one is 
independent or linked to an informal contract with a market intermediary, although the 
incidence of price negotiation is slightly higher among independent producers. In the case of 
farmers with informal contracts, where  the arrangements are more prevalent in input supply 
rather than in output purchase, their being engaged in informal contracts may not show direct 
impacts on the output side in terms of a stronger position to negotiate on prices with regular 
buyers. 
 
There were only a few instances where the prices of the output were fixed by the buyer. In the 
case of producers with informal contracts, these may arise when the informal contract with an 
input or output trader stipulates that the output be delivered to the buyer at his own terms. 
 
6.1.7. Mode of payment by buyers 
Regular Buyers 
There are three main modes of payment used by regular buyers to pay for their output purchases 
from pig producers, namely: (i) cash payment at delivery, (ii) buying on credit, and (iii) cash 
advance.  
Again the formal contract growers are a special case. Contract growers are not paid the price of 
their output but a fixed fee per unit of output for the service. The fee is not given immediately 
upon pick up of the pigs from the farm, but settled at a later date after each production cycle, as 
specified in the contract – thus in a sense, on credit.. 
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Table 36 presents the distribution of the modes of payment for output among the independent 
producers and farmers with informal contracts. 
Table 36. Mode of payment to producers selling to regular buyers, by contract arrangement 




producers      
Both groups     
Type of production 
n % n % n % 
Farrow-to-weaning  22 33.3 15 18.5 37 100 
   - Cash payment at delivery 13 59.1 6 40.0 19 51.4 
   - Credit 2 9.1 2 13.3 4 10.8 
   - Cash advance 7 31.8 7 46.7 14 37.8 
Farrow-to-finish  15 22.7 14 17.3 29 16.0 
   - Cash payment at delivery 7 46.7 4 28.6 11 37.9 
   - Credit 2 13.3 8 57.1 10 34.5 
   - Cash advance 6 40.0 2 14.3 8 27.6 
Grow-to-finish  5 7.6 17 21.0 22 100 
   - Cash payment at delivery 2 40.0 5 29.4 7 31.8 
   - Credit 0 0 8 47.1 8 36.4 
   - Cash advance 3 60.0 4 23.5 7 31.8 
Combination (*) 24 36.4 35 43.2 59 32.6 
 a) Piglet/weanlings 8 100.0 10 100.0 18 100.0 
   - Cash payment at delivery 0 0 5 50.0 5 27.8 
   - Credit 0 0 1 10.0 1 5.6 
   - Cash advance 8 100 4 40.0 12 66.7 
b) Fattened pigs 16 100.0 25 100.0 41 100.0 
   - Cash payment at delivery 4 25.0 4 16.0 8 19.5 
   - Credit 8 50.0 15 60.0 23 56.1 
   - Cash advance 4 25.0 6 24.0 10 24.4 
Total 66 100 81 100 181 100 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
Among independent producers and farmers with informal contracts, there is no consistently 
dominant mode of payment. There is some variation across production activity types, and 
between contract arrangements.  
Among farmers with informal contracts, there is a relative balance between cash-on-delivery 
and cash advance in farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish, and grow-to-finish. In the combined 
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activity, however, cash advance is dominant in the sale of piglets, but credit is relatively 
dominant in the sale of fattened pigs.   
Among independent producers, sale on credit is more commonly used by those engaged in 
farrow-to-finish, grow-to-finish, and in selling fattened pigs from a combined activity.  In this 
case local traders or butchers/slaughterhouses usually purchase slaughter hogs on credit and 
payment will take place between one week-to-one month after sale.  In the activities of farrow-
to-finish, and piglet production in the combined activity, there is a relative balance between 
cash-on-delivery and cash advance. This mode of payment is used by some traders to secure 
supply of pigs from producers, especially during times of high demand for both piglets and 
slaughter hogs.  Cash advance payment is usually paid one to two weeks in advance of pick up 
of pigs by the buyer. 
Non-Regular Buyers 
As before, formal contract growers are a special case as they do not deal with non-regular 
buyers of their output. All pigs are turned in to their integrator company. In contrast, as 
previously discussed, majority of pig producers outside the formal contract growing 
arrangements sell their output to non-regular buyers in the open market.  
Table 37 presents the distribution of the mode of payment for output to independent producers 
and farmers with informal contract arrangements who sell to non-regular buyers of output. 
Table 37. Mode of payment to producers selling to non-regular buyers, by contract 




producers      
Both groups     
Type of production 
n % n % n % 
Farrow-to-weaning  16 100 14 100 30 100 
   - Cash payment at delivery 5 31.3 7 50.0 12 40.0 
   - Credit 11 68.8 1 7.1 12 40.0 
   - Cash advance 0 0 6 42.9 6 20.0 
Farrow-to-finish  29 100 29 100 58 100 
   - Cash payment at delivery 6 20.7 7 24.1 13 22.4 
   - Credit 17 58.6 15 51.7 32 55.2 
   - Cash advance 6 20.7 7 24.1 13 22.4 
Grow-to-finish  6 100 20 100 26 
100 
100 
   - Cash payment at delivery 1 16.7 5 25.0 6 23.1 
   - Credit 3 50.0 8 40.0 11 42.3 
   - Cash advance 2 33.3 7 35.0 9 34.6 
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Combination (*) 56 100 76 100 132 100 
 a) Piglet/weanlings 28 100.0 35 100.0 63 100.0 
   - Cash payment at delivery 11 39.3 1 2.9 12 19.0 
   - Credit 0 0 32 91.4 32 50.8 
   - Cash advance 17 60.7 2 5.7 19 30.2 
b) Fattened pigs 31 100.0 41 100.0 69 100.0 
   - Cash payment at delivery 11 39.3 5 12.2 16 23.2 
   - Credit 12 42.9 18 43.9 30 43.5 
   - Cash advance 5 17.9 18 43.9 23 33.3 
Total 107 100 139 100 246 100 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
The modes of payment used by non-regular buyers are the same as those used by regular 
buyers. The incidence of use of each type, however, varies.  In particular, in contrast to selling 
to regular buyers, there is a relatively higher incidence of use of delayed payments (i.e., sale on 
credit) among non-regular buyers. The exceptions are in farrow-to-weaning among independent 
producers, and in the selling of piglets among farmers with informal contracts engaged in the 
combined activity.  
The prevalence of delayed payments by non-regular buyers appears to characterize the 
condition of the market with non-regular buyers – that it is a buyers’ market. Under these 
conditions, sellers compete with other sellers for a transaction with a limited number of buyers. 
This appears to indicate that when a producer is not able to establish a stable relationship with a 
regular buyer, the resort to non-regular buyers in the open market increases the risk of the 
farmer finding himself in relatively inferior position than the buyer fo the output.  This aspect 
may need to be investigated further to determine the true motivations for why producers would 
be willing to sell their outputs to non-regular buyers on credit. 
Among independent producers, there is also an observed relatively high incidence of use of 
cash advance by non-regular traders. It is conjectured that cash advance payments may act as 
incentives to producers, particularly those not linked to any output marketing contracts to sell to 
non-regular buyers of output. 
6.1.8. Mode of delivery to buyers 
In formal contract growing production, the integrator company schedules the picking up of the 
outputs from the farm, as specified in the agreement. 
Among pig producers outside formal contracts, there are two main modes of output delivery to 
buyers, namely: picked up from farm or delivered to buyers.  Regular buyers often offer to pick 
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up output from the farm, without additional charges. By doing so, they internalize the cost of 
transporting output from farm to the market.   
Table 38 shows the distribution of the mode of output delivery to regular buyers among 
independent producers and farmers with informal contracts. 
Table 38. Distribution of producers by mode of output disposal to regular buyers, by contract 




producers      
 
Type of production 
n % n % 
Farrow-to-weaning 22 33.3 15 18.5 
    - Picked up at farm 22 100.0 15 100.0 
    - Delivered to buyers 0 0 0 0 
Farrow-to-finish 15 22.7 14 17.3 
    - Picked up at farm 15 100.0 14 100.0 
    - Delivered to buyers 0 0 0 0 
Grow-to-finish 5 7.6 17 21.0 
    - Picked up at farm 5 100.0 17 100.0 
    - Delivered to buyers 0 0 0 0 
Combination (*) 24 36.4 35 43.2 
 a) Piglet/weanlings     
    - Picked up at farm 8 100.0 10 100.0 
    - Delivered to buyers 0 0 0 0 
b) Fattened pigs     
    - Picked up at farm 16 100.0 25 100.0 
    - Delivered to buyers 0 0 0 0 
Total number with regular 
buyers 66 100.0 81 100.0 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
When the pig producers are engaged with a regular buyer of output, they uniformly obtain the 
benefit of pigs or piglets being picked up at the farm, rather than the farmers bring the live pigs 
or piglets to the buyer centre of the market intermediary. This is so, whether the producer was 
engaged in an informal contract or not. 
Some non-regular buyers, on the other hand, require delivery of output from the producer’s farm 
to the buyer’s premises. This was observed to be more common among buyers of pigs from 
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farmers engaged in the grow-to-finish activity.  In this case the additional cost of transporting the 
pigs from the farm to the buyer’s premises is borne by the pig producer. 
6.1.9. Benefits from having regular output buyers 
Some of the difficulties faced by pig raisers are the fluctuation and unpredictability of output 
prices, and the seasonality in demand. In addition, recent outbreaks of diseases in livestock, 
such as foot and mouth disease (FMD) in pigs and cattle, bird flu (HPAI) in poultry, and most 
recently the porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS) in pigs, have seriously 
affected animal production in Vietnam. Farmer production and marketing decisions are affected 
by these events, making it more difficult to make decisions specifically about how much to 
produce, and when and where to sell products. Having a regular buyer of output from pig 
production is seen to help to minimize risks in production and marketing of pigs and piglets.  
 
The survey respondents have identified a number of benefits that are derived from having 
regular buyers of output, namely, (i) assured buyers of outputs; (ii) getting price premium on 
volume output sale; (iii) getting payment for output sold in cash; (iv) free technical advice when 
needed; (v) minimum quality requirements demanded; (vi) reduce time spend and other 
transaction costs to find the traders, and (vii) buyers pick up outputs at farm without additional 
cost to producers.  Table 39 presents the distribution of perceived benefits from engaging with a 
regular output buyer, by independent producers and those with informal contracts, across pig 
production activities. 
Table 39. Benefits from having regular output buyers, by contract arrangement and type of 
production system (multiple responses) 
Informal 
contracts 
(n = 166) 
Independent 
producers      
(n = 200) 
Both groups    
(n = 366) 
 
Type of production 
no.  % no.  % no.  % 
Farrow-to-weaning        
    - Assured buyers of outputs 22 56.4 16 50.0 38 53.5 
    - Pick up output on farm, no cost to 
producers 18 46.2 12 37.5 30 42.3 
    - Payment in cash 17 43.6 10 31.3 27 38.0 
    - Price premium on volume output sale 10 25.6 3 9.4 13 18.3 
Farrow-to-finish        
    - Pick up output on farm, no cost to 
producers 17 32.7 12 26.7 29 29.9 
    - Assured buyers of outputs 16 30.8 13 28.9 29 29.9 
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    - Payment in cash 15 28.8 12 26.7 27 27.8 
Grow-to-finish        
    - Assured buyers of outputs 5 45.5 17 37.0 22 38.6 
    - Pick up output on farm, no cost to 
producers 3 27.3 15 32.6 18 31.6 
    - Payment in cash 4 36.4 12 26.1 16 28.1 
    - Minimum quality requirements demanded 3 27.3 6 13.0 9 15.8 
Combination (*)        
    - Assured buyers of outputs 27 42.2 22 28.6 49 34.8 
    - Pick up output on farm, no cost to 
producers 22 34.4 24 31.2 46 32.6 
    - Payment in cash 25 39.1 18 23.4 43 30.5 
    - Minimum quality requirements demanded 16 25.0 12 15.6 28 19.9 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source:  ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
Ranked according to importance, it is shown that having an assured buyer of output, pick up 
services of output from farm without additional charges, and payment in cash, are the three 
most important benefits from having regular output buyers by survey respondents. These three 
benefits were cited predominantly by both producers with informal contracts and independents, 
although the there were some variation in the ranking of these three benefits by the two groups 
as the type of production activity changes. 
 
It is also noted that in dealing with regular buyers of output, the considerations for incentives for 
volume of sale, and quality requirements for output, are beginning to emerge, although not yet 
dominant aspects of the transactions. 
 
6.2. Access to credit and other services 
Lack of capital has always been identified as a major constraint to pig production by pig 
producers.  Table 40 presents the incidence of borrowing by producers with informal contracts 
and independents. 
Table 40. Incidence of using credit, by contract arrangement and type of production system 
(percent share to total sample) 
 
Type of production 
Informal contracts 
(n = 166) 
Independent 
producers       
(n = 200) 
All participants      
(n = 366) 
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Farrow-to-weaning 7.7 28.1 16.9 
Farrow-to-finish  65.4 46.7 56.7 
Grow-to-finish  63.6 50.0 52.6 
Combination (*) 65.6 36.4 49.6 
Total 51.8 40.5 45.6 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey 
 
In general, there is relatively higher incidence of the use of credit among those producers having 
some form of informal contract arrangements compared to independent producers, except in 
farrow-to-weaning.  The relatively low incidence of credit use among those engaged in farrow-
to-weaning could be attributed to the observation of the predominance of small-scale operations 
in this production.  Hence, credit is not easily available to these farms given their scale and type 
of operations.  On the other hand, it could be the case that credit for working capital may not be 
critical in this system as compared to more input intensive systems as grow-to-finish (where feed 
inputs requirements are quite demanding in terms of working capital) or in longer duration cycle 
systems like farrow-to-finish.  Since majority of sows raised for piglet production in the survey 
areas are cross-breeds, the feed requirement will only become more intense (and costly) when 
piglets are born and they are raised to weanling age for 25-60 days. 
6.2.1. Amount of loan 
Farmers in general have obtained at least one loan for pig production and at most three loans at 
the time of the survey. In general, at least half of survey respondents have obtained loans for pig 
production. 
Table 41 provides information on the amount of loan that farmers get from different sources.  
The average amount of loan that pig raisers borrowed from all credit sources varied from 9417.5 
thousand VND (about US$588) to 90000 thousand VND (about US$5625) per household (based 
on 2005 operations, and exchange rate of 16000 VND/US$1).  
 
Table 41. Amount of loan borrowed per loan transaction, by contract arrangement and type of 
production system 
Informal contracts 
(n = 166) 
Independent producers      
(n = 200) 
All participants     
(n = 366) 
 








1. Loan 1             
    Farrow-to-weaning 3 8333.3 9 9778.9 12 9417.5 
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    Farrow-to-finish 30 26050.0 21 25976.2 51 26019.6 
    Grow-to-finish 7 17714.3 22 15636.4 29 16137.9 
    Combination (*) 40 37525.0 29 35431.0 69 36644.9 
2. Loan 2             
    Farrow-to-weaning 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    Farrow-to-finish 1 10000.0 1 15000.0 2 12500.0 
    Grow-to-finish 0 0 4 17525.0 4 17525.0 
    Combination (*) 5 61800.0 4 9750.0 9 38666.7 
3. Loan 3             
    Farrow-to-weaning 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    Farrow-to-finish 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    Grow-to-finish 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    Combination (*) 2 90000.0 0 0 2 90000.0 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
The average amount of loan also varied across types of production system and contractual 
arrangement. On average, producers with some form of informal contracts obtained larger loan 
amounts than independent producers (see Table 42).  Larger average loan amounts are also 
observed in combination systems, followed by farrow-to-finish systems.  This is consistent with 
the relatively higher working capital requirements in full cycle systems that are characteristics of 
both types of production systems, although in combination systems, there could also be shorter-
duration cycles of either fattening or piglet production in combination with farrow-to-finish. 
Table 42. Amount of loan borrowed, by contract arrangement and type of production system 
Informal contracts 
(n = 166) 
Independent producers      
(n = 200) 
All participants    (n = 
366) 
 








1. Farrow-to-weaning 3 8333.3 9 9778.9 12 9417.5 
2. Farrow-to-finish 34 23279.4 21 26690.5 55 24581.8 
3. Grow-to-finish 7 17714.3 23 18004.4 30 17936.6 
4. Combination (*) 42 47380.9 28 38089.3 70 43664.3 
Total sample with loans 86 34075.6 81 26285.3 167 30297.1 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
6.2.2. Sources of credit 
Farmers could borrow money from formal and informal sources. Survey respondents indicated 
that there are usually five sources of credit that farmers can tap for general and pig production 
related purposes. These include (i) Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
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(VBARD), (ii) Bank for Social Policy, (iii) Credit cooperatives, (iv) Bank for Investment and 
Development of Vietnam (BIDV), and (v) money lenders.  Table 43 shows the various sources of 
credit where the independent producers and farmers with informal contract borrowed funds 
from.  
Table 43. Percentage of farmers obtaining loans from different credit sources 
Informal contracts 
(n = 166) 
Independent 
producers             (n 
= 200) 
All      
participants    (n 
= 366) 
 
Type of production 
n % n % n % 
VBARD 50 58.1 48 59.3 98 58.7 
Bank for Social Policy 12 13.9 13 16.1 25 14.9 
Credit cooperatives 11 12.8 8 9.9 19 11.4 
Money lenders 3 3.5 4 4.9 7 4.2 
BIDV 10 11.6 8 9.9 18 10.8 
Total 86 100 81 100 167 100 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
In general, the most popular source of credit was the Vietnam Bank of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (VBARD), with about 60 percent of the borrowers citing this particular source. The 
rest of the sources of credit play a rather minor role as source. 
Across production activities, the relative importance of the various sources of credit also varied. 
Table 44 shows the variation is dominant sources of credit by type of activity and contract 
arrangement. 
Table 44. Sources of credit for pig raising accessed by pig producers, by contract arrangement 
and type of production system 
Informal contracts 
(n = 166) 
Independent 
producers      (n 
= 200) 
All      participants       
(n = 366) 
 
Type of production 
n % n % n % 
1. Farrow-to-weaning 3 100 9 100 12 100 
VBARD 0 0 4 44.4 4 33.3 
Bank for Social Policy 2 66.7 1 11.1 3 25.0 
Credit cooperatives 1 33.3 0 0 1 8.3 
Money lenders 0 0 2 22.2 2 16.7 
BIDV 0 0 2 22.2 2 16.7 
2. Farrow-to-finish 34 100 21 100 55 100 
VBARD 18 52.9 10 47.6 28 50.9 
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Bank for Social Policy 4 11.8 4 19.0 8 14.5 
Credit cooperatives 5 14.7 5 23.8 10 18.2 
Money lenders 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BIDV 7 20.6 2 9.5 9 16.4 
3. Grow-to-finish 7 100 23 100 30 100 
VBARD 7 100 16 69.6 23 76.7 
Bank for Social Policy 0 0 3 13.0 3 10.0 
Credit cooperatives 0 0 1 4.3 1 3.3 
Money lenders 0 0 2 8.7 2 6.7 
BIDV 0 0 1 4.3 1 3.3 
4. Combination (*) 42 100 28 100 70 100 
VBARD 25 59.5 18 64.3 43 61.4 
Bank for Social Policy 6 14.3 5 17.9 11 15.7 
Credit cooperatives 5 11.9 2 7.1 7 10.0 
Money lenders 3 7.1 0 0.0 3 4.3 
BIDV 3 7.1 3 10.7 6 8.6 
(*) Combination between farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
While the VBARD is still a dominant source of credit in most of the production activities, the 
institution as not a source of credit at all among farrow-to-weaning producers with informal 
contracts. This may already indicate that since farrow-to-weaning activities were found to be 
small in scale, the access to credit from VBARD, a formal banking institution, may not be scale 
neutral. The more dominant source of credit for this group Bank for Social Policy, a special bank 
designed to serve the needs of poor people in Vietnam. The bank has relatively less restrictive 
collateral requirements compared with other financial institutions.   
Among independent producers, borrowing from credit cooperatives and from informal sources 
like moneylenders also emerge to be significant among those engaged in  farrow-to-weaning. 
 
6.3. Cost and returns 
6.3.1. Production cost in swine production by type of production systems and type of contract 
arrangements  
The computation of production cost in swine production in Northern Vietnam is based on 
information obtained from survey data.  Specifically, production costs are computed by type of 
production system, e.g., farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish, grow-to-finish, and combination 
type system.  Within each type of production system, costs are further categorized according to 
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breed used to capture potential variations arising from technology use.  In this case, breed types 
as observed among survey respondents are categorized into exotic and combination breed, 
where the former refers to use of pure exotic breeds and the latter refers to use of crossbreeds 
(e.g., local breed x exotic breed, local breed x crossbreed with high local blood, cross breed x 
exotic breed).   
Technology Use 
The use of exotic breed (sow, boar, weanling stock) is associated with the use of a more 
sophisticated technology, where potential productivity is higher, and in order to exploit the 
productivity potentials, would require the use of higher quality feeds, and more intensive animal 
health care to minimize mortality due to diseases. However, not all farmers would venture into 
the use of exotic breeds as the cost of the exotic stock is higher, higher quality feeds more 
expensive, and thus entail higher risks. Table 45 presents the comparison of the use of exotic 
breeds between producers with informal contracts and independent farmers. 
Table 45. Incidence of adoption of exotic breed by sample producers, by contract arrangement 
and type of production system 








1. Farrow to weaning 7.7 9.4 
2. Farrow to finish 86.5 29.2 
3. Grow to finish 18.2 0.0 
4. Combination (*) 60.9 18.7 
All types 53.6 15.5 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
In general, a much higher proportion of producers with informal contracts use exotic breeds 
(54%) than do independent producers (16%). Among activities, producers engaged in farrow-to-
weaning (Type 1), as well as in grow-to-finish (Type 3), exhibit the lowest adoption rate of exotic 
breed technology. 
The low adoption rate of exotic breeds in farrow-to-weaning are likely related to the market 
demand for a particular type of suckling pigs (Mon Cai breed, or its crosses) as well as for 
weanlings by farmers engaged in pig fattening. In addition, the low adoption rate may also be 
scale-related, knowing that most of the farmers engaged in farrow-to-weaning belong to the 
lowest scale in pig operations. 
In the farrow-to-finish activity and combined operations, the difference in adoption rates of 
exotic breeds between farmers with informal contracts and independent producers is very 
evident. This may imply that farmers with informal contracts have greater access to exotic 
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breeds and their complementary technology than do independents, and that this access is 
facilitated by engagement in informal contracts. 
Structure of costs of production. 
In the absence of information on the breakdown of costs of production among formal contract 
growers, only the costs structure relating to independent producers and farmers with informal 
contracts are presented discussed. 
The respective structures of costs of production are computed to determine the relative 
importance of specific inputs to cost, in the various pig production activities, according to 
production technology (i.e., exotic breed vs. combination), and compare them between farmers 
with informal contracts and independent operators. Specific cost items are identified and 
computed, namely, cost of weanlings (as stock), feeds, veterinary medicine, breeding cost, 
utilities, depreciation of equipment, depreciation of sow (in the case of farrow-to-weaning and 
farrow-to-finish operations), and cost of hired labour.  Cost of family labour is not included 
under the assumption that the opportunity cost of family labour is very minimal in Northern 
Vietnam. 
Farrow-to-weaning (Type 1) 
The comparison of the costs structure between producers with informal contracts and 
independents is shown in Table 46. 
Table 46. Cost structure of swine production in farrow-to-weaning (in '000 VND per kg 
liveweight, unless otherwise specified) 
Combination breed 1 Exotic breed 
Informal  
contracts  
(n = 36) 
Independent  
producers  







Cost item Cost/kg % Cost/kg % Cost/kg % Cost/kg % 
1. Weanling 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
2. Feed 10.49 74.2 12.28 78.3 12.34 78.7 11.96 83.3 
3. Veterinary medicine 0.31 2.2 0.28 1.8 0.21 1.3 0.19 1.3 
4. Breeding 0.22 1.6 0.2 1.3 0.16 1.0 0.10 0.7 
5. Utilities 1 7.1 0.95 6.1 1.01 6.4 0.27 1.9 
6. Depreciation of equipment & tools 0.96 6.8 0.93 5.9 0.26 1.7 0.48 3.3 
7. Depreciation of sows 1.15 8.1 1.05 6.7 1.69 10.8 1.25 8.7 
8. Hired labor 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.10 0.7 
 Total 14.13 100 15.69 100 15.67 100 14.35 100 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
Note: 1 Combination breed: local breed x cross breed, local breed x exotic breed, cross breed x 
exotic breed 
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In farrow-to-weaning system, feed costs accounted for the largest share of production costs, with 
with the share of feed costs higher in using exotic breeds (79-83%) than in using a combination 
of breeds (74-78%).  For informal contracts, the cost per unit of output (i.e., piglets, in kg 
liveweight) using exotic breeds is higher than those using combined breeds (by 10%). Note, 
however, that the mean cost of production using exotic breeds are computed using a very 
limited sample size. 
Using combined breeds, comparing between farmers with informal contracts and independent 
producers, the cost shares of each item are quite similar. However, that the average cost per unit 
of output by independent producers is higher by 10% than that of producers with informal 
contracts. This is traced mainly to the higher cost of feed by independent farmers. 
In production using exotic breed, the cost per unit output of informally linked producers is 
higher than that of independent operators by 8%. Again, the cost differences could be attributed 
to the higher cost of feed and the relatively higher proportion of utilities costs by those engaged 
in informal contract arrangements compared with those incurred by independent producers. 
 
Farrow-to-finish system (Type 2) 
In the farrow-to-finish activity, the final output is slaughter hogs, in kilograms liveweight. The 
comparison of the structure of costs between producers with informal contracts and 
independents is shown in Table 47. 
Table 47. Cost structure of swine production in farrow-to-finish (in '000 VND per kg 
liveweight) 
Combination breed 1 Exotic breed 
Informal  
contracts  
(n = 7) 
Independent  
producers  







Cost item Cost/kg % Cost/kg % Cost/kg % Cost/kg % 
1. Weanling 0 0.0 0.1 0.8 0 0.0 0.56 3.9 
2. Feed 10.43 94.3 10.96 92.3 11.89 89.3 12.34 86.4 
3. Veterinary medicine 0.07 0.6 0.08 0.7 0.13 1.0 0.09 0.6 
4. Breeding 0.04 0.4 0.04 0.3 0.06 0.5 0.04 0.3 
5. Utilities 0.16 1.4 0.16 1.3 0.35 2.6 0.2 1.4 
6. Depreciation of equipment & tools 0.11 1.0 0.31 2.6 0.19 1.4 0.27 1.9 
7. Depreciation of sows 0.25 2.3 0.22 1.9 0.68 5.1 0.68 4.8 
8. Hired labor 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.7 
 Total 11.06 100 11.87 100 13.32 100 14.28 100 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
Note: 1 Combination breed: local breed x cross breed, local breed x exotic breed, cross breed x 
exotic breed 
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Compared to farrow-to-weaning, the farrow-to-finish production system is more feed-intensive, 
with the share feed in cost ranging from 86 to 94 percent of cost. This could be attributed to the 
longer duration of the production cycle in this system relative to farrow-to-weaning system.    
Between technologies, the difference between the cost per unit of output using exotic breeds 
and using a combination of breeds is even larger (about 20%, within contract arrangement). In 
general, this could be attributed to the higher costs of feed and higher depreciation of sows in 
the use of exotic breeds. 
Focusing on the use of combined breeds, the cost shares are generally similar between 
producers with informal contracts and independents, although feed costs have a relatively 
higher share among farmers with informal contracts. In cost per unit of output, however, the 
independent producers exhibited a higher unit cost (by 6%) than the producers with informal 
contracts. This is traced mainly to the lower cost of feed by the farmers with informal contracts. 
A similar case can be observed with those using exotic breed where independent producers 
incurred higher cost per unit of output (by 7%) mainly due to higher cost of feeds incurred by 
independent operators. 
 
Grow-to-finish systems (Type 3) 
The grow-to-finish production system is one of the activities where the incidence of the use of 
exotic breeds is lowest (together with farrow-to-weaning). In this system, independent farmers 
did not raise pigs of exotic breed, while only two farmers with some form of informal contract 
arrangements did.  The comparison of cost structures between farmers with informal contracts 
and independent producers is shown on Table 48.  
Table 48. Cost structure of swine production in grow-to-finish (in '000 VND per kg liveweight) 
Combination breed 1 Exotic breed 
Informal  
contracts  
(n = 9) 
Independent  
producers  







Cost item Cost/kg % Cost/kg % Cost/kg % Cost/kg % 
1. Weanling 3.5 33.2 5.28 31.3 0 0.0   
2. Feed 6.24 59.1 10.91 64.7 15 96.6   
3. Veterinary medicine 0.07 0.7 0.08 0.5 0.2 1.3   
4. Breeding 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0   
5. Utilities 0.55 5.2 0.36 2.1 0.32 2.1   
6. Depreciation of equipment & tools 0.19 1.8 0.21 1.2 0 0.0   
7. Hired labor 0 0.0 0.03 0.2 0 0.0   
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 Total 10.55 100 16.87 100 15.52 100     
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
Note: 1 Combination breed:  local breed x cross breed, local breed x exotic breed, cross breed x 
exotic breed 
 
Unique to the grow-to-finish system, relative to the rest, is that two significant cost items figure 
prominently in the production cost structure, namely, the cost of weanling and feed cost, which 
together would account for around 92-97 percent of total production cost.  Specifically, on 
average, cost of weanlings account for at least one-third of total production cost, and feed cost 
for slightly less than two-thirds.   
Similar to the other activities, the cost of producing a kilogram of slaughter hog was higher using 
exotic breeds than in using combined breeds (by almost 50%, within the sample of producers 
with informal contracts). This is mainly traced to the higher cost of feeds using exotic breeds. 
Feed costs also have a higher share in using exotic breeds than combined breeds. The average 
cost, however, was obtained using a very small sample size for exotic breeds (2). 
Comparing between producers with informal contracts and independents in the use of 
combined breeds, the two groups have more or less similar cost shares, except for the cost of 
feeds. This difference is reflected in the cost per unit output where independent producers 
exhibited higher costs (by about 60%) than that of producers with informal contracts.    
 
Combination mode of production (Type 4) 
The production cost structure of Type 4 (combination of farrow-to-weaning, farrow-to-finish and 
grow-to-finish) production systems is relatively more complicated to analyze, given the different 
types of outputs and breed coming out of this production system.  This production system is also 
the more common type observed across pig farms in Northern Vietnam, and in this survey, they 
accounted for just a little less than 40 percent of total sample respondents outside the formal 
contract growing system.  Table 49 presents the cost structure for this production system 
according to breed type and contractual arrangement.  
Table 49. Cost structure of swine production in combination mode (in '000 VND per kg 
liveweight) 
Combination breed 1 Exotic breed 
Informal  
contracts  
(n = 25) 
Independent  
producers  







Cost item Cost/kg % Cost/kg % Cost/kg % Cost/kg % 
1. Weanling 3.54 26.1 4.18 25.9 4.49 29.0 3.44 18.7 
2. Feed 8.14 60.1 10.55 65.5 8.50 54.9 13.20 71.8 
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3. Veterinary medicine 0.18 1.3 0.14 0.9 0.25 1.6 0.21 1.1 
4. Breeding 0.08 0.6 0.08 0.5 0.08 0.5 0.05 0.3 
5. Utilities 0.64 4.7 0.42 2.6 0.55 3.6 0.49 2.7 
6. Depreciation of equipment & tools 0.48 3.5 0.31 1.9 0.56 3.6 0.31 1.7 
7. Depreciation of sows 0.49 3.6 0.41 2.5 0.99 6.4 0.68 3.7 
8. Hired labor 0.00 0.0 0.02 0.1 0.05 0.3 0.00 0.0 
 Total 13.55 100.00 16.11 100.00 15.47 100.00 18.38 100.00 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
Note: 1 Combination breed: local breed x cross breed, local breed x exotic breed, cross breed x 
exotic breed 
 
Similar to the trend in the other types of production activities, the cost per unit of output using 
exotic breeds is uniformly higher than those in using combined breeds (by 12% within contract 
arrangements). This is mainly attributed to the higher costs of feed in using exotic breeds, with 
this system being more feed-intensive (occupying 55-72% share of cost) than using combined 
breeds (60-66%). 
Focusing on the use of combined breeds, and comparing between farmers with informal 
contracts and independents, the cost structures are almost similar, with weanling costs also 
occupying a significant share in production cost (26%), second in importance to feed costs. In 
terms of cost per unit of output, the producers with informal contracts exhibited a lower cost (by 
16%) than that of informal contract producers. This is traced to higher feed and weanling costs 
by independent farmers. 
In production using exotic breeds, comparing between farmers with informal contracts and 
independents, the cost shares are relatively similar. In cost per unit of output, the average unit 
cost incurred by producers with informal contracts is lower (by 16%) than that of the 
independent producers. This is traced mainly to the higher cost of feed incurred by the farmers 
with informal contracts. 
Comparing cost structure between using exotic breeds and using combined breeds, it is also 
interesting to note that the relative share of weanling cost in combination breed is relatively 
higher compared with that in exotic breed particularly for independent farms.  It is not clear why 
this is so, given that it is contrary to expectations that exotic breed weanlings would be relatively 
more expensive due to hypothesized quality differences between pure exotics and crossbreeds.  
On the other hand, this result could materialize in the case where the grow-to-finish component 
of those using exotic breeds is a minor component such that weanling costs would not account 
for a large part of the whole system. 
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6.3.2. Cost and returns in swine production by type of production system and contract 
arrangement 
In the absence of comparable information from formal contract growers, the comparison of costs 
and returns exclude formal contract production. The groups compared are: producers with 
informal contracts with cooperatives (Informal-Cooperative), farmers with informal contracts 
with traders (Informal-Trader), and iii) independent producers. 
In the context of this study, we only computed the value of main products (i.e., piglets or 
slaughter hogs), and exclude the value of by-products (i.e., pig manure). In reality, however, 
farmers also generate benefits (non cash) from use of pig manure for crop production or for 
aquaculture production (e.g., fish farming). In cultivation practices in North Vietnam, pig 
manure is considered as a valuable source of fertilizer in terms of providing nutrition for crops 
and improving soil quality. In the absence of reliable information about manure production and 
utilization in each farm surveyed, it is not feasible to estimate the non-cash benefits from 
manure coming from the pig production enterprise.  
The computation of the total output from pig production included both(i)  the value of output 
that sold during production period, and (ii) the value of unsold output or the volume of pigs (in 
kg liveweight) remaining at the end of the production cycle. For computing the value of output 
sold during the production period, the weighted average selling price of different products 
(piglets, growers, and slaughter hogs) is used. For computing the value of unsold products, the 
average selling price for particular product is used as imputed price. The total value of sold and 
unsold output is then used to derive the value of one unit of output (i.e., by dividing total value 
by total quantity), by type of breed, type of production system, and contract arrangement. 
In the computation of production cost, family labour cost is not included, given that it is 
assumed that family labour has very low opportunity cost under current conditions in Northern 
Vietnam. Hence, the difference between per unit value of output and the per unit cost of output 
can be considered as an indicator of cash returns to family labour. This becomes a proxy for 
private profitability in household based pig production.  
The comparison of costs and returns among the three groups of contract arrangements is done 
according to type of pig production activity, and distinguished between technology, as 
represented by the use of exotic breeds of combined breeds. 
Farrow-to-weaning (Type 1) 
The comparison of costs and returns among pig producers of alternative contract arrangements 
is presented in Table 50. 
Table 50. Cost and return in farrow-to-weaning production system, by type of contract 
arrangement (in '000 VND per kg liveweight of weanling) 
Item Combination Exotic breed 




















Revenue/kg of output 18.1 17.43 17.17 23.26  24.27 
Cost/kg of output 16.14 12.99 15.69 15.66  14.35 
Returns to labor/kg of output 1.96 4.44 1.48 7.6   9.92 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 (1) Production cost excluding family labour cost 
 (2) Returns to labour = Unit value – Unit cost (excluding family labour) 
 
In farrow-to-weaning using a combination of breeds, the returns to family labour in farms linked 
with traders is higher than returns earned in independent farms (by 67%), and the difference is 
statistically significant.  Compared with returns from producers with informal contracts with 
cooperatives, those linked to traders were also slightly higher, and the difference also 
statistically significant. Examining the structure of costs and returns, although the producers 
linked with traders incurred a higher cost per kilogram of output, their advantage was derived 
from the higher revenue per unit of output obtained, i.e., higher prices of weanling output, 
outweighing the cost disadvantages. Thus, even within the same technology of using combined 
breeds, there may still be qualitative differences in output, or that linkage with the traders 
conveyed information that acted as a guarantee of the quality of output of those linked to it as 
an institution. 
In the case of exotic breed, comparison of differences in returns to labour is only made between 
farms linked with cooperatives and those operating as independents as farms linked with traders 
did not raise exotics.  While the results show that returns to labour is higher among 
independents than producers with informal contracts, the difference was not statistically 
significant.  Note that there are only 3 farms in each of these types, and a larger sample size may 
be required to obtain some robust statistical results to validate the hypothesis on the difference 
in returns to labour between the two groups in raising exotics in farrow-to-weaning system. 
Comparing the returns from farrow-to-weaning between using exotic breeds and combined 
breeds, although the sample size of the former is small, it appears that the prices of output in 
exotic systems is higher than those using combined breeds, which more than compensates for 
the higher cost per unit of output, thus yielding higher per unit output returns to family labour. 
 
Farrow-to-finish system (Type 2) 
In the farrow-to-finish activity, Table 51 shows the comparison of costs and returns among the 
three groups of contractual arrangements.  
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Table 51. Cost and return in farrow-to-finish production system, by type of contract 
arrangement (in '000 VND per kg liveweight of slaughter hog) 




















Revenue/kg of output 14.8 13.05 13.96 17.8 16.83 17.65 
Cost/kg of output 11 11.23 11.86 13.25 14.09 14.29 
Returns to labor/kg of output 3.8 1.82 2.1 4.55 2.74 3.36 
Source: ILRI-IFPRI-HAU-FAO survey, 2006. 
 (1) Production cost excluding family labour cost 
 (2) Return on labour = Unit value – Unit cost (excluding family labour) 
 
In the farrow-to-finish activity using a combination of breeds, the returns to family labour is 
higher among producers with informal contracts with cooperatives than among both 
independent producers and producers with informal contracts with traders. The advantage over 
independents was around 45-52 percent. This arises from both higher average prices for output 
(12% advantage) and lower costs per unit of output. 
 
In farrow-to-finish using exotic breeds, the three groups of producers appeared to receive almost 
similar prices per unit of output. Farms linked with cooperatives producers appeared to generate 
higher returns to family labour per unit of output than independent or producers linked with 
traders, but the observed differences were not statistically significant.   
 
Comparing across breeds, mean prices received per unit of output are all higher among 
producers using exotic breeds than those using a combination of breeds. It appears that the 
market for slaughter hogs recognizes qualitative differences of output coming from different 
breeds of pigs. 
 
Grow-to-finish system (Type 3) 
In the grow-to-finish activity, only producers with informal contracts with cooperatives used 
exotic breeds. Thus, comparison among contract arrangements is made only in the use of 
combined breeds. The comparison of costs and returns among groups are presented in Table 52. 
Table 52. Cost and return in grow-to-finish production system, by type of contract 
arrangement (in '000 VND per kg liveweight of slaughter hog) 
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(n-7) (n=2) (n=45) (n=2) (n=0) (n=0) 
Revenue/kg of output 14.2 11.5 13.62 11.04   
Cost/kg of output 10.51 10.72 16.87 15.52   
Returns to labor/kg of output 3.69 0.78 -3.25 -4.48     
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 (1) Production cost excluding family labour cost 
 (2) Return on labour = Unit value – Unit cost (excluding family labour) 
 
In the use of a combination of breeds, the returns to family labour per unit of output is higher for 
producers with informal contracts with cooperatives than that of independents, and the 
difference is significant. Also, the returns to the Informal-Cooperative group are higher than that 
of the Informal-Trader group, and the difference is statistically significant. The advantage of the 
Informal-Cooperative group over the independents could be traced mainly to the lower costs per 
unit of output (by 38%) obtained by producers with informal contracts with cooperatives. It thus 
appears that the benefits of engaging in informal contracts with cooperatives appear indirectly in 
the reduction of costs in purchasing good quality inputs , thus producing higher quality of 
output.  
Looking at the cost and returns results of the Informal-Cooperative group using exotic breeds, 
the prices received per unit of output are lower than prices received by any group using 
combined breeds, and the cost per unit of output are higher than those informal contracts using 
combination breeds. However, this observation is inconclusive given that the sample size of 
exotic breed users is very small, and thus need further investigation. 
Combination activity (Type 4) 
In the type 4 system, the costs and returns are more difficult to interpret as the production 
activity is a combination between piglet production, farrow-to-finish and grow-to-finish.  The 
comparison of costs and returns across contract arrangements is shown on Table 53. 
Table 53. Cost and return in combination production system, by type of contract arrangement 
(in '000 VND per kg liveweight of joint product) 




















Revenue/kg of output 14.98 14.62 14.91 19.42 17.67 17.5 
Cost/kg of output 13.84 12.1 16.11 15.67 12.88 18.38 
Returns to labor/kg of output 1.14 2.52 -1.2 3.75 4.79 -0.88 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 (1) Production cost excluding family labour cost 
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 (2) Return on labour = Unit value – Unit cost (excluding family labour) 
 
In the use of a combination of breeds, the Informal-Trader group have significantly (at 1% level 
of significance) higher returns to family labour than producers in the independent producers. 
This advantage can be traced back to the high costs incurred by independent producers over 
informal trader group. The Informal-Trader group also have a significant advantage over 
Informal-Cooperative group in terms of returns to family labour. The difference can be traced 
back to the average price received per unit of output (by 2%), but incurred higher cost per 
kilogram of output. 
Focusing on farmers using exotic breeds, a similar scenario is observed, that is, the Informal-
Trader group have gained higher returns to family labour compared to independent producers 
and even to the Informal-Trader group. As for the producers in the Informal-Cooperative group, 
they received higher average prices per unit of output (by 9%), but incurred higher costs per unit 
of output than the independents (by 18%) compared to Informal-Trader group.. 
 
Comparing costs and returns using exotic breeds with those using combined breeds, all 
producers using exotic breeds received higher prices per unit of output than those using a 
combination of breeds. This may imply that the market for output is recognizing qualitative 
differences in output. On the costs side, however, those using exotic breeds incurred uniformly 
higher costs per unit of output than those using a combination of breeds, except for Informal-
Trader group whose costs per unit of output was in the range of the costs incurred by informal 
contracts using combination breeds. In net terms, production using exotic breeds in this 
production system appears to pay off, with returns to family labour per unit of output 
everywhere higher than those generated using a combination of breeds, across contractual 
arrangements, although negative in the case of independent producers.  
This watermark does not appear in the registered version - http://www.clicktoconvert.com
 105 
7. Assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of contract 
arrangements in facilitating profitable swine farming 
partnerships 
Contract arrangements have been shown to generate benefits to those who choose to engage in 
them, specifically in terms of access to new markets, technical assistance, specialized inputs, 
and financial resources.  Results are mixed however, as was shown in the preceding chapter, 
where in some cases, contract arrangements result in higher returns to labor while in some cases 
being an independent operator was more profitable.  This chapter discusses in details the 
empirical evidence from the survey of pig producers in Northern Vietnam, particularly the 
observed and perceived indicators and extent of impacts of contract arrangements among the 
surveyed respondents. 
7.1. Benefits of contract farming and indicators 
Contract arrangements and other forms of vertical integration can provide positive benefits to 
pig farmers by offering a mechanism to ease production, share risk and provide proper 
incentives for attainment of difficult-to-observe quality attributes. Table 54 illustrates the 
possible benefit and risk sharing between contractors and contract growers. 
 
Table 54: Sharing of risks and benefits of between contractors and contract growers 
Risks 
 
Benefits to integrators, 
buyers or traders 
Benefits to contract 
growers (contractors) 
No capital Access to investment 
opportunities in livestock; 
facilities construction 
Access to capital 
Loss of capital Incentive to contract grower 
to renew capital 
Protect against systematic 
loss 
Loss of animal Protection against careless 
labour 
Protection against diseases 
Quality of animal Assurance of product  Access to better stock 
Reliability of output price Reliability of supply Reliability of outlet 
Quality and price of inputs Quality gain for integrators Quality assurance, 
availability, credit 
Timing/availability of outputs  Timing and availability of 
management 
Timing of output sales  Timely outlet 
Labour supervision Absence of issue Absence of daily 
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supervision 
Land tenure Access to land  
Environmental regulation Avoid legal responsibility for 
pollution 
 
Knowledge deficiency  Access to extension 
Free-rider risk Better health control Better health control 
 
 
Smallholders face both production and market risks that are highly correlated with their small 
scale of operation. Resource constraints from lack of land and other assets, lack of access to 
capital and credit, and limited availability of labour with the appropriate skills make 
smallholders vulnerable to systematic shocks in production. Also, the limited volume of 
production and the often low or undifferentiated quality from smallholder production also make 
smallholders susceptible to the whims of the market, where they are considerably marginal 
players even if in the aggregate they potentially constitute a formidable force if properly 
organized and empowered. 
 
Contract farming and other forms of market organization that systematically organize and 
coordinate smallholder production activities to effectively link smallholders to a viable supply 
chain for their commodities will provide the opportunities and benefits that individual farmers 
may not be able to access on their own, while at the same time allow them the ability to reduce 
risks that are inherent to their being small and unorganized. This form of coordination also 
allows benefits both ways, i.e. at the contractor level and the individual farmer level. 
 
Specifically, in the framework above, contract growers will potentially benefit from engaging in 
contractual arrangements by having access to capital (credit), stock and other inputs of reliable 
quality, a reliable market outlet (in terms of price and timing of sales), technical inputs such as 
veterinary services and extension, good quality assurance systems that transfer technology and 
other management know-how leading to improved skills at the farm, and more importantly, by 
being protected against losses from systematic shocks. From the point of view of the 
contractor/integrator, the benefits include access to investment opportunities that potentially 
generate attractive returns, access to land and other facilities that reduces investment costs, 
access to labour, having the ability to control quality and ensure reliable supply of products with 
acceptable quality, minimal requirement for labour supervision (as long as incentives are put in 
place to minimize shirking), and to some extent avoiding full legal responsibility for 
environmental impacts emanating from contract production. 
 
In the context of growing demand for quality and food safety requirements leading to rapid 
changes in market organization where market-driven systems are replacing traditional supply-
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driven product-oriented systems, the potential for smallholders being left out is not far-fetched 
unless appropriate measures are put in place to enable them to become competitive and 
effectively integrated in these emerging modern supply chains. Contract farming is an option for 
linking smallholder farmers to these supply chains. 
 
In the specific case of pigs and pig meat, there is growing evidence that consumers are willing to 
pay for quality (in terms of lean meat and other observable attributes associated with sensory 
perception and hygiene) and food safety (in terms of absence of harmful chemicals and other 
residues). Hence, contract farming and other forms of coordination that will enable producers to 
meet consumer demand for attributes and be recognized for doing so in the market can facilitate 
this process and provide producers with the advantage of achieving competitiveness in the 
market for pig meat. The relevant empirical issue, therefore, is whether smallholders will be able 
to effectively engage in contracting or other forms of market organization that will enable them 
to meet market demand in an efficient and sustainable manner. Some forms of contract farming 
may not be accessible to smallholders while others forms may not be suitable or attractive to 
them. Empirical evidence on these aspects is discussed in the following sections. 
 
7.2. Contract arrangements in the supply chain for pigs in 
northern Vietnam 
Figure 24  illustrates the  supply chain for pigs in Vietnam. Along the chain, a number of 
contractual arrangements have been identified involving both large-scale and smallholder pig 
producers. Information from key informants revealed that relatively larger farmers are engaged 
in formal contract agreements offered by integrators. On the other hand, there are also 
contractual arrangements that are considered informal in that they do not have the same 
characteristics as formal contract arrangements that integrators have established with some pig 
producers who are generally large-scale producers in the context of the farm structure for pig 
production in northern Vietnam. Two types of informal contractual arrangements that can 
potentially facilitate smallholder access to pig markets are contracts with cooperatives and 
contracts with input/output traders. 
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Figure 24: The supply chain for pigs in Vietnam. 
 
7.3. Formal contract arrangements with integrators 
The CP Vietnam Company and Japfa Comfeed of Indonesia have offered formal contracts for 
swine production in northern Vietnam since 2000 and 2003, respectively. By the end 2005, 
there were 34 formal contract pig farms in northern Vietnam, concentrated in the provinces of 
Ha Tay and Bac Giang. Of these 34 farms, six are sow contract growing farms for piglet 
production and 28 are slaughter hog contract growing farms (see Table 55). 
 
Table 55. Type of outputs in formal contract growing 
Items No. of HH        
(n = 34) 
Percentage     (%) 
1. Type of contract   
   a. Piglet production 6 17.6 
   b. Growing/Fattened pigs 28 82.4 
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7.3.1. Salient features of formal contracts offered 
Obligations of each party 
The formal contracts offered by CP Vietnam Company and Japfa Comfeed are generally for 
farrow-to-wean and grow-to-finish operations with a breeding component to control for genetic 
quality of stock, a feed milling/mixing section to control for quality of livestock nutrition and a 
veterinary and animal health program to control the incidence of diseases. The formal contract 
farmers with supervision from integrators choose the optimal timing of the sale of their outputs, 
and are up to date with information on the daily price fluctuations in the market for live hogs. 
The integrators assist contract growers to construct pig pens and buy equipment for pig farms. 
Integrators also maintain personnel to manage the contract farms. Specifically, they monitor the 
following items: proper specifications of pig pens, feed utilization, animal health condition and 
vaccination schedules, growth performance and optimal marketing date for outputs. 
 
In case of piglet production, the integrator provides breeding stock (sows and boars), feeds, 
medicines, and technical assistance.  After 21 days, piglets are harvested and purchased by the 
integrator; payment is based on agreed terms, usually consisting of a fixed fee plus premium or 
penalty based on performance relative to agreed indicators (e.g., feed conversion ratio, mortality 
rate, etc.).  In case of the contract growing for slaughter hogs, the integrator provides the stock 
(weaner) at age of 21 day-old, feeds, veterinary supplies, and technical services. The integrator 
bears all costs of these inputs. The integrator also buys all slaughter hogs at the weight of 90 kg 
to 120 kg/head, and pays the contract fee based on the terms of contract and actual 
achievements. The payment is normally made within a month after harvesting.  
 
The contract growers should have their own or hired land for farm space, and have to invest 
their own capital to build houses/pens and buy tools and equipment for the farm. They are also 
responsible for farm management, consulting with the local authority for business permits and 
dealing with the local community regarding negative environmental problems that may be 
generated from their production activities. The contract growers are also responsible for the 
environmental services such as structures and facilities for hog waste management and disposal. 
 
Benefits obtained by each party 
By engaging in formal contract arrangements, farmers can receive benefits that would otherwise 
not be available to them if they operated as independent producers. Farmers considered that 
they received very good benefits from almost all aspects of contracting (Table 56).  Specifically, 
the majority of farmers considered the following benefits as very good, namely: (i) assured buyer 
of output, (ii) access to veterinary services, (iii) access to good quality inputs, (iv) stabilized sale 
price of output, (v) access to technical advice, (vi) improved quality of pigs (piglets) produced, 
(vii) reduced marketing cost, and (viii) access to credit for inputs. Only about a third said they 
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considered good prices from outputs to be an important benefit. This is probably one area in the 
contract term negotiation that farmers and integrators need to be clear about in order to 
minimize the chances of one partner benefiting more than the other. 
 
Table 56. The level of benefits obtained from formal contract growing arrangements in pigs 
Benefit level (% of responses) 
Type of benefit 
None A little Average Very good 
Assured buyer of output 0 0 2.9 97.1 
Access to good quality inputs 0 0 5.9 94.1 
Timely payment for output 0 0 32.4 67.6 
Good price for output 5.9 11.8 44.1 38.2 
Access to credit for inputs 14.7 0 0 85.3 
Access to veterinary services 2.9 0 2.9 94.2 
Access to technical advice 2.9 0 8.9 88.2 
Improved quality of pig (piglet) produced 2.9 0 8.9 88.2 
Stabilized sale price of output 5.9 0 2.9 91.2 
Reduced marketing cost 2.9 0 8.9 88.2 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey, 2006. 
 
Risks borne by each party 
Formal contracts for pig production observed in Northern Vietnam are generally fixed-fee 
contracts. That is, contract growers are paid a fixed fee based on minimum liveweight delivered 
(both for piglets and slaughter hogs) and additional fees are paid based on the contract grower’s 
actual achieved levels of feed conversion ratio and mortality rate vis-à-vis the integrator’s 
criteria. All terms of the contract are fixed for 5 years without negotiation and adjustment.  
According to contract growers, under the current contract terms and with the increasing prices 
of slaughter pigs, the fixed nature of contract terms do not allow them the flexibility to negotiate 
for better sharing of gains from increases in output price.  On the other hand, production costs 
have also increased and contract growers have to bear these costs such as electricity, labor, 
interest rate, tools and equipments. With increasing production costs but fixed prices for 
outputs, contract growers indicated that their profit margins have been squeezed.  
 
Since the integrator provides growing stock, feeds, and veterinary supplies and services to the 
contract growers, then the prices of these inputs are zero from the viewpoint of the growers, 
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possibly leading to a temptation to resell them clandestinely or use them on private stock. The 
integrator bears all market and production risks. The grower typically does not share in the 
benefits of increasing output prices (nor share in the losses due to falling output prices). The 
integrator buys all slaughter hogs at 90 to 120 kg/head and pays the contract fee based on the 
terms of contract and actual achievements. The payment is normally made within a month after 
harvesting. Before 2005, the output of contract farms growing slaughter hogs was mainly for 
export at 45 to 48 kg/head live weight, and good quality female growers were sold to farmers as 
a source of breeding stock (farmers later buy these female growers as replacement gilts for their 
sows). 
The growers receive a guaranteed fixed fee for each live animal (in cash per piglet, or per kg 
liveweight of slaughter hog) that is successfully harvested in a condition that is acceptable to the 
integrator for the purposes of live sale for piglets and slaughter hogs.  The fee is determined on 
the basis of feed conversion ratio and mortality rate, and adjusted accordingly based on the 
actual achievements of the contract growers. The contracts are on a non-negotiable five-year 
basis. 
 
The scale bias of formal contracts 
It is observed that only relatively large farms are able to engage in formal contracts, given the 
large capital requirements for building pens and buying other equipment.  In addition, 
integrators also generally require contract growers to have more experience and good 
management skills in animal production. These requirements are necessary because the contract 
growers need to have their own or hired land for building the animal pens as well as capital to 
invest for these infrastructure as well as tools and equipment for the farm.  They are also 
responsible for farm management, consulting with local authority for business permission, and 
dealing with local community for negative environmental problems that may emanate from their 
production activities. The contract growers are also responsible for the environmental services 
such as structures and facilities for hog waste management and disposal. 
 
Given the larger scale and intensive nature of the production system in formal contract growing 
schemes, the integrator needs to maintain hired personnel to manage the operation of the farms. 
Specifically, they monitor the following items: proper specifications of pig pens, feed utilization, 
animal health condition and vaccination schedules, growth performance and setting of optimal 
marketing date for outputs. The terms for contract violation normally explicitly includes use by 
integrator of inputs (i.e., feeds, medicines, vaccination) provided under contract for activities 
outside the contract growing arrangements, e.g., production of other animals outside the 
contract or selling of outputs to other buyers without permission from the  integrator. The 
integrator imposes penalties on contract growers who are found to violate the terms of contract. 
The penalties are graduated in severity, in accordance with the frequency of non-compliance. 





Contract violation normally explicitly includes using integrator inputs (feeds, medicines, 
vaccination) for animals not covered by the contract, selling inputs to other households o r  
selling outputs to other buyers without permission from integrator. The integrator imposes 
penalties on contract growers for violating the terms of the contract. The penalties are graduated 
in severity according to the frequency of non-compliance. 
7.3.2. The supply chain for formal contract growers 
Figure 25 presents the supply chain for formal contract growers in Northern Vietnam. 
 
Figure 25. Supply chain for formal contract growers in Northern Vietnam 
 
The supply chain for formal contract growers of integrators as observed in Northern Vietnam is 
relatively short.  That is, inputs (stock (piglets or fatteners), feeds, veterinary medicine, technical 
services) flow from the integrator to the contract growers.  The outputs (in the form of either 
piglets or slaughter hogs) then flow back from the contract growers to the integrators.  Market 
outlets used by integrators for selling the outputs from their contract growers depend on the 
output to be sold. 
 
Before 2005, slaughter hogs from formal contract farms at liveweight ranging from 45-48 
kg/head were mainly sold to processing companies in Hai Phong for export, and only a small 
proportion, specifically the good female pigs, were sold to farmers as breeding stock (that is, as 
replacement gilts for their sows). After 2005, exportation to selected markets like Russia was 
discontinued so that the domestic market, specifically slaughterhouses in Hanoi, has become 
the main market for slaughter hogs from contract growers in Northern Vietnam.  Other market 
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7.3.3. Reasons for participation or non-participation in formal contract arrangements in pigs 
Reasons for participation 
Table 57 provides information on the main reasons for participation in formal contract farming 
as revealed by the six households (17.6%) that raised piglets and 28 households (82.4%) that 
raised growing/fattened pigs under formal contracts. 
 
Table 57: Main reasons for household participation in formal contract farming 
Reason for participating in formal contract farming Number of households 
citing the reason 
Assured buyer of output 31 (91.2) 
Access to good quality inputs (breed, feeds) 17 (50.0) 
Access to technical advice on pig-raising 6 (17.6) 
Stable price for outputs 9 (26.5) 
Percentages in parentheses 
Source: ILRI-IFPRI-HAU-FAO survey (2006) 
 
The most frequently cited reason for joining formal contract growing arrangements was having 
assurance of a market for output; this was largely motivated by the objective to reduce market 
(price) risks in a volatile market for pigs. Also, having access to good quality inputs (breeds and 
feed) is also an important consideration for pig producers’ decisions to engage in formal contract 
arrangements. This is particularly important in the context of growing demand for quality from 
consumers of pig meat. Having an assurance of certified input quality by the providing company 
is a major plus to producers and gives them an edge in differentiating their products and getting 
market recognition. This aspect may not be of major concern to a producer who engages in the 
spot market for pigs intermittently but is of critical importance to a producer who would like to 
develop a sure footing in the pig meat market and subsequently be compensated adequately for 
investing in the industry. Having stable price for outputs is another key motivator for joining 
formal contract agreements; this is also related to the ability to reduce price risk in spot markets 
for pigs. Thus, it protects farmers from the potential negative impacts on returns from 
unanticipated drops in market prices; this appears to be much more valued than the opportunity 
cost of passing up the chance to benefit from higher prices when market prices pick up. 
 
Interest in participating in formal contracts among non-contract growers 
There was high interest in entering into formal contract arrangements among farmers without 
contracts ( Table 58). This was strongly evident among those engaged in farrow-to-finish 
operations and to some extent in farrow-to-wean and in combination operations. There was also 
a significant share of undecided individuals who preferred to wait for more convincing evidence 
to trigger their interest to join formal contract arrangements. Given that mixed results from 
existing studies on contract farming in general and the limited evidence to date on pig contract 
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farming in particular, this is an opportunity for research to provide the information needed to 
guide farmers’ decisions in this regard. 
 






(n = 71) 
Farrow-to-finish 
(n = 97) 
Grow-to-finish 
(n = 57) 
Combination 
(n = 141) 
Yes 40.85 50.52 35.09 47.52 
No 25.35 12.37 26.32 7.80 
Undecided 33.80 37.11 38.60 44.68 
Source: ILRI-IFPRI-HAU-FAO survey, 2006 
 
Reasons for non-participation in formal contracts 
Table 59 summarizes farmers’ reasons for not joining formal contract arrangements. Lack of 
awareness about formal contract arrangements was cited by the majority of respondents as a 
reason for not joining; this view cut across the different types of production systems. This finding 
presents an opportunity to fill this information gap and educate farmers about available options 
for their consideration. The second most cited reason (cited by at least one-fifth of respondents) 
was failure to qualify for a contract; this failure was due to the inability of farmers to meet the 
requirements imposed by contractors. Respondents revealed that this is often due to their 
inability to meet the land and/or capital requirements. Integrators have been shown to prefer 
farmers with land sizes tha t  are usually larger than the average land holding in northern 
Vietnam. Integrators also prefer to give contracts to farmers who have capital to put up the 
required infrastructure such as pig pens and necessary equipment such as water and waste 
disposal facilities, electricity, etc. Thus, while smallholder farmers may be willing to enter into 
formal contract arrangements, they are often barred from participating due to farmer-specific 
constraints. Integrators certainly have their reasons for imposing such restrictive requirements 
based on valid business profitability or viability indicators. Public policy should, therefore, focus 
on helping farmers to accumulate assets that will help them surmount some of the resource-
related constraints to participation. 
 
Table 59: Percentage of farmers citing reasons for not joining formal contract arrangements 




(n = 71) 
Farrow-to-
finish 
(n = 97) 
Grow-to-
finish 
(n = 57) 
Combination 
(n = 141) 
Not interested 0.00 4.12 3.51 2.17 
Not yet ready 2.82 7.22 8.77 5.07 
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Did not qualify 29.58 24.74 26.32 21.01 
Not aware 57.75 55.67 50.88 60.87 
Do not have shed/land 0.00 1.03 0.00 0.00 
Scale of farm 1.41 3.09 3.51 5.07 
Contract terms not good 0.00 2.06 0.00 0.00 
Others 8.45 2.06 7.02 5.80 
Source: ILRI-IFPRI-HAU-FAO survey (2006) 
 
7.3.4. Farmer perception of effectiveness of contract implementation 
While there may be isolated cases of conflict in the actual implementation of the contract, the 
incidence of conflict is rare (Table 60). Only about 3% of respondents indicated that conflicts 
often arose in the contract implementation, mainly over pricing. Some farmers indicated that 
being locked in a contract with fixed output prices over the duration of the contract is restrictive. 
However, this does not take into consideration that the contractor also takes on the full burden 
of the price risk when market prices turn out to be lower than the agreed contract price. 
 
Table 60: Occurrence of and reasons for conflict during formal contract implementation  
 Number of respondents 
Occurrence  
Never 19 (55.9) 
Seldom 14 (41.2) 
Often 1 (2.9) 
Reasons  
Price  9 (40.9) 
Quality  1 (4.5) 
Quantity  2 (9.1) 
Delivery time 3 (13.6) 
Others 7 (31.8) 
Percentages in parentheses 
Source: ILRI-IFPRI-HAU-FAO survey (2006) 
 
7.4. Informal contracts with cooperatives 
Cooperatives play a significant role in the supply chain for pigs in northern Vietnam, given the 
conditions that l im i t  the access of smallholder pig producers to formal contract growing 
schemes. The following cases illustrate the current status and performance of cooperatives 
engaged in pig production in northern Vietnam. 
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7.4.1. Total number of existing cooperatives in North Vietnam, types, and location 
Based on the information from MARD, up to the end of 2003 there were about 8,090 
cooperatives in the whole country as shown in Table 61. These include the cooperatives 
specialized in agricultural production, aquaculture production and services. 
 
Table 61. Number of cooperatives and their distribution in Vietnam (as of end of 2003) 
Of which 






Number Share (%) Number Share (%) 
Whole country 8,090 7,694 95.0 367 0.04 
Red river delta 3.425 3,373 98.0 51 0.14 
North east  949 906 95.0 32 0.03 
North west  256 253 99.0 2 0.01 
North central coast 1,662 1,465 88.0 192 0.11 
South central coast 723 688 95.0 35 0.05 
Central high land 168 166 99.0 2 0.01 
 251 239 95.0 10 0.04 
Source: MARD, May 2006 (Website of MARD) 
By the end of 2004, in the whole country there were about 9255 cooperatives with 
approximately 250000 members. Most of the cooperatives provided services for the household 
farmers, of which 1595 cooperatives specialized on land preparation services, 4599 on seed 
services, 6848 on irrigation services, 4923 on crop protection services, and 538 on output 
marketing.  By the end of 2005, there were 17133 cooperatives all over the country (MARD, 
department of cooperative management) 
7.4.2. Cooperatives interviewed in focus group discussions and their characteristics 
Five cooperatives were interviewed during focus group discussions, namely: 
 
1) Tang Tien cooperative, specialized in pig raising activity (mainly forcusing on Mong Cai sow 
to produce piglet). Tang Tien cooperative is located in Viet Yen district of Bac Giang province. 
 
2) Viet Y cooperative, a multi-function cooperative, and provides not only services for pig 
production (feed, outlet for output) but also other survices such as input supply (fertilizers, 
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seeds), credit, land preparation service and transportation service. Most of members of the coop 
raise both sows (cross breed) and fattening pigs (cross-breed). Cooperative sign contract with 
feed company to provide feed to members, cooperative help to find outlet for products. Viet Y 
cooperative is located in Viet Yen district of Bac Giang province. 
 
3) Dan Hoai cooperative, specialized in pig raising activity (farrow to finish mode of production 
in extic breed). Dan Hoai cooperative is located in Dan Phuong district of Ha Tay province. 
They combine together to buy animal feed and piglet to reduce transaction costs, the 
cooperative provide veterinary services, technical advice and information for market price or 
help to sell products 
 
4) Thai Binh cooperative, specialized in pig production. Head quarter of the cooperative locates 
in Thai Binh city of Thai Binh province. The member of the cooperative are the breeding stock 
company of Thai Binh province, Ha Lan feed processing company, the first level agent of feed 
sellers, pig farms (farrow to finish mode of production in exotic breed) which spread out in 
many districts as Kien Xuong , Thai Thuy, Dong Hung, Quynh Phu, and Tien Hai  
 
5) Dinh Tuong cooperative, specialized in pig production. It is located in Thieu Yen district of 
Thanh Hoa province. 
 
Characteristics of these cooperatives are summarized in Table 62 below. In the four provinces in 
the study sites, the cooperatives can be divided into two main groups as follows.  In the first 
group, the members of the cooperatives were neighbors in the same village or commune and 
they were more or less the same in scale of operation and production technology. This type of 
cooperative exists in Bac Giang and Thanh Hoa provinces. They had small or medium scale 
operation and most of them engaged in farrow to wean or combination mode of production. In 
the second group, the members of cooperatives were located in different communes and 
districts and consisted of medium and big farms. This type of cooperative exists in Thai Binh and 
Ha Tay provinces. Most of them engaged in combination or farrow to finish mode of 
production. 
 
Table 62. Characteristics of cooperatives interviewed   
Name of coop Year started No of current members 
Tang Tien 2002 300 
Viet Y 2001 100 
Dan Hoai 2004 14 
Thai Binh coop 2004 67 
Dinh Tuong 1994 75 
This watermark does not appear in the registered version - http://www.clicktoconvert.com
 118 
 
7.4.3. Salient features of informal contracts with cooperatives 
In order to be a member of the cooperatives, the following requirements need to be satisfied, 
specifically, capital contribution, having a minimum number of sows or fattening pigs, raise 
specific breed such as Mong cai, exotic, or crossbreeds, abide by the cooperative rules and 
regulations. In general, the cooperatives interviewed varied in terms of requirements of scale 
and production systems engaged in by members.  For example, the Tang Tien cooperative 
required the members to raise sows of Mong Cai breed only for piglet production (i.e., farrow to 
wean. The Dan Hoai cooperative required its members to raise exotic breed with the scale not 
less than 20 sows per farm and mainly for producing finished pigs (i,e., farrow to finish). The 
Thai Binh cooperative required its members to raise exotic breed mainly for producing finished 
pigs. In the Dinh Tuong cooperative, the members could raise either exotic or cross breed for 
producing either piglets or finished pigs. 
 
Obligations of each party 
Farmer members of cooperatives are obligated to produce piglets or slaughter hogs as 
requirements of cooperative and also to buy feed, medicines, and vaccine from the cooperative.  
In return, the cooperative provides input supply services such as assistance in contacting feed 
distributors or sources of breeding stock, provision of inputs (e.g., feed, stock, credit, medicine, 
and vaccine) to the members as requested, provision of technical assistance as needed; output 
marketing services including direct marketing or assistance in linking members with buyers of 
their outputs either as piglets or slaughter hogs.  
 
For example, in the case of the pig producer cooperative in Thai Binh that was started in 2000 
and members comprised pig producers who raise exotic sows, participation is voluntary and 
members contribute a minimum of VND 500,000 as equity and up to 30% of the total capital of 
the cooperative. The cooperative provides the following services to its members: 
· provision of piglets as source of breeding stock 
· provision of services in animal feed, where the cooperative as an entity cooperates with 
CP, veterinary medicine producers and feed distributors  
· provision of market information, transfer of technology for animal breeding, farm 
management and disease prevention activities  
· assistance in output marketing 
· distribution of profits based on the following sharing arrangement: 50% to the cooperative 
fund, 25% to members according to their use of cooperative services and 25% equally 
distributed as dividends among all members and  
· access to the government budget for extension services and infrastructure development. 
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Another type of cooperative that is primarily engaged in marketing also operates in the same 
province. Members o f  t his cooperative include livestock raisers (not just pig raisers) and 
companies engaged in animal breeding, feed processing and veterinary medicine production 
and distribution. This also has legal status, having its own seal. It also requires an equity 
contribution from its members and can also access loans from formal credit institutions on 
behalf of its members. 
 
This cooperative provides the following services to its members: 
· provision of cattle breeding stock 
· production and sale of animal feed, medicine and other inputs 
· processing, marketing, import and export of agricultural products 
· preparation and implementation of scientific project proposals 
· provision of advice in construction and investment in infrastructure and equipment for 
animal husbandry and technology transfer and 
· distribution of annual profit according to the following sharing arrangement: 20% to the 
production development fund, 5% to the reward fund, 5% to the social benefit fund and 
the rest to members as follows: 30% as cash reward for patronizing cooperative services, 
10% as dividends and 30% as salaries to the management team.  
 
In Ha Tay province, there are currently three pig-raising cooperatives: Binh Minh, Dan Hoai and 
Hop Thang. Cooperative members comprise pig raisers, animal feed and piglet traders and 
veterinary doctors. Membership is voluntary and the cooperative follows the Law of 
Cooperatives in Vietnam.  
 
The cooperative’s main responsibilities to its members include provision of piglets, veterinary 
inputs and technical services; transfer of appropriate technologies for pig husbandry and 
assistance in marketing of outputs. 
 
In Hai Duong province, specialized cooperatives have developed for the production of exotic 
pigs. Cooperative members consist of pig-raising households as well as veterinary service 
providers. Participation is voluntary and members contribute a minimum of VND 300,000 and 
receive interest earnings from these contributions at the rate of 1% per month. 
 
The cooperative provides the following services to its members: 
· Access to loans from formal credit sources 
· Access to market information on input and output markets (breeding, animal feeds, 
medicines, epidemics etc.)  
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· Provision of animal feeds and veterinary services  
· Access to information by acting as a hub where technologies are transferred, techniques 
exchanged and extension activities carried out.  
 
Benefits obtained by each party 
The coop members could buy inputs from the cooperative or from other sources of inputs. If 
buying inputs from the cooperative, the members could buy on credit. The coop members could 
also sell all outputs to the cooperative or sell to other output buyers. The outputs were sold in 
live weight not in carcass.  Other benefits obtained by members include profit sharing from 
cooperative, technical assistance, and buying inputs at lower price. 
 
The cooperative also provides services to members upon request of the members. Depending on 
requirements of the members, inputs could be delivered to the farms. The coop members could 
also obtain these services from other sources, and in practice, most of coop members bought 
inputs from the cooperative as well as from other sources depending on what was available and 
where they can obtain lower prices. 
 
One important aspect of the cooperative in Thai Binh is that while the requirement to sell back 
outputs to the cooperative is not binding, farmers generally consider the cooperative the most 
viable option to sell to when the market for pigs is unfavourable and market prices are reduced 
by a glut in the market. In such cases, the cooperative buys back the pigs for sale by its members 
without any rejections, and it is able to do so by utilizing the cooperative fund to stabilize the 
market price and provide an assured market for its members. 
 
In general, benefits from being linked with a cooperative as cited by key informants include the 
following: 
· The organization is simple and flexible, resulting in good performance and promoting 
active roles in supporting the animal growers. 
· The relationships among growers are strengthened so that by acting collectively in key 
production activities to support production such as input procurement, growers are able to 
reduce input prices and improve their competitiveness by reducing transaction costs. 
· Cooperative members benefit from the effective interaction of the cooperative with 
extension service providers and other government institutions at different levels.  
7.4.4. The supply chain for cooperatives 
The supply chain for cooperatives as observed in Northern Vietnam is shown in Figure 26.  The 
cooperative usually provides inputs (stock, feeds, veterinary medicine, technical support) to its 
members and the members may sell back its output (piglets or slaughter hogs to the cooperative.  
If the cooperative provides marketing services to its members, it assists its members looking for 
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buyers.  For sourcing inputs, the cooperative may directly negotiate with feed distributors for 
bulk purchase of feeds for its members.  Similar arrangements may be undertaken for provision 
of other inputs including technical support as required by its members.  In some cases, the flow 
of inputs into and outputs from producer members of cooperative may mimic the flow of inputs 
and outputs within the formal contract growing scheme.  The only difference in most cases is 
that some cooperatives allow their members to buy inputs from other suppliers outside the 
cooperative (although there are incentives provided to members for choosing to patronize the 
cooperative for their input requirements).  Similarly, cooperative members may sell their outputs 
directly to other buyers such as traders or other farmers for piglets, or traders and 
butchers/slaughterhouses for slaughter hogs. 
 
 
Figure 26. Supply chain for producers linked with cooperatives in Northern Vietnam 
7.4.5. Key contributions to facilitating smallholder market access  
Cooperatives have contributed towards facilitating smallholder competitiveness by providing 
effective linkages with input and output markets, access to new technologies, access to working 
capital or credit (where cooperatives may act as guarantors), and access to market information. 
While cooperatives may also have limitations, particularly in the requirement for membership 
fees that may not be affordable to all smallholders, they enable smallholders to have access to 
the above-mentioned services that would otherwise b e  inaccessible to them as independent 
operators. Previous discussions have established that there is a scale barrier imposed by the 
requirements of integrators to potential formal contract growing participants. It has also been 
shown from descriptive analysis of trader information that while some traders could 
accommodate the business of small-scale pig producers, in general their objective of 
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on conditions that are scale related and likely biased towards relatively larger production 
operations. However, once these scale-related barriers are surmounted or minimized through 
innovative partnerships using collective action, there is potential for significant benefits in terms 
of the third-party certification that traders can provide to their farmer partners. 
 
Cooperatives can facilitate this process by providing a platform for collective action to mediate 
b e t w e e n  t h e  private sector (feed distributors, meat processing companies, private 
slaughterhouses and meat wholesalers/retailers) and the smallholder pig producers. There is a 
cost to doing this; the public sector may be able to contribute towards this cost through a 
facilitating role. Public sector facilitation may include providing the necessary infrastructure to 
support development of effective and efficient cooperatives and other voluntary organizations in 
local communities, and may include tax incentives and simple procedures for registration to 
obtain legal status and hence be able to access public sector services and available funds. 
Access to quality extension and veterinary services is also critical and the public sector can 
contribute towards this by investing in improving the delivery of extension and veterinary 
services to local communities. 
 
7.5. Informal contract arrangements with traders 
A network of big and small traders pervades the supply chain for pigs in Vietnam. These traders 
supply inputs, purchase outputs or both. Traders perform an important function of linking 
smallholders to markets, particularly in situations where producing units are geographically 
dispersed and located in villages and towns that are distant from market centres. Various 
informal arrangements between traders and farmers have evolved in response to market needs 
and the opportunities to take advantage of these and subsequently generate positive benefits by 
forging partnerships between these two actors. 
 
Figure 27 illustrates the linkages between pig producers and other actors in the pig supply chain. 
The flow of inputs into and outputs from the pig farm and the key actors linked to these flows 
indicate the potential pathways for informal contract partnerships that may evolve between pig 
producers and input/output traders. 
 
Input traders range from large feed distributors to small retailers (for feed input supply) or large 
slaughterhouses to small pig collectors (for pig output purchase). Field surveys and interviews 
with key informants revealed that partnerships between farmers and input suppliers commonly 
develop in the supply of feeds by a feed trader or distributor, usually provided on credit (one 
week to 15 days grace period for payment) and motivated by the feed trader’s objective of 
capturing a steady client base for the feed trading business. From the farmer’s perspective, 
engagement in this partnership is motivated by the ability to procure feed inputs on a regular 
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basis and with some guarantee of quality, especially if the feed trader distributes known brands 
of feeds from reputable companies, thereby being in a position to procure good quality feeds 
that can be guaranteed by the feed trader himself/herself. In addition, the delayed payment 
transaction is an added service to attract customers and develop a captive market. 
 
 
Figure 27. Supply chain for pig producers informally linked with traders 
 
Output supply contracts between output buyers and pig producers are less common than input 
supply contracts. Informal output purchase agreements were observed between local traders or 
collectors, where farmers receive advance payment for delivery of a specified number of piglets 
or slaughter pigs at a designated time when the buyer (output trader) will pick up the animals 
from the farm. Direct supply of outputs to slaughterhouses or meat processing companies was 
very rare among individual farmers; farmers were facilitated via an intermediary, either a 
cooperative or a large-scale trader (wholesaler).  What is interesting though is the observation 
that information flow between output buyers and feed traders may exist, particularly when feed 
traders, in order to secure patronage of the pig producers, may provide this market information 
service.  Specifically, feed traders may assist pig producers to locate output buyers including the 
prices that these buyers offer to potential sellers of piglets or slaughter hogs.  Moreover, aside 
from price information, feed traders may also provide information to the potential buyers about 
the quality of pigs from its clients, e.g, whether the pigs are in good health or have been sick, 
the quality of feeds fed to the pigs, etc. thereby informally certifying the output of its producer 
clients.  It is to the interest of the feed traders that its clients receive good prices for its outputs in 
order to ensure that these clients are able to continue buying feeds and other inputs from the 
trader, and also to enable timely payment of advances in kind (e.g., feeds and other inputs) 
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7.5.1. Characteristics of traders and their business 
Three types of traders were interviewed in the field surveys: input traders, output traders and 
input/output traders. The third group of traders undertakes both input supply and output 
purchase functions. Fifty traders were sampled, of which 34 (68%) were input traders, 10 (20%) 
output traders and 6 (12%) input/output traders. Table 63 summarizes the main characteristics of 
the trader respondents. On average, input traders were slightly older than output traders o r  
input/output traders. Average levels of education were almost similar for the three groups though 
output traders have been in the trading business longer than the other two groups. 
 
Table 63: Characteristics of trader respondent by type of business 
Item Input 
traders 
(n = 34) 
Output 
traders 
(n = 10) 
Input/output 
traders 
(n = 6) 
All 
traders 
Average age (years) 45.2 41.4 43.5 44.2 
Average number of years of schooling 11.0 11.2 12.0 11.2 
Average number of year in business 9.9 15.1 9.3 10.9 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
There was a significant share of female participation in the trading business with women 
accounting for about one-third of sampled traders (Table 64). Female participation in trading 
was particularly pronounced in input trading, where women accounted for about 38 percent of 
all input traders. On average, male traders were slightly more educated than their female 
counterparts. It is also interesting to note that female traders engaged in input trade were more 
experienced than their male counterparts, having been in the input trading business for almost 
twice as long as the sampled male traders.  
 
Table 64: Characteristics of trader respondents by type of business and gender 
Input trader Output trader Input/output 
trader 
All traders (n=50) Item 
 
Male 
(n = 21) 
Female 
(n = 13) 
Male 
(n = 9) 
Female 
(n = 1) 
Male 
(n = 5) 
Female 
(n = 1) 
Male 
(n = 35) 
Female 
(n = 15) 
Average age (years) 46.5 43.0 41.2 43.0 42.8 47.0 44.6 43.3 
Average number of 
years of schooling 
11.3 10.5 11.3 10.0 12.0 12.0 11.4 10.6 
Average number of 
year in business 
7.7 13.5 16.4 3.0 9.5 8.0 10.2 12.4 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
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Trading business appears to be a significant source of household income among the trader 
respondents; more than half indicated getting more than 80% of their household income from 
trading business (Table 65).  
 
Table 65: Number of traders obtaining household income from trading business 
Percentage of household 








Less than 50% 1 0 0 1 (2) 
50 to 80% 12 7 0 19 (38) 
Over 80% 21 3 6 30 (60) 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
Percentages in parentheses 
 
Trading business also appears to require high levels of working capital, ranging from an average 
of about VND 116.7 million (USD 7291) to VND 10 billion (USD 625,000), depending on the 
type of business. On average, traders contribute at least half of their working capital 
requirements and the balance is made up of loans (Table 66). 
 
Table 66: Working capital requirements by type of business activity 






Input trader    
Producing animal feeds 8,750,000 54.3 45.7 
Buying and selling feed and other inputs 398,103 81.3 18.7 
Buying and selling piglets 116,667 85.7 14.3 
Output buyer    
Processing frozen meat 10,000,000 60.0 40.0 
Slaughterhouse 440,000 71.4 28.6 
Butcher 131,250 100 0 
Combination input/output trader    
Buying and selling slaughter hogs 2,066,667 75.8 24.2 
Buying and selling feed and other inputs 1,000,000 60.0 40.0 
Buying and selling piglets 325,000 69.2 30.8 
VND: Vietnam Dong 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
7.5.2. Characteristics of contract arrangements with traders 
Input traders engage in three types of activities with pig producers: buying and selling feed 
and/or other inputs, buying and selling piglets, and producing animal feeds. Production of 
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animal feeds is generally a function of a feed miller or processor. Traders engaged in feed 
production have the largest average number of farms with whom they have contract 
arrangements, followed by traders engaged in buying and selling of piglets (Table 67). In both 
cases, these contract farms may be considered medium- to large-scale in the context of the farm 
structure of pig production in northern Vietnam. 
 
Table 67: Number of farms engaged in contract arrangements with traders and average 
numbers of pigs per farm 




number of hogs 
per farm 
Average 
number of sows 
per farm 
Input traders    
Buying and selling feed/other inputs 42 43 8 
Buying and selling piglets 105 36 3 
Producing animal feeds 110 100 30 
Output buyers    
Slaughterhouse 20 572 0 
Butcher 38 75 0 
Processing frozen meat  30 90 0 
Combination input/output traders    
Buying and selling inputs and 
grower/slaughter hogs 
60 47 8 
Buying and selling piglets/inputs 43 52 6 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
Trading activities and scale of farms with contract arrangements 
Output traders can be classified into slaughterhouses, butchers and meat processors. While 
relatively fewer farms have contract arrangements with these output traders, these farms are 
generally of medium to large scale (Table 67). For example, slaughterhouses enter into contracts 
with large-scale farms that have 500 or more pigs and butchers have contract arrangements with 
medium-scale farms that have an average of 75 pigs. 
 
Two types of activities were observed among input/output traders: buying and selling of inputs 
and grower/slaughter hogs, and buying and selling of piglets and inputs. These traders have 
contracting arrangements with relatively smaller farms compared to the other two types of 
traders, although the relative farm sizes are in the upper end of the small-scale continuum (Table 
67). 
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Conditions for establishing contract agreements 
Traders consider a number of conditions when they establish contract agreements with farmers 
(Table 68). The most important consideration is the size of the animal inventory of the farms. 
Hence, traders may use some minimum scale below which they will not consider establishing 
contract agreements. This condition is particularly important among input traders, consistent 
with their objective of maximizing feed sales from their client base. The larger the size of the 
farms, the higher the feed input requirements. The second most important condition for 
establishing contract agreements with farmers is the farmer’s reputation; a good reputation is a 
must, in terms of ability and willingness to pay on schedule. Again, this condition appears to be 
an important consideration among input traders. Volume of feed use, which is also related to the 
size of animal inventory, and breed of stock are other important considerations. Hence, it 
appears that conditions related to pig production operations are high up in the list as compared 
to farmer-specific characteristics such as experience, size of landholdings etc. This suggests that 
there may also be a scale bias towards relatively larger scale farms. It is also interesting to note 
that about 20% of sampled traders, particularly those engaged in output trading, did not impose 
any conditions for establishing contract agreements. 
 
Table 68: Numbers of traders citing conditions for establishing contract arrangements with 
farmers (multiple responses) 
Conditions Input 
traders  
n = 34 
Output 
traders 
n = 10 
Input/output 
traders 
n = 6 
All traders 
n = 50 
Size of animal inventory  23 1 1 25 (50) 
Good reputation (payment/supply) 15 1 4 20 (40) 
Volume of feeds use  17 0 0 17 (34) 
Breed of stock  15 0 0 15 (30) 
Farmer experience in pig-raising 6 2 0 8 (16) 
Size of landholding 3 0 0 3 (6) 
Properties of the farmer 3 0 0 3 (6) 
No conditions 0 9 2 11 (22) 
Percentages in parentheses 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
Contract terms for pricing and payment 
Once a contract agreement has been established, terms for pricing and payment are negotiated. 
The majority of input supply contracts base the delivery price of inputs on flexible pricing, 
which may be negotiated between the trader and the farmer (Table 69). About one-third of input 
supply contracts use a fixed delivery price. Payment methods used are cash, credit or a 
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combination of the two. Among input traders, almost half use a combination of cash and credit 
payment while a larger share of output traders use cash payment only, as do half of input/output 
traders. Also, sale on credit was least preferred by input/output traders. 
 
Table 69: Percentage of traders citing negotiated delivery price and terms of payment  
Delivery and payment terms Input 
traders 
(n = 34) 
Output 
traders 
(n = 10) 
Input/output 
traders (n = 6) 
All traders 
(n = 50) 
Flexible delivery price 67.6 n/a 66.7 67.5 
Fixed delivery price 32.4 n/a 33.3 32.5 
Cash-only payment 26.5 40.0 50.0 32.0 
Payment on credit 32.4 30.0 16.7 30.0 
Cash and credit payment 41.1 30.0 33.3 38.0 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
Conditions for contract renewal 
About 40% of traders considered a good reputation as an important condition for contract 
renewal ( Table 70); this suggests that the farmer adheres to the conditions of the contract in 
terms of timely payment and agreed volume of input supply. Scale-related conditions were also 
important considerations for contract renewal. For instance, about 25% of trader respondents 
would renew an agreement with a farmer who buys in large and stable volumes and at least 
20% of traders would renew agreements with farmers having a large scale of production. Scale-
related conditions were more pronounced among input traders. 
 
Table 70: Percentage of farmers citing conditions for contract renewal 
Conditions Input 
traders  
(n = 34) 
Output 
traders 
(n = 10) 
Input/output 
traders  
(n = 6) 
All traders 
(n = 50) 
Good reputation 12 5 4 21 
Large production scale 8 0 3 11 
Facing risk in production cycle 6 1 0 7 
Buying a large and stable volume 11 2 0 13 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
Incentives provided to regular clients 
Traders provide a variety of incentives in order to retain the business of their regular customers 
and ensure longevity of the partnership.  Among input traders, the most cited incentive was 
provision of information on potential output buyers, followed by delivery of inputs purchased by 
This watermark does not appear in the registered version - http://www.clicktoconvert.com
 129 
farmers ( Table 71). These two services are very important for improving farmers’ market 
participation, for example, by reducing transaction costs in searching for output buyers and in 
many cases in certifying the quality of output (via the quality guarantee on the feed used to raise 
the pigs), and also reducing transport costs. Provision of credit as well as price discounts on 
large volume purchases were also cited as popular incentives. 
 
Table 71: Numbers of traders citing incentives provided to regular customers 











(n = 50)  
Inputs     
Information on potential output buyers 26 n/a 5 31 (77.5) 
Delivery of input purchases 27 n/a 1 28 (70.0) 
Credit on input purchased 23 n/a 4 27 (67.5) 
Price discount on volume input purchases 25 n/a 0 25 (62.5) 
Guaranteed quality assurance of input 14 n/a 1 15 (37.5) 
Assistance in output sales negotiation with buyers 9 n/a 4 13 (32.5) 
Assurance quality of outputs to potential buyers 3 n/a 4 7 (17.5) 
Outputs     
Cash payment on output purchased n/a 5 5 10 (62.5) 
Timely pick up of outputs purchases n/a 6 1 7 (43.8) 
Minimum quality requirements on output n/a 5 1 6 (37.5) 
Advance payment on purchase of outputs n/a 0 4 4 (25.0) 
Price premium on volume output sales n/a 0 4 4 (25.0) 
Both inputs and outputs     
Technical advice when needed 19 5 1 25 (50.0) 
Information on market price of outputs 17 5 1 23 (46.0) 
Percentages in parentheses 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
Cash payment of output purchased was the incentive cited by the majority of output traders. 
This is an attractive incentive in the sense that farmers need not wait for a few days to receive 
payment and hence incur some opportunity cost in terms of foregone earnings between the time 
of sale transaction and actual payment in cash. About two-fifths of output traders cited timely 
pick up of output purchases from the farm as an incentive through which they internalize the 
cost of transporting outputs from the farm to their own premises, thereby reducing the farmer’s 
marketing costs. Advance payment of purchases and price premium on large volume of output 
purchases were other incentives provided to retain business of regular output suppliers. Other 
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output traders may require minimum quality requirements as an incentive to encourage farmers 
to deliver quality outputs. 
 
The provision of technical advice to their farmer clients was cited as a popular incentive by half 
of input/output traders. The provision of information on market price of output was another 
incentive cited by close to half of the sample respondents belonging to this trader category. The 
incentives provided were intended to reduce transaction costs of the farmer in doing business 
with the trader, to improve their ability to negotiate better prices, or to improve their overall 
productivity and efficiency in market engagement. 
 
Conditions for contract termination 
Among input traders, the most cited condition for contract termination was delay in payment of 
inputs purchased, followed by inability to buy the required volume of inputs as agreed (Table 
72). Procuring inputs from other sources at prices lower than the contract price or in order to 
obtain incentives provided by these other suppliers was considered a cause for contract 
termination by more than half of trader respondents.  
 













Inputs     
Unable to buy agreed volume of inputs  28 n/a 2 30 (75) 
Farmers buy inputs from other parties at lower price 21 n/a 1 22 (55) 
Delay in payment of purchases 34 n/a 4 38 (95) 
Outputs     
Unable to deliver required volume of pigs/piglets n/a 10 6 16 (100) 
Farmers sell products to other traders  n/a 6 4 10 (62.5) 
Percentages in parentheses 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
Inability to meet the required volume of output supply (piglets and/or fattened pigs) is cause for 
contract termination was cited by all output and input/output traders. Diverting supply for sale 
to other output buyers was also considered a violation of the contract and valid ground for 
contract termination. 
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Scale of farms that frequently violate contract agreements 
The incidence of contract violation was higher among small-scale farmers (Table 73). The 
majority of input and output traders cited contract violations specifically by small-scale farmers 
followed by medium-scale ones. Very few traders c i t ed contract violations by large-scale 
farmers. Again, these trends are consistent with earlier observations that in many input and 
output contract agreements, scale-related conditions are highly dominant and it is likely that 
small-scale farmers find it harder to meet these conditions than medium- or large-scale farmers 
by the very nature of their operations. 
 
Table 73: Number of traders citing farmers who frequently violate contract agreements 
Type of farmers Input traders 
(n = 34) 
Output traders 
(n = 10) 
Input/output 
traders (n = 6) 
All traders 
(n = 50) 
Small-scale 21 6 1 28 
Medium-scale 10 4 1 15 
Large-scale 3 0 4 7 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
7.5.3. Input traders 
Sources of input supply 
The different types of input traders obtain their input supply from various sources ( Table 74). 
Input traders supplying piglets generally obtain piglets from farmers. Trader respondents did not 
cite any other sources, suggesting that piglet traders do not have alternative sources of piglets 
aside from farmers. Feed traders identified two main sources of feed supply: feed millers and 
first-level agents of feed distributors. Most of the sampled input traders cited feed millers as their 
main source of feed supply. First-level agents of feed distributors are the main source of feed 
supply for a significant number of sampled feed traders. Input traders generally obtain non-
commercial feed ingredients from rice millers (for rice bran), feed millers (for maize) or other 
larger traders t hat stock relatively larger volumes and more diversified inventories of feeds. 
Veterinary medicines are purchased directly from pharmaceutical companies or their first-level 
agents. 
Table 74: Number of input traders citing main sources of inputs  
Source of inputs Type-1 input 
traders (n = 34) 
Type-3 input 
traders (n = 6) 
All input traders 
(n = 40) 
Piglets    
Farmers 3 2 5 
Commercial feed      
Feed millers 22 3 25 
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First-level agents 4 0 4 
Rice bran    
Rice millers 3 0 3 
Other traders 1 0 1 
Maize    
Feed millers 6 1 7 
Other traders 3 0 3 
Farmers 1 0 1 
Veterinary medicine    
Pharmacy companies 3 3 6 
First-level agents 4 0 4 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
Services provided by input traders 
The majority of feed traders deliver feeds to the farmers’ farm (Table 75). The average cost of 
transporting feeds from trader’s premises to the farm is between VND 6000 and 16 ,000 per 
tonne for an average distance of 11 km.  
 
The majority of traders also provide inputs on credit. On average, type-3 traders (input and 
output traders) provide inputs on credit to some 113 farmers, much higher than the average 
number of farmers (68 farmers) to whom type-1 (input traders) provide inputs on credit. 
 
In addition to providing inputs on credit, some input traders provide farmers with loans in the 
form of cash for use in other activities related to pig production such as purchase of piglets, 
repair of pig pens or expanding the herd size. This lending practice is more common among 
type-3 traders. Farmers usually pay back the amount to the trader in the form of piglet/pig supply 
so this can actually be considered as an advance payment for future delivery of output. About 
30 to 50 farmers per trader have received loans, with most farmers receiving loans from type-1 
traders. 
Table 75: Services provided by input traders 
Services Type-1 
traders 
(n = 34) 
Type-3 
traders 
(n = 6) 
All input 
traders 
(n = 40) 
Supply of feeds    
Traders delivering feeds to farms (%) 82.4 50.0 77.5 
Transportation cost (‘000 VND/ton) 6 16 6.9 
Average distance from input trader to 11 12 11.1 
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farm (km) 
Supply of inputs on credit    
Traders providing inputs on credit (%) 85.3 50.0 80.0 
Number of farmers buying input on 
credit per trader 
68 113 181 
Provision of credit    
Traders providing credit to farmer (%) 5.9 33.3 10.0 
Number of farmers borrowing money 
per trader 
50 30 80 
VND: Vietnam Dong 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
Input price determination by traders 
In general, input prices are fixed by the traders (Table 76). Among type-3 traders, input prices 
are based on negotiations between traders and farmers, while all the sampled type-1 traders 
decided on the input price. The criteria used to determine the input price are the prevailing 
market price, the price paid by other traders and the quality of inputs. Most traders use the 
prevailing market price as a basis for determining input price while slightly more than one-
fourth base their input price on the price paid by other traders. Slightly more type-3 than type-1 
traders use prices by other traders as a basis for determining their input prices. Only a small 
proportion of type-1 traders consider quality of input when determining price of inputs. 
 
Table 76: Percentage of traders citing who decides on the input price, and basis of input price 
Decision on and basis of input price Type-1 
traders  
(n = 34) 
Type-3 
traders 
(n = 6) 
All input 
traders  
(n = 40) 
Traders decide on input price 100 50.0 92.5 
Farmers decide on input price 0 50.0 7.5 
Price based on prevailing market price 67.6 66.7 67.6 
Price based on that paid by other traders 26.5 33.3 27.0 
Price based on quality of input 5.9 0 5.4 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
Volume of transactions and margins from trading business 
The volume of monthly transactions differed by type of commodity traded for each type of 
trader. For commercial feeds such as mixed and concentrate feeds, type-3 traders purchased and 
sold more feed supply that their type-1 counterparts (Table 77). Margins from mixed feed (as 
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percentage of total revenues) were 4.9% for type-1 traders and 3.6% for type-3 traders. Margins 
for concentrate feed were much higher: 16.7% for type-1 traders and 3.7% for type-3 traders. 
 
Among different types of non-commercial feeds, the average monthly volume of wheat bran 
traded was highest followed by maize and rice bran. Type-3 traders do not trade in rice bran 
and wheat bran. Rice bran generates an average margin of 4.7% while the average margin from 
wheat bran was 5.6%. The average margin from maize generated by type-1 traders was much 
higher at 15.3% compared to 7.2 % by type-3 traders. 
 
The average volume of piglets traded by type-1 traders was about 2.5 times that traded by type-3 
traders. Type-1 traders also generated slightly higher margins (8.4%) than type-3 traders (6.7%). 
Type-1 and type-3 traders received almost similar average margins from veterinary medicines 
and other supplies.  
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Table 77: Average quantity, purchase price and sale value of inputs bought and sold by input traders per month, and percent margins 
Type-1 traders Type-3 traders 
Inputs purchased  Inputs sold  Margin 
(%) 




















Mixed feed 44.4 159,453 44.1 167,681 4.9 86.7 351,000 85.7 364,083 3.6 
Concentrated feed 23.6 108,771 23.6 130,114 16.4 90.0 643,500 90.0 668,000 3.7 
Rice bran 5.3 13,640 5.3 14,320 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 
Maize 26.4 68,467 26.4 80,861 15.3 9.7 27,067 9.7 29,167 7.2 
Wheat bran 50.0 151,000 50.0 160,000 5.6 0 0 0 0 0 
Piglets 35.0 673,500 35.0 735,500 8.4 13.5 243,150 13.5 260,700 6.7 
Medicine - 19,000 - 21,928 13.3 - 23,347 - 26,880 13.1 
Data are based on 2005 operations 
Margins calculated as % of total revenue 
VND: Vietnam Dong 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
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7.5.4. Output buyers (traders) 
Type-2 traders sold an average of 33 tonnes live weight of fatteners per month in 2005 while 
type-3 traders sold slightly over 2 tonnes per month during the same period (Table 78). Growers 
and piglets are traded by type-3 traders only.  
 
Table 78: Scale of business of output buyers 









Fatteners 33.4 364,995 2.3 24,975 
Growers 0 0 0.7 9045 
Piglets 0 0 6.7 75,000 
Data are based on monthly operations in 2005 
VND: Vietnam Dong 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
Sources of output supply 
Output traders bought piglets and grower pigs from farmers (Table 79). The piglets were later 
sold to meat factories for processing and export. Slaughterhouses, butchers and live pig traders 
bought slaughter hogs from integrators and farmers. Half of the output traders bought slaughter 
hogs from farmers and only 25% bought slaughter hogs from integrators (Table 70) since the 
integrator farms existed in only two of four provinces in the study site. Meat from butchers was 
then sold at local markets. Carcasses from slaughterhouses were normally sold to urban areas 
(e.g. Hanoi), provincial cities and towns. 
 
Table 79: Percentage of output traders buying outputs from various sources 
Outputs Type-2 output 
traders (n = 10) 
Type-3 output 
traders (n = 6) 
All output 
traders (n = 16) 
Piglets    
Integrators 0 0 0 
Farmers 0 33.3 12.5 
Grower pigs    
Integrators 0 0 0 
Farmers 0 83.3 31.2 
Slaughter hogs    
Integrators 40.0 0 25.0 
Farmers 70.0 16.7 50.0 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
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Services provided by output traders 
On average, 75% of output traders collected piglets or slaughter hogs from farms.  With an 
average distance of about 19 km from farms to slaughterhouses or selling markets, the 
transportation cost is about VND 200,000 per tonne (Table 80). About 18.7% of traders bought 
outputs on credit which means that 81.3% of them have to pay cash or even cash in advance 
(37.5% of traders provided cash advance to pig raisers). According to key informants, traders in 
some areas preferred to give farmers a cash advance (equivalent to a portion of the total cost) 
one or two weeks before harvesting; the advance is considered a deposit on later delivery of 
specific outputs). An average of five farmers per trader received cash advances. 
 
Table 80: Services provided by output traders to customers 
Type of service Type-2 output 
traders (n = 10) 
Type-3 output 
traders (n = 6) 
All output 
traders  
(n = 16) 
Traders picking up outputs from farms (%) 60.0 100 75.0 
Transport cost (‘000 VND/tonne) 200 200 200 
Average distance from farm to delivery place (km) 21.8 14.2 19.1 
Traders buying output on credit (%) 10.0 33.3 18.7 
Traders providing cash advance to farmers (%) 50.0 16.7 37.5 
VND: Vietnam Dong 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
Output price determination by output traders 
Data from survey showed that all output traders dictated the output prices since the traders have 
more information on buying and selling prices, not only at local markets but also at related 
markets ( Table 81). The output price is based on the following criteria: the prevailing market 
prices in the region, the price paid or offered by other buyers and the quality of outputs. The 
most commonly used basis for determining output prices was the prevailing market price. Type-
2 traders commonly based output price on prevailing market price or price offered by other 
traders, while type-3 traders based output price on the prevailing market price or the quality of 
outputs. Basing the output price on quality is feasible when the output trader also provides or 







This watermark does not appear in the registered version - http://www.clicktoconvert.com
 138 
 
Table 81: Percentage of output traders citing the basis of output price determination 
Basis of output price determination Type-2 output 
traders (n = 10) 
Type-3 output 
traders (n = 6) 
All output 
traders (n = 16) 
Prevailing market price 40.0 66.7 50.0 
Price offered by other traders, 
butchers or slaughterhouses 
40.0 0 25.0 
Quality of output 20.0 33.3 25.0 
Source: ILRI-HAU-IFPRI-FAO survey (2006) 
 
7.6. Facilitating input-output market linkages through informal 
contract arrangements 
The role of input and output traders in facilitating smallholder access to pig meat markets has 
been under-emphasized and often misrepresented. While profit motives have always been 
ascribed to these market actors in their dealings with their target clientele, there has been very 
little interest in assessing other impacts that these relationships have in the efficiency of the pig 
and pig meat markets in general and in the performance of individual producers in particular. 
 
For example, it is apparent that input and output traders are a major source of market 
information to producers in the absence of an efficient system and infrastructure for making 
information accessible to producers, particularly the small-scale ones. Second, input and output 
traders may also perform the function of financial intermediation where financial markets are 
inefficient or not easily accessible to smallholder producers. Third, input and output traders can 
effectively link smallholders to markets. There is evidence from this study that these functions 
have provided some benefits to smallholder pig producers in northern Vietnam, although there 
is still much that needs to be improved in terms of equal sharing of risks and benefits and 
making them more widely accessible to those at the lower end of the small-scale producers.  
 
It is important to note that while these arrangements may not be perfect, there is scope for using 
them as alternative pathways to enable smallholder pig producers to be competitive and active 
participants in the changing market for pigs and pig meat in Vietnam. There is certainly a role 
for public policy to provide an enabling environment to make these linkages more efficient and 
equitable. For instance, public policy could provide investment incentives to private companies 
that purposively partner with smallholders to provide input supply and/or output marketing 
services.  
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7.7. Overcoming barriers from scale 
Despite the inherent efficiency of small-scale farmers and the fact that it is sometimes politically 
attractive to deal with them, the high costs of supervision and other related per unit transaction 
costs are often prohibitive (Coulter et al. 1999).  A number of conditions for successfully linking 
smallholders and agribusiness is discussed by Dorward et al. (1998) including the following: 
· Increased competition among traders or firms to prevent monopsonistic control, 
although this creates opportunities for side-selling, leading to problems of contract 
enforcement; 
· A guaranteed outlet for the final product; 
· An effective repayment mechanism through loan groups of farmers; 
· Access to market information by farmers to prevent exploitation and to strengthen 
bargaining power; 
· Volume of transactions that are large enough to reduce transaction costs, and this can 
be achieved through farmer cooperatives or farmer groups; 
· A well-established formal or informal network of traders to control rogue traders; and 
· Little alternative sources of raw material to prevent the trader or agribusiness from 
buying from other farmers. 
In order to address the scale-related biases that have emerged as barriers to participation by 
smallholders in these partnerships, public policy could also facilitate the strengthening of 
voluntary organizations by farmers including pig producers through appropriate measures that 
will motivate them to organize themselves and be assisted in the process. By organizing farmers, 
the scale bias is neutralized and individual farmers can benefit as a group while retaining 
individual control over their farm activities.  Promotion of farmer groups or farmer-controlled 
enterprises can also mitigate the high transaction costs of dealing with smallholders (Coulter et. 
Al 1999).  The cooperative could bargain and negotiate prices and the terms of the contract on 
behalf of the farmers.  It can also be instrumental in providing information, inputs, and technical 
and quality assistance to the growers.  The agribusiness as such will have a stake in 
strengthening such institutions since it will contribute to considerably lower transaction costs. 
Hence, there is scope for integrating private-led initiatives in input and output markets with 
public-sector initiatives that support farm-level organizations (e.g. in form of cooperatives). 
Public-sector support to cooperatives will need to be targeted to subsidy-neutral initiatives to 
make them sustainable and provide appropriate incentives for collective action at the farm. This 
support could be targeted mainly towards initiatives such as improving the regulatory 
framework, providing appropriate infrastructure  and delivering public services – such as 
extension, animal health and market information – effectively and efficiently. 
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8. Summary of findings and policy implications 
The study looked at three key areas of inquiry to assess the performance of contract farming of 
pigs in northern Vietnam in terms of how it enables market participation by smallholder pig 
producers in the changing market for pigs and pig meat in Vietnam. These areas included the 
identification of barriers to participation by smallholders in various forms of contract 
arrangements in pig production, the estimation of the costs and benefits of contract 
arrangements in terms of quantitative and qualitative indicators, and assessing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of contract arrangements by evaluating producer performance in terms of 
economic measures (profitability). These are summarized in the following sections. 
 
8.1. Determinants of participation in contractual arrangements 
Pig producers may engage in formal or informal contractual arrangements or operate 
independently without entering into a contract arrangement. It was also revealed from field 
surveys and key informant discussions that informal contracts take many forms although two 
main types are prominent; informal contracts with cooperatives o r  informal contracts with 
traders of inputs, outputs or both. 
 
Descriptive analysis showed that the types of contract arrangements in which farmers are 
engaged also vary with the type of production system they undertake. In the case of formal 
contracts, the type of production system is exogenous to the farmer as it is the contractor or 
integrator that usually determines the production activity to be undertaken under contract. Here 
only two types of production activity are carried out under formal contract arrangements: 
farrow-to-wean (piglet production) and grow-to-finish (fattening) operations. More importantly, 
there is a striking scale bias among the participants in formal contract arrangements, where 
farmers can be categorized as large-scale in the context of the farm size distribution in northern 
Vietnam. Specifically, farmers that engaged in formal contracts either had more than 50 sows or 
fatteners in an average inventory or generated outputs between 5 tonnes and more than 50 
tonnes live weight per year. 
 
There was more variability in the configuration of types production systems among pig 
producers not engaged in formal contracts. This was also largely driven by scale. For example, 
piglet production and fattening operations were common in smaller farms, while farrow-to-finish 
or full cycle operations were common in relatively larger farms within the continuum of small- 
and medium-scale farms in northern Vietnam. Combination systems in some ways mimicked the 
full-cycle production system but with more flexibility, given the relatively diverse components of 
the herd.  Here, a much wider range of scale was observed among participants, ranging from 
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small- to large-scale in the context of farm size distribution in northern Vietnam although more 
skewed towards the higher end of the scale spectrum. 
 
Hence, it can be inferred that formal contracts tend to favour short duration production cycles 
that have the potential to be made more intensive with appropriate coordination of production 
activities. On the other hand, informal contracts are largely driven by the scale of the pig herd. 
Informal arrangements for input supply and/or output purchases tend to be dictated by scale; 
input and output traders preferred to enter into contract agreements and trade with farmers who 
can generate large volumes of feed input requirements or can deliver significant volumes of 
piglets and/or pigs. This scale bias is potentially neutralized when traders deal with pig producer 
cooperatives. Cooperatives are generally intended to organize small producers to achieve some 
common production and marketing objective for each member and membership entails some 
initial costs like membership fees. Such fees and other required contributions have to be at the 
level where the expected benefits from membership to the farmer must be higher than the costs. 
One much appreciated benefit that cooperatives provide to their members is protection from 
market and price risks; this was exemplified by a Thai Binh cooperative that provides a market 
of last resort for its members when there is an oversupply or when prices are low and members 
cannot easily sell their pigs without incurring significant losses in the spot market. 
 
Descriptive statistics on the demographics of survey respondents revealed that participants in 
formal contracts are relatively older (hence likely be more experienced), have more years of 
schooling, own more land and spend most of their time in pig-raising activities compared to pig 
producers are engaged in informal contracts or who operate independently. Variables related to 
transaction cost – in terms of distance to formal credit sources, input supply and services – were 
prominent distinguishing factors between farmers engaged in informal contracts with 
cooperatives and those who had contracts with non-cooperatives. Specifically, farmers who 
were situated farther away from formal sources of credit, input supply and services tended to 
enter into informal contracts with cooperatives rather than non-cooperatives. This may be 
because cooperatives always attempt to provide their members with access to inputs and 
services if unable to deliver them. 
 
Econometric analysis of farmers’ decisions to enter into a specific type of contractual 
arrangement further validated the observed trends from descriptive analysis. A farmer’s decision 
to engage in a formal contract was found to be driven by age, proportion of time spent in pig-
raising, level of resource ownership and location, which likely captures the effects of the policy 
environment conducive to pig-raising including infrastructure and market conditions. A farmer’s 
choice to engage in informal contracts with cooperatives was also influenced by similar 
demographic characteristics though land was not a significant driver and variables related to 
transaction cost were more important. Engagement in informal contracts with cooperatives was 
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significantly related to the distance to veterinary shops, a proxy for access to animal health 
services which are important inputs in pig production. In the case of participation in informal 
contracts with input/output traders, variables related to transaction cost also appear to be 
significant drivers of farmers’ decisions, while demographics and resource-related variables do 
not appear to be important. Specifically, distance to VBARD (a proxy for access to formal credit) 
significantly influenced farmers’ decisions to engage in informal contracts with traders; this 
suggests that pig producers with limited access to formal sources of credit may ease this 
constraint by partnering with input/output traders who can provide credit in kind to sustain their 
pig production activities. Location variables were also significant drivers of farmers’ decisions to 
engage in informal contracts either with a cooperative or an input/output trader. 
 
8.2. Costs and benefits of contract arrangements 
Costs and benefits of contract arrangements were assessed quantitatively by estimating 
profitability (returns to labour) under various types of contracts and identifying qualitative 
indicators of benefits and costs. Note that in the absence of available data on production and 
other costs from formal contract growers, comparisons were made between informal contracts 
and independent operators only. 
 
Prior to assessment of profitability, the production cost structure in pig production was drawn up 
to reveal that indeed feed costs account for the largest proportion of total production cost in pig-
raising, with some variation across types of production system. Quality differences in feed and 
stock (weanlings) were assumed to have been captured via market prices at which these inputs 
were procured at the time of the survey. 
 
Profitability was assessed by comparing the production of exotic breeds and crossbreeds under 
various production systems within each type of contract arrangements. Estimates of returns to 
labour in  the farrow-to-wean (piglet production) system showed that producers of crossbreeds 
with informal contracts with cooperatives and non-cooperatives generated significantly higher 
returns than independent producers, while no significant difference was observed in the 
production of exotic breeds. In farrow-to-finish (full cycle) operations, independent producers 
generated higher returns to labour in the production of crossbreeds and exotic breeds than 
producers engaged in informal contracts with cooperatives. No comparison was made between 
independent producers and farmers with contracts with non-cooperatives because of limited 
sample size in the latter category of farmers. In grow-to-finish ( fattening) operations, farmers 
engaged in informal contracts generated higher returns to labour in the production of 
crossbreeds than their independent counterparts. No comparison was made for exotic breeds 
because independent producers do not raise this breed type in grow-to-finish systems. In the 
combination system of production, returns to labour were higher among producers with 
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informal contracts with cooperatives in the production of crossbreeds than among independent 
farmers; there was no significant difference in returns to labour between the two groups in the 
production of exotic breeds. 
 
There is evidence, therefore, to suggest that informal contracts with either cooperatives or 
traders can facilitate higher returns in some specific production activities using specific 
technologies. In this study, it is shown that informal contracts appear to facilitate better returns 
in production of crossbreeds in farrow-to-weaning and grow-to-finish systems; these are both 
short duration systems that were also the preferred types for formal contracts by integrators. It 
should also be emphasized that in these two cases, the informal contracts were w i th  
cooperatives. For longer duration production cycles (farrow-to-finish), independent producers 
had higher returns to labour. Informal contracts with cooperatives also facilitated higher returns 
to labour among producers engaged in combination mode of production of crossbreeds. This 
can be rationalized by the fact that in combination systems, producers can engage in two types 
of short-cycle production processes: farrow-to-wean and grow-to-finish. 
 
Various qualitative indicators of benefits were also identified during the survey. In general, 
survey respondents identified the following benefits of participation in contract arrangements: 
access to quality inputs and services, access to financing, access to assured market for outputs, 
access to information about technology and technology transfer, protection from production and 
market risks, reduced transaction costs in input procurement and output marketing and, more 
importantly, reduced transaction costs arising from asymmetric information in product quality 
certification. This last benefit is important because it represents the lost sales that farmers could 
incur when the market does not recognize the quality of the product they bring to the market, 
assuming that there is quality differentiation. Key informant discussions revealed that informal 
contract arrangements with input suppliers can facilitate this third-party certification of output 
by pig producers who are linked with reputable feed distributors who usually assist their clients 
to search for market outlets for their products and negotiate prices. These linkages occurred at 
the farmer and cooperative levels; in the latter case, the cooperative had input supply 
arrangements with a feed distributor. Farmers linked with cooperatives were also able to obtain 
protection from market risk as the cooperatives provided them with a market of last resort for 
their outputs when the market was down and it was difficult to sell pigs at the spot market 
without incurring substantial losses. The cooperatives were able to provide this service to their 
members through a collective fund contribution meant to provide resources to help stabilize 
prices and provide a buffer to members from the effects of market fluctuations. Given the limited 
scope of this present study, it would be worthwhile to pursue more detailed investigations of 
these services and functions that generate substantial benefits to farmers. Greater understanding 
and quantification of these specific benefits would enhance current understanding of the true 
costs of and benefits from pig production contracts. 
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8.3. Efficiency and effectiveness of contract arrangements 
Results from the survey revealed that there is limited scope for smallholder pig producers to 
participate in formal contract agreements primarily because of the barrier due to scale, i.e. 
participation in formal contracts is not scale-neutral. This scale requirement is largely due to 
profit and efficiency motives of the contractor. Efficiency can be derived from reduced 
monitoring costs, lower risks of default and economies of scale. This is because it is easier to 
monitor and supervise a few large farms than numerous small farms, large farms have more 
resources to invest and sustain their operations than small farms, and large farms have a lower 
cost per unit of input and services provision to contract growers. Hence, smallholder 
participation in formal contracts may be limited in the long term unless alternative forms of 
contracts can be developed that will provide the right incentives for the private-sector investor 
(contractor or integrator) to engage with smallholder producers. 
 
In the meantime, alternative forms of informal contracts are emerging and have been observed 
to enable smallholder participation. These include informal contracts with cooperatives and 
informal contracts with input/output traders. Between the two, contracts with cooperatives have 
the potential for mitigating the scale bias inherent in formal contract agreements that are 
currently observed in Northern Vietnam. Some input traders have also indicated preference for 
contracting only with relatively larger pig production operations in order to generate substantial 
volumes for their feed supply or output supply businesses, although information from survey 
data indicates that the proportion of small-scale producers among those having informal 
contracts with traders is relatively high. Traders also indicated that there was a higher incidence 
of contract violation among small farmers, hence many traders preferred to enter into contracts 
with large-scale farmers. In this case, not all smallholders will be able to participate in these 
contracts. On the other hand, cooperatives are generally designed for smallholder membership. 
When cooperatives function effectively and efficiently,  they are more likely to facilitate 
beneficial smallholder participation in pig production and marketing contracts but without the 
substantial costs of entry required for formal contracts. 
 
When informal contracts work, they can provide a number of benefits through services to pig 
producers. Such benefits and services as cited by survey respondents include assistance in 
searching for market outlets for outputs, delivery of inputs to farm, pick up of outputs from farm, 
price discount or premium on volume of output traded, quality assurance of input supply, 
assurance of regular input supply, credit in kind (input purchases), advance payment (output 
purchases), technical assistance and advice and market information. 
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Based on the comparison of returns to labour between farmers with and without contracts, there 
is quantitative evidence to suggest that informal contract arrangements are effective in 
facilitating economic returns from pig production. Beyond this quantitative evidence, qualitative 
indicators based on benefits derived by pig producers with and without contracts also confirm 
that contracts facilitate the access of pig producers to these benefits. However, this study was 
not able to assess whether these benefits are efficient thus further inquiry is needed on this 
subject. 
 
8.4. Implications for policy 
The foregoing discussions present some key areas for pro-poor public policy in addressing the 
issues of smallholder participation in contract farming and other forms of market coordination 
for improving smallholder competitiveness in pig markets. First, the potential to harness the 
informal linkages between traders and pig producers to develop more sustainable private-public 
partnerships will be worth investigating. There appears to be potential to extract public goods 
from a partnership that is founded on private profit motives. Specifically, with proper incentives, 
traders can bridge the gap in information asymmetry in output quality certification that will 
enable pig producers to be appropriately compensated for delivering quality pigs to the market 
by output buyers who will accept and pay for the informally certified pigs. However, this is only 
a second-best solution in the short term to address the prevailing needs of smallholder pig 
producers. There is still the bigger policy issue of market power and this third-party certification 
may not work effectively where the market is a buyers’ market. Hence, the long-term interest of 
the public would be best served by establishing some form of product certification or 
infrastructure that will make it easy for smallholders to access and have the quality of their pigs 
assessed and certified (particularly for disease-free status or lean meat content) according to 
specific grading standards. In addition, complementary policies to address the need for 
infrastructure in markets and services (wholesale markets, transport and communication 
services, and inspection and storage facilities) will also be useful intervention points from the 
public sector, as well as co-financing arrangements that will promote private-sector investment 
in infrastructure. 
 
Meanwhile, there is still merit in facilitating p artnerships between large farms/companies and 
smallholder pig producers instead of viewing the relationship in a confrontational manner. It is 
true that such partnerships, when properly designed and implemented, can generate 
employment especially to the large unemployed sectors in rural areas. They can also 
demonstrate new ways to diversify income and reduce risks, and establish new market outlets 
that otherwise may not be accessible to smaller farmers and from which they will subsequently 
benefit. Since this is largely an initiative that is private-sector led, public policy can provide an 
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enabling environment for enforcement of laws on contracts, trade and labour, among other 
sectors, to support private-sector investment. 
 
Given the potential of cooperatives to facilitate profitable pig production by smallholders as 
validated by empirical results of this study, public policy will need to consider how best to use 
this mechanism to help smallholder pig producers improve their competitiveness in the 
changing market for pigs and pig meat. Barriers to entry in cooperatives by smallholders are not 
as restrictive as those in formal contracts and to some extent in some informal contracts with 
traders. Scale-related barriers can be partly addressed by a general improvement in the overall 
conditions of the economic environment; this will facilitate higher productivity and possibly 
more asset accumulation in the long run. In the short term and in the absence of clear directions 
on how to tackle the scale barriers imposed by formal contracts, public policy can focus 
attention on enhancing smallholder opportunities to participate in informal contracts with 
cooperatives. This may include providing an enabling regulatory environment to facilitate 
formation of voluntary farmer groups as well as special assistance in training and capacity 
building of smallholder farmers in these producer organizations. 
 
Maintaining smallholder competitiveness in the changing market for pigs and pig meat remains 
an important development challenge, particularly in the context of pro-poor public 
policymaking. With the ongoing rapid changes in market organizations to respond to changing 
consumer demand and market requirements, there is little room for complacency when it comes 
to identifying viable options for smallholders to remain active participants in the pig industry 
where they are substantially contributing in terms of total output. Continued research will be 
necessary in this regard to provide appropriate tools to inform the policy debate. In the current 
context of the policy debate on how to develop the livestock sector in general, future inquiries 
will need to be directed and adequately supported towards new knowledge on viable 
institutional options and market organizations that will continue to keep smallholders as viable 
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Annex 1: Survey questionnaires 
Household Survey of Smallholder Pig Producers 
 
Enterprise Type:   [      ] 
1 = With formal full contract (contract grower) 
2 = With informal contract (input and output arrangements) 





District                        _____________________ 
Sub-district                  _____________________ 
   Enumerator                 _____________________ 
   Date of survey             _____________________ 




   Reviewed by:   _____________  Date: __________ 
   
   If sent back for verification/correction: 
Date sent back to enumerator _______________ 
Date corrected and returned:  _______________ 
Reviewed again by: ______________________ 
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A.  DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN CONTRACT ARRANGEMENTS 
 
A1.  Are you currently involved in any contract farming arrangement? [    ]  
0 = No 1 = Yes 
        If Yes, go to Section B. 
A1a. If No, Were you ever involved in any contract farming arrangement previously and later 
dropped out? [    ]  0 = No  1 = Yes 
A1a1. If Yes, what was the most important reason for dropping out?  [   ] 
Code: 1 = contract was terminated by contractor due to _______________________. 
 2 = could not satisfy contract performance measures; 
3 = did not find any benefit from the contract;  
4 = others (specify) _________________________ 
 
A1a2.  If no, what is the main reason why you never joined any contract farming arrangement? [   
] 
Code:   1 = not interested;  
2 = not yet ready to participate;  
3 = did not qualify based on contractor’s requirements;  
4 = not aware of any contract farming arrangement being offered;  
5 = contractor only contracts farms with sheds and land;   
6 = contractor only contracts larger farms;   
7 = buyer would offer me a contract, but I don’t trust buyer;   
8 = buyer would offer me a contract, but the terms are not good enough;  
9 = Others (specify)_________________________ 
 
A2.  Would you be interested to participate in a contract farming arrangement if offered in the 
future? [     ]    0 = No   1 = Yes 
 
GO TO SECTION C. 
 
B.  CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTRACT ARRANGEMENTS (This section is applicable only to 
those with formal contract arrangements.) 
 
B1.  What output/s do you produce? [     ]   [     ]   [     ] 
Code:  1 – piglets (weaners);  2 = growing pigs;  3 = fattened pigs (finishers)   
 
B2.  In what year did you start your contract arrangement?  ____________ 
 
B3.  With whom do you currently have a contract arrangement?  [     ]  [     ] 
This watermark does not appear in the registered version - http://www.clicktoconvert.com
 152 
Code:  1 = integrator;  2 = input supplier;  3 = trader (middlemen)  4 = meat processor 
(processed meat products);   
5 = butcher/slaughterhouse (fresh meat);  6 = supermarket;  7 = cooperative;  8 = others 
(specify)_____________________ 
 
B4.  What type of contract is it?  [     ] 
Code:  1 = input supply (feeds, medicine);  2 = output supply (marketing);  3 = both (full 
contract) 
 
B5.  What is the duration of the contract?   __________years (or months, whichever is applicable 
to the cases in survey sites). 
 
B6.  Is the contract renewable?  [     ]   0 = No  1 = Yes. 
B6a.  If yes, how often is it renewed?  [     ] 
Code:  1 = every year;  2 = every two years;  3 = variable depending on contractor;  4 = others 
(specify)_________________________ 
 
B7.  What were your two main motivations to join this contract arrangement?  
B8a [     ] B8b [    ] 
Code:  1 = assured buyer of output;  2 = access to good quality inputs (feeds and stocks);  3 = 
timely payment for output;  4 = good price for output;  5 = access to credit for inputs;  6 = 
access to veterinary services;  7 = access to technical advice on pig raising;  8 = stable price for 
output;  9 = others (specify)_________________________ 
 
B8. If you are under a full contract, what are the obligations of the contractor? 
Category a. % (0-100) b. Mode of payment 
1 = Cash/check/ 
m o n e y  o r d e r / b a n k  
transfer;  2 = credit;  
3 = advance; 99 = not 
applicable 
c.  D e l i v e r y /pick 
up at farm 
1 = yes, 0 = no,  
99 = not 
applicable 
B81. Supply of piglets    
B82. Supply of feeds    
B83. Supply of drugs and/or 
vaccination 
   
B84. Building/facility    
B85. Equipment/tools    
B86. Labor    
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B87. Artificial insemination (AI)    
B88. Technical advice/training    
B89. Supervision of farm/staff    
B810. Waste disposal    
B811. Purchase of output    
B812. Others (specify)    
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B9.  If you are under a full contract, what are the technical performance parameters achieved by 
the farm during the most recent cycle and relevant bonuses or penalties received? 
Technical parameters a. Actual achieved 
(based on most recent 
cycle) 
b. Penalties received c. Bonuses received 
B91. Mortality rate 
(%) 
   
B92. Feed conversion 
ratio 
   
B93. Liveweight at 
sale (kg, ave. or 
fixed?) 
   
B 9 4 .  V a c c i n a t i o n  
frequency 
   
B 9 5 .  F e e d i n g  
frequency 
   
B96. Harvest recovery 
(%) 
   
Penalties Code:  1 = reduction in output price by xx%; 2 = rejection of all output;  3 = non-
renewal of contract; 4 = no penalties imposed; 5 = others (specify)______________________ 
Bonuses Code:  1 = premium price at the rate of xx% per kg;  2 = discount on feed costs at the 
rate of xx% per kg;  3 = others (specify)___________________ 
 
B10.  Do conflicts happen in contract implementation?  [     ] 
Code:  1 = never;  2 = seldom;  3 = often 
 
B11.  What are the main reasons for conflicts in contracts?  B11a [     ]   B11b [     ] 
Code:  1 = price term;  2 = quality term;  3 = quantity term;  4 = delivery time;  5 = others 
(specify)____________________________ 
 
B12.  Please characterize your experience of the level of benefits obtained from your current 
contract.  For each benefit, use the following code:  0 = none; 1 = a little;  2 = average;  3 = 
very good. 
Benefit Type Benefit Level 
B121. Assured buyer of output  
B122. Access to good quality inputs  
B123. Timely payment for output  
B124. Good price for output  
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B125. Access to credit for inputs  
B126. Access to veterinary services  
B127. Access to technical advice  
B128. Improved quality of pigs (piglets) 
produced 
 
B129. Stabilized sale price of output  
B1210. Reduced marketing cost  
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C.  HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 
 
C1.  Characteristics of the household head 
 a .  A g e  
(years) 
b .  S e x  
(0=M 
1=F) 
c. Years of 
schooling 
d .  M a i n  
occupation* 
e .  Subs id i a r y  
occupation* 
f. Proportion of 
time spent in 
swine-related 
activities (%) 
C11. Husband       
C12. Wife       
C13.        
C14.       
*Occupation Code:  1 = Agriculture;  2 = Pig production;  3 = Agricultural labor;  4 = 
Government/Private employment;  5 = Feed trade sub-contracting;  6 = Others (specify)_______ 
 
C2.  Decision-making in the household pig enterprise 
Task a. Husband (%) b. Wife (%) 
C21. Production   
C22. Marketing   
C23. Others (specify)   
   
   
 
C3.  What is your household size?  [     ] 
 
C4.  How many family members are engaged in your household’s pig production enterprise? 
C4a.  Full time  [     ]     C4b.  Part time  [     ]    C4c. If part time, average %__________. 
 
C5.  Are you a member of a cooperative?  [     ]  0 = No  1 = Yes 
C5a.  If yes, number of years being a member:_______________ 
C5b.  If yes, what type of cooperative?_____________________ 
 
C6.  What was the approximate total annual cash income of the household in 2005 and 
sources? 
Source of income a .  V o l u m e  
sold 
b. Price per 
unit 
c. Total Value  
(000 VND) 
C61. Pig production    
C62. Poultry production    
C63. Cattle/buffalo prodn.    
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C64. Goat production    
C65. Fish production    
C66. Crop production    
C661.    
C662.    
C663.    
C664.    
C67. Fruit production    
C68. Non-agricultural (handicrafts, etc.)    
C69 .  N o n -farm wages by family 
members 
   
C610. Remittances by family members    
C611. Gifts    
C612. Salary from government 
employment 
   
C613. Others (specify)    
C614.    
 
C7.  Landholdings 
 Owned Leased –in Leased-out 








e. No. of 
plots 
f. Area  
(sao) 
C71. Area with agric. crops        
C72. Area under pig farm       
C73. Area of homestead (including 
orchard garden) 
      
C74. Area with fish pond       
C75. If rented, rental rate  
(000 VND/sao) 
      
Note: 1 sao = 360 sq. meters 
D.  ACCESS TO MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE AND INFORMATION FROM THE FARM 
 
Infrastructure/Information Distance from farm (km) Available on farm/home 
0 = No  1 = Yes 
D1. Paved road   
D2. Telephone   
D3. Television   
D4. Access to internet   
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D5. Radio   
D6. Post office   
D7. Credit cooperative   
D8. VBARD*   
D9. Bank for social policy   
D10. Acceptable water supply 
source for farm operations 
  
D11. Electricity   
D12. Commercial feed supply 
shops/source 
  
D13. Veterinary service staff   
D14. Veterinary drug store   
D15. District town   
D16. Residential area   
D 1 7 .  N o n -commercial feed 
supply source 
  
D18. Major slaughterhouse   
D19. Butcher   
D20. Integrator center   
D21. Commercial (non-state 
farm) piglet supply source 
  
D22. State farm   
D22. Newspapers   
*VBARD is Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
 
E.  PRODUCTION SYSTEM AND CHANGES IN ANIMAL INVENTORY INCLUDING SALES 
 
E1.  Indicate the type of pig production system you currently have.  [     ] 
Code:  1 = farrow to wean (piglet production);  2 = farrow to finish (complete cycle);  3 = grow 
to finish (pig fattening);  4 = 1 (farrow to wean) and 2 (farrow to finish);  5 = combination of 3 
(grow to finish) and 2 (farrow to finish) 
 
Use only the applicable table/s based on the type of production system from the following tables 
to record changes in animal inventory. 
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E2.  Changes in animal inventory 
 
E21. Production System Type 1:  Farrow to wean 
 
 Beginning  
(Date:____________) 




during the cycle 
Sales/Culled/Slaughtered 




















































Sows:                   
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
Boars:                   
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
Replaceme
nt gilts: 
                  
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
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     Cross                   
Sucklings:                   
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
Weanlings:                   
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
* Ending = Beginning + Additions – Deaths/Lost/Stolen/Gift – Sales/Culled/Slaughtered 
This watermark does not appear in the registered version - http://www.clicktoconvert.com
 161 
Source code:  1 – birth,  2 – bred on farm,  3 – purchased from state government,  4 – purchased from neighbor/market,  5 – purchased from 
commercial breeder,  6 – integrator, 7 – gifts, 8 – grown (transformed from previous stage),  9 – others (specify)______________________. 
Outlet code:  1 – integrator’s outlet; 2 = neighbor; 3 = local trader; 4 = butcher/slaughterhouse; 5 = meat dealer/retailer; 6 = fastfood 
chain/restaurant/hotel; 7 = supermarket; 8 = others (specify)_______________________. 
E21a.  If you purchased animals, did you incur transportation costs?  [     ]   0 = No  1 = Yes. 
If YES, how much for the entire cycle? _______________ 
E21b.  If you incurred deaths, how did you dispose of the dead animals? [      ] 
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Additions during the cycle Deaths/Lost/Stolen/Gift 
during the cycle 
Sales/Culled/Slaughtered 
during the cycle 
Ending* 
(Date:__________) 


























Sows:                   
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
Boars:                   
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
Replacement 
gilts: 
                  
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
Sucklings:                   
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
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Weanlings:                   
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
Growers:                   
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
Finishers:                   
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
* Ending = Beginning + Additions – Deaths/Lost/Stolen/Gift – Sales/Culled/Slaughtered 
Source code:  1 – birth,  2 – bred on farm,  3 – purchased from state government,  4 – purchased from neighbor/market,  5 – purchased from 
commercial breeder,  6 – integrator, 7 – gifts, 8 – grown (transformed from previous stage),  9 – others (specify)______________________. 
Outlet code:  1 – integrator’s outlet; 2 = neighbor; 3 = local trader; 4 = butcher/slaughterhouse; 5 = meat dealer/retailer; 6 = fastfood 
chain/restaurant/hotel; 7 = supermarket; 8 = others (specify)_______________________. 
E22a.  If you purchased animals, did you incur transportation costs?  [     ]   0 = No  1 = Yes. 
If YES, how much for the entire cycle? _______________ 
E22b.  If you incurred deaths, how did you dispose of the dead animals? [      ] 
Code:  1 = buried; 2 = incinerated; 3 = rendered (at rendering plant); 4 = open pit; 5 = closed pit; 6 = others (specify)______________ 
Benchmark: 
Sucklings:   
Weanlings: 
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Additions during the 
cycle 
Deaths/Lost/Stolen/G
ift during the cycle 
Sales/Culled/Slaughtered 




















































                  
     
Local 
                  
    
Exotic 
                  
     
Cross 
                  
Finisher
s 
                  
     
Local 
                  
    
Exotic 
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Cross 
                  
* Ending = Beginning + Additions – Deaths/Lost/Stolen/Gift – Sales/Culled/Slaughtered 
Source code:  1 – birth,  2 – bred on farm,  3 – purchased from state government,  4 – purchased from neighbor/market,  5 – purchased from 
commercial breeder,  6 – integrator, 7 – gifts, 8 – grown (transformed from previous stage),  9 – others (specify)______________________. 
Outlet code:  1 – integrator’s outlet; 2 = neighbor; 3 = local trader; 4 = butcher/slaughterhouse; 5 = meat dealer/retailer; 6 = fastfood 
chain/restaurant/hotel; 7 = supermarket; 8 = others (specify)_______________________. 
E23a.  If you purchased animals, did you incur transportation costs?  [     ]   0 = No  1 = Yes. 
If YES, how much for the entire cycle? _______________ 
E23b.  If you incurred deaths, how did you dispose of the dead animals? [      ] 
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Additions during the cycle Deaths/Lost/Stolen/Gift 
during the cycle 
Sales/Culled/Slaughtered 
during the cycle 
Ending* 
(Date:___________) 


























Sows:                   
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
Boars:                   
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
Replacement 
gilts: 
                  
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
Sucklings:                   
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
This watermark does not appear in the registered version - http://www.clicktoconvert.com
 168 
Weanlings:                   
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
Growers:                   
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
Finishers:                   
     Local                   
     Exotic                   
     Cross                   
* Ending = Beginning + Additions – Deaths/Lost/Stolen/Gift – Sales/Culled/Slaughtered 
Source code:  1 – birth,  2 – bred on farm,  3 – purchased from state government,  4 – purchased from neighbor/market,  5 – purchased from 
commercial breeder,  6 – integrator, 7 – gifts, 8 – grown (transformed from previous stage),  9 – others (specify)______________________. 
Outlet code:  1 – integrator’s outlet; 2 = neighbor; 3 = local trader; 4 = butcher/slaughterhouse; 5 = meat dealer/retailer; 6 = fastfood 
chain/restaurant/hotel; 7 = supermarket; 8 = others (specify)_______________________. 
E24a.  If you purchased animals, did you incur transportation costs?  [     ]   0 = No  1 = Yes. 
If YES, how much for the entire cycle? _______________ 
E24b.  If you incurred deaths, how did you dispose of the dead animals? [      ] 
Code: 1 = buried;  2 = incinerated;  3 = rendered (at rendering plant);  4 = open pit;  5 = closed pit;  6 = others (specify)____________ 
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F.  DETAILS ON SOURCES OF INPUTS 
 
Regular Source Non-regular Source  





N o .  o f  




f o r  c h o i c e  













i n  o n e  
cycle 
Main 









F1. Weanlings           
F2. Growers           
F3. Feeds           
F31.           
F32.           
F33.           
F4.  Medicine           
F5.  Others 
(specify) 
          
F6.            
Source code:  1 = bred on farm;  2 = purchased from state farm;  3 = purchased from non-state farm (commercial farm);  4 = purchased from neighbor 
(backyard farm);  5 = integrator;  6 = purchased from livestock market; 7 = integrator; 8 = feed distributor (commercial, branded); 9 = feed miller; 10 = 
feed retailer (commercial, branded + other local ingredients); 11 = veterinarian;  
12 = other (specify)_____________________ 
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Commodity Main reason for choice of regular source Main reason for choice of non-regular source 
Weanlings   
Growers   
Feeds   
1.   
2.   
3.   
Medicine   
Others (specify)   
 
F7.  What specific benefits and/or incentives do you get from your regular input supplier?  Identify as many as applicable from the list below. 
Benefits/Incentives 0  = No 1 = Yes 
F71.  Assured supply of inputs when needed  
F72.  Price discounts on volume purchases of inputs  
F73.  Inputs purchased on credit, no interest  
F74.  Free technical advice provided when needed  
F75.  Information on potential output buyers provided when needed  
F76.  Information on output prices provided when needed  
F77.  Variety of inputs are available and no need to look elsewhere  
F78.  Can provide assistance in negotiation of output sale with potential buyers  
F79.  Can provide guarantee of quality of output (to potential output buyer) because of use of his/her input supply  
F710.  Can deliver to farm, no cost to farmer  
 
F8.  How is input price determined? 
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Code:  1 =  based on prevailing market price;  2 = fixed by input supplier;  3 = negotiated between input supplier and producer;  4 = based on set 
criteria (describe________________________);  5 = others (specify)_________________________________ 
 
F9.  How much time do you spend on the following tasks per cycle. 
Task a. How task is done [     ] b. Time spent (hours or 
days per cycle) 
F91.  Getting information on potential input sources   
F92.  Getting information about input prices   
F93.  Contacting input suppliers and negotiating input supply   
F94.  Examining input delivered/purchased to ascertain quality   
F95.  Examining input delivered/purchased to determine exact quantity required   
Task Code:  1 = by telephone;  2 = by personal visit;  3 = provided by third party agents, no cost;  4 = provided by third party agents, with a fee;  5 = 
others (specify)_____________________________________ 
 
H.  MARKET OUTLETS FOR OUTPUTS 
 
Regular market outlet: code [     ] Other market outlet: code  [     ] Item 
a. Piglets b. Fattened pigs c. Piglets d. Fattened pigs 
H1. output sold, most recent salen(no./ %)     
H2. picked up from farm (no./ %)     
H3. delivered to buyer (no./ %)     
H4. if delivered, distance from farm     
H5. how output price is determined (code)     
H6. how output is paid (code)     
H5. price premium received, most recent sale     
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(VND per kg) 
H6. output rejected for quality deficiency, most 
recent sale? (0 = no; 1 = yes) 
    
Outlet code:  1 – integrator’s outlet; 2 = neighbor; 3 = local trader; 4 = butcher/slaughterhouse; 5 = meat dealer/retailer; 6 = fastfood 
chain/restaurant/hotel; 7 = supermarket; 8 = others (specify)_______________________. 
Price determination code:  Code:  1 =  based on prevailing market price;  2 = fixed by output buyer;  3 = negotiated between producer and output 
buyer;  4 = based on set criteria (describe________________________);  5 = others (specify)_________________________________ 
Mode of payment code:  1 = cash payment at delivery; 2 = cash payment ______days after delivery (credit);  3 = pre-paid deposit (cash advance);  4 = 
others (specify)______________________________ 
 
H7. What specific benefits and/or incentives do you get from your regular output buyer?  Identify as many as applicable from the list below. 
Benefits/Incentives 0  = No   1 = Yes 
H71.  Assured buyer of output when needed  
H72.  Price premium on volume sale of outputs  
H73.  Output purchases paid in cash  
H74.  Free technical advice provided when needed  
H75.  Variety of inputs are available for sale and no need to look elsewhere  
H76.  Can provide credit on input purchases  
H77.  Information on output prices provided when needed  
H78.  Minimum quality requirements demanded  
H79.  Picks up output on farm, no cost to producer  
 
H8.  How much time do you spend on the following tasks per cycle. 
Task a. How task is done [     ] b. Time spent (hours or 
days per cycle) 
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H81.  Getting information on potential output buyers   
H82.  Getting information about output prices   
H83.  Contacting output buyers and negotiating output sales   
H84.  Getting information about quality requirements by output buyers   
Code:  1 = by telephone;  2 = by personal visit;  3 = provided by third party agents, no cost;  4 = provided by third party agents, with a fee;  5 = others 
(specify)_____________________________________ 
 
I.  FEED CONSUMPTION AND EXPENDITURES 
 
I1.  If you are a pure commercial feed user, please complete the following table on feed consumption (per cycle) 



































i x f 
I31.Booster           
I32.Pre-starter           
I33.Starter           
I34.Grower           
I35,Finisher           
I36.Others 
(specify) 
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Mode of payment code: 1 = does not pay for feeds; provided by contractor;  2 = cash on delivery;  3 = on credit, payable after _________period;  4 = 
others (specify)_____________________ 
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I2.  Do you use only one specific brand of commercial feed?  [     ]    0 = No  1 = Yes 
I2a.  If yes, why?_____________________________________________________________ 
I2b.  If no, why?______________________________________________________________ 
I3.  Do you use leftovers as feed:  [     ]    0 = No   1 = Yes 
I4.  Do you mix commercial feed with other ingredients?  [     ]    0 = No   1 = Yes 
I4a.  If yes, who does the mixing? _______________________________ 
I4b.  If yes, how much time is spent each time? ___________________________ 
I5.  If you prepare your own feed using local feed ingredients mixed with some commercial 
concentrate feed, please complete the following table below for ingredients used (per cycle). 
Purchased from markets Type of feed 
ingredient used 
a. Produced at home 
(kg) b. Total quantity (kg) c. Price paid 
(000VND/kg) 
I51. Broken rice    
I52. Rice bran    
I53. Maize    
I54. Wheat bran    
I55. Concentrate feed    
I56. Fish or fish meal    
I57. Soybean or 
soybean meal 
   
I58. Sweet potato    
I59. Cassava    
I510. Processing by-
products 
   
I511. Vegetables    
I512. Others (specify)    
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J.  OTHER NON-FEED EXPENDITURES 
J1.  Operating costs 
Expenditure items a. Own              
(000 VND) 
b. Provided by integrator 
/contractor (check) 
J11. Maintenance of buildings and equipment (per 
year) 
  
J12. Natural boar service (per cycle)   
J13. Artificial insemination service (per cycle)   
J14. Veterinary service (per cycle)   
J15. Private extension service (per month)   
J16. Medicines and drugs (per cycle)   
J17. Chemical disinfectants (per cycle)   
J18. Transportation (except for feeds purchases) (per 
month) 
  
J19. Electricity   
J110. Water   
J111. Others (specify)   
J112.   
J113.   
J114.  Total   
 
K.  HIRED LABOR COSTS 
Hired labor/wages/non-cash benefits a. Male b. Female 
K1. No. of full time employee (year-round)   
K2. Average wage rate (cash)   
K3. Value of other non-cash benefits   
K4. No. of part-time employee   
K5. % of time spent working per cycle   
K6. Average wage rate (cash)   
K7. Value of other non-cash benefits   
K8.  % Share in output, if any   
 
 
L.  ACCESS TO CREDIT AND ANIMAL HEALTH SERVICES 
L1.  Access to credit 
L11.  Have you applied for a loan from formal or informal institutions any time within this year? 
(2005)  [     ]   0 = No   1 = Yes 
L11a.  If No, why?_________________________________. 
This watermark does not appear in the registered version - http://www.clicktoconvert.com
 177 
L11b.  If Yes, were you granted the loan?  [     ]   0 = No   1 = Yes 
L11b1.  If No, why?________________________________. 
L11b2.  If Yes, what were the amount(s), interest rate(s), and purpose(s) and source (s) of the 
loan? 
 
 a. Amount  
(000 VND) 
b.Duration c.Interest rate (%) 
per month or 
year 
d.Purpose e.Source 
L11b21. Loan 1      
L11b22. Loan 2      
L11b23. Loan 3      
L11b24. Loan 4      
Purpose code:  1 = pig production; 2 = crop production; 3 = consumer loan; 4 = medical 
emergency;  5 = housing loan;  6 = others (specify)__________________________ 
Source code:  1 = VBARD; 2 = Bank for Social Policy; 3 = credit cooperative; 4 = NGO (micro-
credit); 5 = moneylender; 6= others (specify)________________________ 
 
L2.  Access to animal health services during the previous production cycle 
Sources of Veterinary Services a. No. of 
Visits 
b. Fees per visit, if any 
(000 VND) 
c. Drug cost, if 
any (000 VND) 
L21. Govt. veterinarian    
L22. Para-veterinarian    
L23. Breeding or pharmaceutical 
company 
   
L24. Integrator    
L25. Self-prescription    
 
TMENTS IN FACILITIES, STRUCTURES, AND EQUIPMENT 




c .  Y e a r  





e .  To ta l  
life 
(years) 
M11. Feeding set/troughs      
M12. Watering or drinking 
set/nozzles 
     
M13. Cleaning set, hose, 
buckets 
     
M14. Animal health care set      
M15.       
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M16.      
M17. Pens/housing      
M18. Elevated pens      
M19. Storeroom, warehouse      
M110.      
M111.      
M112. Lagoons      
M113. Biogas digester      
M114. Manure treatment or 
spreading equipment 
     
M115. Equipment for disposal 
of dead animals 
     
M116.      
M117.      
M118. Others (specify)      
M119.      
M120.      
 
 
N.  MANURE UTILIZATION 
 
Manner of utilization a. % share of each use b. Value (VND) 
N1. Use in crop field   
N2. Use in fish pond   
N3. Sold   
N4. Dumped somewhere   
N5. Others (specify)   
N6.   
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O.  OTHERS 









 O2. In what way (qualitative) do these constraints adversely (negatively) affect your livelihood 








 O3. How strongly (quantitative/estimate) do these constraints adversely affect your livelihood in 
this pig activity? (e.g., lesser income by half, or a quarter, or by 20%, or by 10%, etc., due to this 
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INPUT TRADERS/OUTPUT BUYERS 
 
Enterprise Type:   [      ] 
1 = Input trader 







Province  ____________________ 
District    ____________________ 
Sub-district                     ____________________ 
Enumerator                 ____________________ 
Date of survey             ____________________ 




   Reviewed by:   _____________  Date: __________ 
   
   If sent back for verification/correction: 
Date sent back to enumerator ______________ 
Date corrected and returned:  _______________ 
Reviewed again by: ______________________ 
 
This watermark does not appear in the registered version - http://www.clicktoconvert.com
 181 
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENT 
 
A1.  Name of Trader/Buyer  ___________________________________________________ 
A2.  Address where business is being operated____________________________________ 
A3.  Average distance to regular suppliers/customers____________________kms. 
    
4. Age 
(years) 
5. Years of 
schooling 
6. Sex  
(1=male,  
2=female) 







10. % total 
income from 
trading 
       
Occupation:  1 = Agriculture;  2 = Buying and selling piglet/slaughterhog;  3 = 
Agricultural labor;    4 = Government/Private employment;  5 = 
Buying and selling feed 
6 = Other Non-farm income (pls specify) __________________________ 
 
B. GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT BUSINESS 
 
B1. In what year did you first start your business?___________ 
B2. What is your main business activity?  [       ]   [       ] 
Code:  1 = buying and selling slaughterhogs;   2 = buying and selling piglets;   
3 = Buying and selling feed/other inputs;   4 = slaughterhouse;   5 = butcher;   
6 = others (specify)_____________ 
B3. What form of input/output arrangement do you have with a pig producer?  [     ] 
Code:  1 = formal, written contract;   2 = informal, unwritten contract 
B4.   With how many pig producers do you currently have arrangement?_________ 
 
B5.   What is the average number of heads raised by these farmers?   [      ] 
B9a. Fattening pig ______________ head/cycle 
B9b. Sow ________________ head 
 
B6. What is the average duration of the arrangement? _______years (or months) 
 
B7. What commodities are delivered under the arrangement? (Use table below) 
Commodity Delivered by respondent  
0 = No, 1 = Yes,  
99 = not applicable 
Delivered by farmers 
0 = No, 1 = Yes,  
99 = not applicable 
B71. Piglets   
B72. Commercial mix feed   
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B73. Concentrated feed   
B74. Rice bran   
B75. Maize   
B76. Wheat bran   
B77. Medicine   
B78. Growers/fatteners   
B79. Fattened pigs   
B710.  Others (specify)   
   
 
B8. Are there terms negotiated in the arrangement?  [      ]   0 = No;  1 = Yes 
 B6a. If no, are they drafted completely by you (respondent)?  [     ]   0 = No;  1 = Yes 
 B6b. If yes, what terms are negotiated?  Check items that are applicable. 
Terms 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
B8b1. Delivery price of piglets/feed and other inputs  
B8b11.  Price floor  
B8b12. Flexible price  
B8b13. Fixed delivery price  
B8b14. Others (specify)  
  
B8b2. Payment method  
B8b21. Cash payment  
B8b22. Pre-paid deposit  
B8b23. Credit  
B8b24. Others (specify)  
 
B9.  What are your conditions/requirements for establishing an arrangement with a farmer?   
Please check those that are applicable: 
Conditions 0 = No;  1 = Yes 
B91. Size of landholding    
B92. Size of animal inventory     
B93. Breed of stock      
B94. Volume of feeds used        
B95. Properties of the farmer  
B96. Experience of the farmer in pig raising   
B97. Good reputation    
B98. Other business activity related to pig production  
B99. Human labor availability          
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B910.  Education of the farmer    
B911. Others, pls specify  
 
B10.  What are the conditions under which the arrangement can be terminated?  Please check 
those that are applicable. 
Conditions 0 = No; 1 = Yes 
B101.Unable to meet the required quality of pigs/piglets to be delivered  
B102. Unable to meet the required volume of feed and other inputs to be 
purchased   
 
B103. Farmer buying inputs from other parties for a lower price    
B104. Delay in payment of feeds and/or inputs purchased    
B105.  Farmer selling products to other traders for other reasons  
B106. Others, pls specify  
  
 
B11. Which sizes of farmer more frequently violate contracts based on your experience? [    ] 
Code:  1 = small;  2 = medium;  3 = large 
 
 
B12.  How do you resolve disputes with the farmer with whom you have arrangement [      ] 
Code:  1 = Resolve mutually;  2 = Court of law;  3 = others (specify)________________ 
 
B13.  List the conditions under which the arrangement can be renewed  
Variable Rank Conditions 
B131 1  
B132 2  
B133 3  
B134 4  
B135 5  
 
B14. Do you share any of the following costs and risks?   
Type of cost Yes=1 
No=0 
a. Total cost 
(VND) 
b. Shared by the 
Trader/Buyer (%) 
c. Shared by the 
contractee (%) 
B141. Transport of piglets/feed up 
to pick up point 
    
B142. Animal loss     
B143. Dead animal disposal     
B144. Others, pls specify     
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B15. What is your closest approximation of the working capital you needed for your 
operations? 000 VND __________ per year 
Of the amount indicated above, what value was financed from: 
B151.   Own sources  000 VND_________ 
B152.   Loans  000 VND_________ ; 2a. annual interest rate ____% 
 
B16. Investment in facilities, structures and equipment 
Equipment/Facility a. No. b. Size/ 
Capacity 
c .  Y e a r  




e .  T o t a l  
life (years) 
B 1 6 1 .  S t o r a g e  
room/area  
     
B162. Pens/housing      
B163. Vehicle (large)      
B164. Motorbike      
B165.       
B166.       
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B17.  If you have both input and output trade, what is your main motivation for combining both 
activities in your business?  [     ] 
Code:  1 = to have stable customer base; 2 = reduced transaction costs for searching new 
customers and/or getting payment from farmer with whom there is input supply arrangement; 3 
= stabilize the delivery price;  4= expand customer base for products sold;  5 = increase profit 
margins;  6 = others (specify)____________________________ 
 
B18.  Do you monitor the production performance of the farmer with whom you have 
arrangements? [     ]  0 = No; 1 = Yes___ 
 B18a.  If yes, what is:  
B18a1. Frequency of visit:  [      ]   
 Code:  1 = Daily; 2 = alternate days; 3 = weekly 
B18a2. Travel cost in each visit: VND ________ 
B18a3. Parameters to be monitored:  Please check those that are applicable. 
B18a31. Animal health [     ]   0 = No;  1 = Yes 
B18a32. Feed and nutrition   [     ]  0 = No;  1 = Yes 
B18a33. Hygiene [     ]   0 = No; 1 = Yes 
B18a34. Others (specify)_________________ 
 
B19. Decision making process   
Nature of decision a. Decision-maker: 
code [     ] 
b. 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
 
a. Breed (If yes, breed preference): code [         ]   
b. Housing spacing   
c. Type of feed   
d. Type of pig pens   
e. Feeding schedule   
f. Amount of feed   
g. Vaccination schedule   
h. Drinking schedule   
i. Type of equipment   
j. Disinfecting shed   
k. Time of harvest   
 Breed code:  1=local; 2= exotic; 3= crossbreed 
 Decision-maker code:  1 = farmer; 2 = trader; 3 = both jointly. 
 
B20. Cost of negotiation to the respondents (from January to December 2005).   
Nature of cost  a. Unit b. Value        
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B20a. Information search cost   
B20a1. No. of visits undertaken   
B20a2. Travel cost for all visits   
B20a3. Time spent each visit   
B20a4. Communication cost (telephone calls, etc.)   
B20b. Contract negotiation cost     
B20b1. No. of visits undertaken   
B20b2. Travel cost for all visits   
B20b3. Time spent each visit   
B20b4. Communication cost (telephone calls, etc.)   
B21c. Notary charges (Stamp paper)   
B21d. Lawyer’ fees   
B21e. Other costs if any   
   
 
B21. Other cost (rental for building/vehicle, equipment, others…) for your operation in 2005: 
(000 VND) _____________ 
 
B22.  What benefits/incentives do you provide to farmers with whom you have a regular 
input/output supply arrangement? 
Benefits/incentives 0 = No  1 = Yes 
B221. Cash payment on purchases of their outputs  
B222. Credit on their input purchases  
B223. Advance payment on purchases of their outputs  
B224. Price premium on volume output sales  
B225. Price discount on volume input purchases  
B226. Timely pick up of output purchases  
B227. Technical advice when needed  
B228. Delivery of input purchases  
B229. Minimum quality requirements on output purchases  
B2210. Guaranteed quality assurance of inputs provided  
B2211. Information on market prices for their outputs  
B2212. Information on potential buyers of their output  
B2213. Assistance in output sales negotiation with other output buyers  
B2214. Assurance of quality of outputs to potential buyers (from use of 
feeds/inputs being supplied to the farmer) 
 
 
This watermark does not appear in the registered version - http://www.clicktoconvert.com
 187 
C. FOR INPUT TRADER (FEEDS, PIGS, OTHER INPUTS) 
 
C1.  Where do you frequently get your input supply? 
Commodity Source (outlet) Distance from respondent’s base (km) 
C11. Piglets   
C12. Growers   
C13. Commercial Feeds   
C14. Other inputs   
Outlet code: 1 = integrator; 2 = feedmiller; 3 = other traders; 4 = farmer customers; 5 = state 
farm/enterprise; 6 = others (specify)___________________________________ 
  
C2. Do you deliver feed/piglets to the farm?  [     ]  0 = No;   1 = Yes.  
C2a.       If yes, 
C2a1.  What is the total transport cost from the feed/piglet source to the farm?  
000VND/ton __________ 
 C2a2.  How far is the feed/piglet source to the farm? _____ kms 
C3. Do you provide input on credit to the farmer with whom you have arrangement? [     ]            
0 = No;  1 = Yes 
C3a.       If Yes,  
C3a1. number of farmers who were provided input on credit in 2005___________;  
C3a2.  interest rate (on average)____________;  
 
C4. Do you provide cash credit to the farmer with whom you have arrangement [        ]     
0 = No;  1 = Yes 
C4a.       If Yes,  
C4a1.  indicate number of farmer who were provided cash credit in 2005___________;  
C4a2.  interest rate (on average)____________;  
C4a3.  Main purpose for cash credit:  [      ]    
1 = purchase of animals;  2 = purchase of inputs;  
3 = meet household consumption requirements;  4 = education;  
5 =others (specify)_______________  
 
C5. Who are your main competitors?  [      ] 
Code:  1 = Integrator;   2 = Feedmillers;  3 = other traders 
4 = others (specify)_____________________________ 
C6. Do you decide the price of inputs? [    ]   0 = No; 1 = Yes 
C6a.     If yes, from where do you base your price? [     ] 
 Code:  1 = prevailing market price;  2 = other traders;   
3 = quality of input; 4 = others (specify)_____________ 
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C7. What is the average volume of feed/piglet/medicine that you sell per time? (Daily, 
weekly or monthly if applicable) 











e.    Price 
(VND) 
f. Total    Value   
(VND) 
C71. Mix Feed       
C72. Concentrated feed       
C73. Rice bran       
C74. Maize       
C75. Wheat bran       
C76. Piglet        
C77. Growers       
C78. Medicine       
C79. Other inputs (specify)       
       
 
C8.  Transaction costs in input sale 
Item a. Daily b. Weekly c. Monthly 
C81. Time spent to obtain information about market price    
C82. Travel cost incurred in (C71)    
C83. Communication costs (telephone etc.)    
 
Actual selling costs Unit Value 
C84. Transportation cost for delivery to clients   
C85. Loading charges    
C86.Unloading charges   
C87. Hired labor cost    
C88. Family labor (time spent)   
C89. Commission paid to agents   
C810. Sales tax, etc.   
C811. Income tax (VND)   
 
C9. Please map out the marketing channel in which the trader respondent currently 
participates. For example: Feedmills è Feed trader è farmer  
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D. FOR OUTPUT TRADER, SLAUGHTERHOUSE, BUTCHER, PROCESSOR 
 
D1. Indicate whether the respondent is [  ] 
Code: 1 = Output trader;  2 = Slaughterhouse;  3 = Butcher; 4 = Processor 
 
D2. Where do you frequently get your output supply? 
Commodity Source (outlet) Distance from respondent’s base 
(km) 
D21.  Piglets   
D22.  Growers/fatteners   
D23.  Slaughterhogs   
Outlet code:  1 = integrator; 2 = farmer customers; 3 = other traders; 4 = state farm; 5 = 
livestock market; 6 = others (specify)_________________________ 
 
D3. Do you pick-up the pigs from the farm?  [      ]  
0 = No;  1 = Yes  
D3a.  If yes, 
D3a1.  What is the total transport cost from the farm to place of delivery of pigs? 000VND/ton 
_____________ 
 C3a2.  How far is it from the farm to the place of delivery of pigs? _____ kms 
 
D4. Do you buy output on credit from the farmer-supplier?  [      ]    0 = No;  1 = Yes 
D4a. If Yes,  
D4a1.  number of farmers from whom output was bought on credit in 2005___________;  
D4a2.  interest rate (on average)____________;  
 
D5.  Do you provide cash in advance to your farmer-supplier [        ]    0 = No;  1 = Yes 
D5a.       If Yes,  
D5a1. number of farmers to whom you provided cash in advance in 2005_______;  
D5a2. interest rate (on average)____________;  
 
D6. Who are your main competitors in pig buying business? [      ] 
Code:  1 = Integrator;  2 = other trader;  3 = other meat Processors;  
4 = other slaughterhouse; 5 = other butcher;   
6 = others (specify)_______________ 
 
D7. Do you dictate the price of output? [    ]   0 = No; 1 = Yes 
D7a.     If Yes, where do you base your price from? [     ] 
 Code:  1 = prevailing market price; 2 = price offered by other traders;   
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3 = price offered by other slaughterhouse/butcher/processor 
4 = quality of output;  5 = others (specify)_____________ 
 
D8. What is the average number of pigs that you purchase and sell?  (Daily, weekly, monthly if 
applicable) 
Purchased Sold  












f. Total value 
(VND) 
D81. Fatteners       
D82.Growers       
D83. Piglets       
D84. Others        
 
Comment:  “Sold” columns not applicable to slaughterhouses/butchers/processors. 
 
D9.  What specific output attributes do you require from your output suppliers? 
Attributes 0 = No  1 = Yes 
D91. Breed  
D911.  Indicate preferred breed(1=exotic, 2=local, 3=crossbreed)  
D92. Age of animals  
D93. Weight of animals  
D94. Color of animals  
D95. Lean meat content  
D96. Visible signs of disease  
D97.  Indication of feeds used  
 
D10. Please map out the marketing channel in which the trader/buyer respondent currently 
participates. For example: farmer è trader è slaughterhouse (or butcher) è retail market 
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E.  OTHERS 









 E2. In what way (qualitative) do these constraints adversely (negatively) affect your livelihood 








 E3. How strongly (quantitative/estimate) do these constraints adversely affect your livelihood in 
this pig business? (e.g., lesser income by half, or a quarter, or by 20%, or by 10%, etc., due to 
these constraints;  alternatively, if the constraints are removed, income will be higher by some 




























Province …………….. ____________________ 
District    _________________ 
Sub-district                     ____________________ 
Enumerator                 ____________________ 
Date of survey             ____________________ 




   Reviewed by:   _____________  Date: __________ 
   
   If sent back for verification/correction: 
Date sent back to enumerator ______________ 
Date corrected and returned:  _______________ 
Reviewed again by: ______________________ 
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A.  HOG CONTRACT GROWING 
 
A1.  Name of Contractor/Integrator:__________________________________________ 
 
A2.  Main location of operations:____________________________________________ 
 
A3.  How long have you been engaged in contract farming?_________years. 
 
A4.  What type of contract do you offer to your contractees?  [      ] 
Code:  1 = marketing contract;  2 = production contract;  3 = both 
 
A5.  What form of contract do you offer to your contractees?  [      ] 
Code:  1 = written contract;   2 = non-written (oral) contract 
 
A6.  What commodities are covered by your contract agreement with your contractees?  [     ] 
Code: 1 = piglets;  2 = growers/fatteners;  3 = slaughter pigs;  4 = sows 
 
A7.  Are contract terms negotiated?  [    ]  0 = No;  1 = Yes 
A7a.  If no, are they drafted completely by the integrator?  [    ]   0 = No;  1 =Yes 
A7b.  If yes, what contract terms are negotiated? Use table below 
 
Contract terms 0 = No  1 = Yes 
Delivery price:  
A7b1. price floor?  
A7b2. flexible price?  
A7b3. fixed delivery price?  
A7b4. Others (specify)?  
A7b5.  
Payment method:  
A7b6. cash payment?  
A7b7. pre-paid deposit (advance)?  
A7b8. fixed delivery price?  
A7b9. others (specify)  
A7b10.  
A7b11. Duration of contract?  
A7b12. Other terms (specify)?  
 
A8.  How many contract growers do you currently have?   ____________________ 
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A9.  In which commune/district are they mostly located?______________________ 
 
A10.  What is your main reason for choosing contract growers in those locations? [     ] 
Code:   
 
A11.  What is the relative size of your contractees?  
A11a.  Ave. no. of heads per cycle:________________________ 
A11b.  Ave. no. of sows_________________________________ 
A11c.  Ave. area of land for pig production__________________ 
 
A12.  What percent of your contract growers have violated the contract agreement?  [    ] 
 
A13.  What is the main reason for contract violation?  [     ] 
Code:  1 = unacceptable quality of pigs/piglets delivered;  2 = contractee selling outputs to other 
parties for a higher bid price;  3 = failure to deliver agreed quantity of pigs/piglets;   
4 = others (specify) 
 
A14.  How are contract disputes resolved:  [      ] 
Code:  1 = none;  2 = legal action;  3 = local government intervention;   
4 = others (specify)_____________ 
 
A15.  What type of organizational chain is connecting you as integrator with your contract 
farmers?  [      ] 
Code:  1 = integrator + farmer;  2 = integrator + village government + farmer;   
3 = integrator + cooperative + farmer;  4 = integrator + middlemen + farmer;   
5 = integrator + local authority + farmer;  6 = others (specify) 
 
 
A16.  What is your main motivation for utilizing contracts in your operations?  [     ] 
Code:  1 = stable supply of raw materials (piglets, growers/fatteners, slaughter pigs);   
2 = high quality of pigs/piglets delivered;  3 = reduced transaction costs;  4 = stabilizing the 
delivery price;  5 = obtain government support for operations;   
6 = others (specify)_________ 
 
 
A17.  Who provides and takes charge of expenses for the following facilities, equipment, and 
inputs?  (% by : Contract Grower or Integrator) 
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FACILITY/EQUIPMENT/INPUT CONTRACT GROWER % INTEGRATOR % 
A.  Equipment      
      Feeding Set     
      Watering/Drinking Set     
      Cleaning Set/Sanitation Facilities     
      Animal Health Care Set     
      Weighing Scale    
      Other Equipment (specify)     
     
B.  Building/Facility     
      Pens/housing     
      Elevated Pens     
      Storeroom/warehouse     
      Worker’s Quarters     
     
 C.  Inputs     
      Feeds   
      Growing Stocks   
      Vaccines   
      Antibiotics   
      Disinfectants   
      Water   
      Power/electricity   
      Animal health/veterinary services   
      Security   
      Breeding services (e.g., AI)   





For the last loading and harvest (i.e., last cycle), what were the volumes of the following? 
ITEM Quantity (Kg, Bag, or Ton) 
Total feeds delivered  
Total feeds consumed  
Total feeds transferred   
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Total excess feeds  
 
Loading and Harvest Recovery  
For the last loading and harvest, what was the number of heads (or total liveweight) for the 
following? 
ITEM NO. OF HEADS or Total Liveweight (kg) 
Total loadings and allowance  
Total mortalities  
Farm rejects  
Total accepted for hauling  
 
Number of Days of Raising  
3.1 Date of Loading:  _______________________, 2005 
3.2 Date of Harvest:  _______________________, 2005 




What was the weight range, average weight, and total weight (tonnage) of the piglets/weanlings 
when loaded? 






Total Tonnage (kgs) 
Loading 
   (Piglets/Weanlings) 
   
Harvest 
   (Finished Pigs) 
   
 
Relative Performance Measures 
For the last loading and harvest, what was the average farm performance relative to the 





Actual Farm Performance 
(Ave.) 
Harvest recovery (HR) [%]   
Feed conversion ratio (FCR)   
Average live weight (ALW) [kg]   
Average daily gain (ADG) [kg]   




GROWING FEES, INCENTIVES AND BONUSES, PENALTIES AND CHARGES 
 For which unit or number of contract growers?  
Base Fee 
What was the base fee for the contract? 
How are these apportioned to FCR and HR? 
 
ITEM VND/Head (or 000 VND/kg) 
Total base fee  
FCR portion  
HR Portion  
 
Actual Fees Received 
Considering all incentive bonuses and underperformance penalties and charges, what were your 
net fees? 
 
ITEM VND/Head (or 000 VND/kg) 
Total net fee  
Net FCR fee  




What bonuses did you give? 





(or 000 VND/kg) 
Total Farm Bonuses  
(000 VND) 
Better FCR   
Higher HR   
Correct-size ALW   
 
Penalties and Charges for Underperformance 
For the last harvest: 
What sorts of penalties due to underperformance did you charge? 
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(% of total) 
Poorer FCR than base    
Lower HR than base    
Poorer than critical FCR    
Poorer than critical HR    
Poorer than critical ALW    
 
Other Penalties: 
   
  Unaccounted-for mortalities    
  Rejected hogs    
  Downgraded hogs (Class B) in 
excess of standard allowance 
   
  Excess crop weight     
  Delayed loading of hogs to 
truck 
   
  Other (specify)    
    
    
    
 
5.  Contract performance ratio:  Based on your experience, what is the ratio of well-exercised 
contracts to the total number of contracts?____________% 
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IV. TRANSACTION COSTS ON INPUT AND OUTPUT MARKETS   
 
1.  Transaction costs in input market: Information search and acquisition costs for the period 
from January to November 2005. 
 
Item First Batch Last batch 
Weanlings   
  Source of procurement     
  Distance from village (km)   
  Communication costs (telephone etc.)   
  No. of visits to get information on weanlings   
  Time in each visit (Hrs)   
  Travel cost each visit   
  Transportation cost of weanlings(VND):   
         Loading charges (VND)   
         Unloading charges (VND)   
         Weanlings died during transportation (no. of head)   
Feed   
  Source of procurement     
  Distance from village (km)   
  Communication cost   
  No. of visits to get information on feed   
  Time in each visit (Hrs)   
  Travel cost each visit (round trip)   
  Transportation cost of feed (VND):   
        Loading charges (VND)   
        Unloading charges (VND)   
Medicines, etc.   
  Source of procurement     
  Distance from village (km)   
  Communication cost   
  No. of visits to get medicines   
  Time in each visit (Hrs)   
  Travel cost each visit   
  Transportation cost     
 
2.  Transaction costs in output disposal for the period from January to November 2005. 
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Item First Batch Last Batch 
Information on prices   
  Visits undertaken to know market prices (number of visits)   
  Time spent in each visit   
  Travel cost in each visit   
  Communication costs (telephone etc.)   
Where sold (market outlet) (code)   
   Distance from farm (km)   
   Transportation cost (VND):   
          Loading charges (VND)    
          Unloading charges (VND)    
    Travel cost (VND)    
    Waiting time (Hrs)    
    Commission (VND)   
    Sales tax, etc.   
    Income tax (VND)   
    Price realised (VND/kg)   
    Market price (VND/kg)   
Outlet Code:  1 = own shop;  2 = farm gate;  3 = retail market (fresh meat);  4 = slaughterhouse;  
5 = export processing plant; 6 = collectors;  7 = cooperative;  8 = others 
(specify)___________________________ 
 
3.  Cost of Working Capital 
 
For the last batch, what is your closest approximation of the working capital you needed for 
operations? VND ____________ 
Of this total, what value was financed from: 
Own sources  VND____________ 
Supplier Credits VND____________ (in kind/not cash) 
Loans  VND____________ (money) 
 
V: GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE CONTRACT   
 
What are the conditions/requirements to become a contract grower in your firm? 
Able to meet facilities required by the firm 
Post a bond  
If the answer is b), in what form was this? 
[  ] cash bond  [  ] bank guarantee [  ] time deposit  
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[  ] real estate mortgage   [  ] other (specify) __________________ 
How much is this bond? 
b.1 VND ______________ per head; or  
b.2 A total of VND ______________ for entire stock 
Others, pls specify 
 
2.  Monitoring of the contract by the integrator/firm’s staff: 
 
a.   Frequency of the visit by firm staff (a) Daily (b) alternate days (c) weekly 
b.   Travel cost in each visit: VND ________ 
Honorarium/service fee per visit:  VND_________ 
Parameters to be monitored (a) animal health (b) feed and nutrition (c) hygiene (d) _____ 
Do you report to the firm in case of any problem?  Yes/No.  
How do you report? (a) To the supervising firm staff when he visits to the farm (b) Telephone call 
(c) visit to the supervising field staff (iv) in writing  
3. What is the frequency of payment ? [     ] 
Code:  1 = Weekly;  2 = Fortnightly;  3 = Monthly 
 
4.  Do you give payments on time? [       ]   0 = No;  1 = Yes;. 
8a. If No, how many days it is delayed? Days____________ 
5.   Do you provide credit to the producers? [      ]   0 = No;  1 = Yes 
9a. If Yes, indicate number of producers provided in 2005___________;  
9b. average loan size___________. 
9c. interest rate____________;  
9d. type of credit: [        ] 
Code:  1 = in kind;  2 = in cash 
9e. main purpose: [       ] 
Code:  1 = purchase of animals; 2 = purchase of inputs; 3 = meet household consumption 
requirements; 4 = education; 5 = others (specify)_______________ 
   
6. Who are your main competitors in the hog market? (this refers to competitors who sell 
to the same market that the integrator/contractor is selling, hence this is not bound by 
geographical location)  [        ] 
Code:  1 = Cooperative;  2 = Other integrators/contractors;  3 = Independent large scale 
producers;  4 = others (specify)___________________________ 
 
7.  Does the firm share any of the following costs and risks ?    
Type of cost 0=No  





Shared by the 
contact grower 





Building rent     
Electricity charges     
Slaughter hog transport up to pick point     
Water charges     
Wages of hired labor     
Cost of equipment      
   (Pls specify equipment)     
     
Feed cost      
Capital credit     
Land rent     
Labor supervision     
Cost of pig pens      
Cost of growing stocks     
Cost of other inputs     
Animal health control     
Quality of growing stock (breed)     
Feed quality     
Timing of output sales      
Animal loss     
Loss of capital     
Failure of equipment     
Fire/other calamities     
Manure disposal     
Animal disposal     
Environmental regulation     
Others, pls specify     
     
     
 
VI.  SELECTION CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING CONTRACTEES 
 
1. What are your criteria for choosing your contractees? List 3 main criteria [     ]   [     ]   [     ] 
Code: 
 
2. From among the list, what is the most important criterion? [      ] 
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Code:   
 
3. From among the list, what is the least important criterion?  [     ] 
Code: 
 
4.  What is your rate of rejection from those who apply to be contractees?  [     ] 
Code: 
 
5.  How does this compare with the rate of rejection of others in your business?  
 a)  Higher by:__________________ 
 b)  Lower by:__________________ 
 c)  The same 
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VII.  CONSTRAINTS  









 2. In what way (qualitative) do these constraints adversely (negatively) affect your firm’s profit 








 3. How strongly (quantitative/estimate) do these constraints adversely affect your firm’s profit in 
this pig business? (e.g., lesser profit by half, or a quarter, or by 20%, or by 10%, etc., due to 
these constraints;  alternatively, if the constraints are removed, your firm’s profit will be higher 
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Annex 2: Typology of contractual arrangements in pig 
production in northern Vietnam 
Inputs side    Outputs side 
Case 1: closed loop 
Feeds/stocks   Piglets/fattened pigs 
Integrator    Contract grower    Integrator 
(Ha Tay, Bac Giang) 
 
Case 2: closed loop 
Feeds/stocks   Piglets/fattened pigs 
Integrator    Contract grower    Integrator 
(Thai Binh, Ha Tay) 
 
Smallholder farmers    Contract grower 
 
Case 3: open loop 
Feeds 
Integrator    Feed distributor (with pigs) 
(Ha Tay) 
      Piglets/fattened pigs 
Smallholder farmers    Product outlets 
 
Case 4: open loop 
Feeds/stock 
Integrator    Cooperative 
(Thai Binh, Bac Giang) 
      Piglets/fattened pigs 
Smallholder farmers    Cooperatives 
 
 
         Product outlets 
 
Case 5: open loop 
Various feed/stock suppliers  Cooperative 
(Ha Tay) 
      Piglets/fattened pigs 
Smallholder farmers    Cooperatives 
 
 
         Product outlets 
Case 6: open loop 
Various feed/stock suppliers  Cooperative 
(All sites) 
      Piglets/fattened pigs 
Smallholder farmers    Product outlets 
 
Case 7: input supply only 
Feeds     
Input traders   Smallholder farmer 
 
Case 8: output supply only 
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Annex 3: Procedure for sample selection 
 
Selection of respondents for household survey (participants and non-participants) 
1. Validate the types of contract arrangements in each province (from the provincial 
reports presented during the inception workshop) chosen as the survey site with key 
informants in each province. 
2. Identify the areas (districts, communes) where these contract arrangements are 
predominant with key informants. 
3. Once the areas with contracts have been narrowed down (based on some criteria, e.g. 
more variations in types of contract arrangements, high to medium pig density, high to 
medium poverty incidence, and high to medium market access), get available 
information to draw up a list of households in each commune that are identified as 
those with contract agreements (formal and informal). 
4. Once the list is developed, use this as a basis for random sampling of households with 
contracts (number of sample respondents as agreed during the inception workshop). 
5. Households without contracts (i.e. independent producers) should be selected in the 
same areas where participant households are selected. The following sampling 
procedure is proposed: 
a. Select household through systematic random sampling, e.g. every 10 
households, for example, depending on total number of households in the 
commune.  
b. If the household is not engaged in any contract arrangement, ask the farmers 
why they not engaged in any contract arrangement. If they respond,  “ not 
interested” or “do not want to participate” do not choose that household as a 
non-participant sample but find another household instead. 
c. I f  the next household is not engaged in a contract arrangement, indicated 
interest in participation but could not due to some constraint, then choose that 
household as a non-participant sample. 
d. Repeat this process until the required number of sample respondents for non-
participants are obtained. 
 
Selection of respondents for integrators, traders and other market mediating actors (farmer 
cooperatives, meat processors, butchers or slaughterhouses) 
These sample respondents will be selected in the same areas where the household sample 
respondents will be chosen. A total of 50 respondents will be selected. The distribution of each 
type (as indicated above and identified from the mapping of the market chain) will be based on 
their overall distribution across the four provinces. 
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